Archive | January 25th, 2011

Zio-Nazi: Security Precondition (20)

Meeting Minutes: Saeb Erekat, Amos Gilad and Tzipi Livni

Summary

 

Minutes of meeting on February 11, 2008. The meeting kicked off with a discussion on security with Israeli official Amos Gilad saying “We believe in the two-state solution but security is a precondition to that.” There was also discussion on the general regional security istuation, with mention of Gaza, Jordan, Iran and Iraq. Later, a discussion ensued about whether a future Palestinian state would be “demilitarized” or have “limited militarization.”

Full text

Meeting Minutes

 

Jerusalem

Inpal/Larome Hotel

11 February 2008

19:30 – 21:30

 

 

Attendants:

 

Palestinian side:

  •  Dr. Saeb Erekat
  •  Colonel Hazem Atallah
  •  Salah Ilayan

 

Israeli side:

  •  Tzepi Livni
  •  Amos Gilead
  •  Tal Beker

 

 

Livni: After I’ve read in Israeli papers that you’re tired of my talk, I brought Amos Gilead to talk. Let’s be flexible regarding borders, and it depends on what borders we’ve on the other side. We don’t wish to put obstacles before the negotiations, but let’s see what we’ve in common in your and our vision.

 

Abu Ala’: When we talk about security we talk about our and your security needs and not at the expense of borders or Jerusalem or other. We refuse to bargain on issues. What’s necessary for security has to be dealt with in the sphere of security until we reach an agreement, and the same goes for borders and Jerusalem and other issues. In the end we want to reach an agreement regarding all issues; we don’t want simply to bargain.

 

Livni: Thus I see that talk about security needs depends on what happens on the other side of the borders. If there’s a response regarding our security needs then I can be flexible regarding borders.

 

Abu Ala’: Every nation in the world wants to live in security and peace and cooperate with other nations. We’ll discuss the need for security and stability.

 

Livni: We’re in the hands of generals so let’s listen to them (in reference to General Gilead as well as US Generals Dayton-Frazier and Jones).

 

Gilead: I want to refer to our fears in a clear and plain manner.  We haven’t discussed this matter since 2000. We’re now discussing the borders with Salam Fayyad and we don’t talk about it as a strategic matter.

 

Livni: We want to talk about the future and not the current situation on the ground.

 

Gilead: We believe in the two-state solution but security is a precondition to that. I want to learn from the lessons of the past. If we look at Jordan we see that it’s one united solid kingdom with one police and one army. When we go into Jordan we find that everything is stable and quiet. I mention Jordan because it’s the best model and is better than any other place in the Middle East. What we want is reliable armed forces that keep security and impose law and order. We can’t accept a compromise solution due to the proximity of the distance.

 

What happened in Gaza is a strategic case, since a force that is against peace has defied the security apparatuses, which weren’t organized and which we’ve warned against. In a couple of hours that force managed to have full control over the whole area.

 

You must have the capacity to prove your competence in organizing the security and intelligence apparatuses in order to be able to impose security and law, and fight against terrorism because anarchy leads to terrorism.

 

If we analyze what had taken place in Gaza we can easily say that there were no responsible security apparatuses. There should be no more than one or two security apparatuses. The infrastructure is the medicine that feeds terrorism and fighting terrorism doesn’t take place by merely fighting against terrorist groups but by putting an end to the manufacturing of explosives and incitement which is like fuel to terrorism.

 

We want to have close cooperation with a responsible security apparatus; either you put an end to terrorism or we’ve to do it ourselves. (This was Sharon’s position).

 

There’s another dimension with regard to the West Bank. When the West Bank is weak, Iran will make efforts to weaken Jordan. The West Bank is important and can cause more danger because it’s closer to Israel.

 

There’s stability on the borders because of Jordanian security efforts. Jordan has reliable security apparatuses, but in the west Bank we’re very far from being like Jordan. If in two weeks we let the West Bank become Hamastan or Anarchistan this will affect Jordan and will open the doors for Iran.

 

Jordan has good capacities and therefore it’s the strategic depth between Jordan and Iraq. Iraq will be divided into two regions, one for the Kurds in the north and which will have more stability than other regions, and another for the Sunnis which will be a base for al-Qaeda Organization.

 

We’re talking about a state and the Gaza Strip is part of it. There’s not doubt about this. Besides, you’ll not agree to any apolitical solution without the Strip. But there’s an entity called Hamstan and it’s strong and organized and controls the region. It is an extremist entity that doesn’t look for peace, but it’s goal is to control the West Bank and destroy Israel. This is the declared goal of Hamas and they make no secret of it. It’s a strategic goal which they hope to achieve by joining a united national government and have full control over the West Bank.

 

What happened in Gaza shouldn’t happen in the West Bank. You had money, arms, and police officers, and there was a group that was getting support from Iran and in 5 hours you lost all of the Gaza Strip. They were corrupt officers most of whom were residing in Cairo, and I warned them that this might happen.

 

Abu Ala’: Was this your analysis or did you have information or perhaps indirect coordination with what they were planning to do?

 

Gilead: This was our analysis, and I was in a security meeting with Egyptian security officers in Cairo and I told them that. I told them that Hamas was building the executive force as a military force against the Authority. Hamas managed to defeat thousands of the security authority individuals.

 

Hazem: These thousands weren’t paid for 15 months.

 

Gilead: I’m speaking frankly because peace is the only strategic option but without security we’ll have nothing.

 

I talked with President Abu Mazen in 2000, and I told him that he’d be the president after Arafat and that he must act against Hamas.

 

They built the executive force and terrorist capacities but they failed to translate them against us because of the barrier around the Gaza Strip. So they manufactured rockets that have become now the biggest problem for us because we haven’t yet found the means to stop them.

 

In brief, as a result of the infrastructure that Hamas set up in the Gaza Strip you’ll not be able to regain control ove the strip again. I don’t think you prefer us to do that and then you follow us to hand it over to you.

 

Livni: Can I put this as a question?

 

Gilead: Everything is a question.

 

Livni: We want to reinforce the state but we can’t accept a terrorist, extremist and incapacitated state. In order to have a powerful state there are prerequisites that Gilead referred to. He referred to capacity and I can’t accept to have this capacity targeted against Israel. As long as you won’t threaten Israel, we don’t mind you having capacities.

 

Abu Ala’: We’re looking forward to having strategic security for peace and not to having dictates in the name of security. I don’t want to avoid talking about the situation today, and there’s a follow-up committee headed by the Americans to implement the first article in the Road Map. Thus our task is here and what I want is an agreement on the nature of the state so that we can have peace of mind. We want a state that’s able to protect its land, civilians and neighbors. How do you want the state to fight against terrorism and cooperate together so that we both have security?

 

If you ask me about my priorities today I say they’re ending the occupation. My future priorities are to achieve security, stability and growth. The priority now isn’t the same as the priority in the future.

 

Livni: There are elements that must be put down to the table in order for the state to be established. These elements must also be discussed for the post-state stage.

 

Saeb: Amos and I’ve been together for several years. We used to sit together with other Israeli security officials. I insisted that they shouldn’t invest in creating strong men and then corrupt them and turn them into merchants working at the crossings. I’ve documents that indict many of your generals who participated in this. And if you look into Hamas’ behavior, you’ll find out that Hamas used to send a suicide bomber and that you responded by destroying our security capacities.

 

I won’t allow you to dictate to me what I’ve to do because one of our officials wants to get corrupt, and I won’t declare who has corrupted our officials.

 

We’ve a new generation of security individuals who are ready for work.

 

Hazem: We want to learn lessons from what had happened in Gaza and we’ve formed a committee for this purpose. The committee put its recommendations and about 57% of the recommendations were implemented.

 

The situation on the ground in the West Bank is much better that it was before. I mentioned that our security individuals haven’t received salaries for 25 months and I asked General Dayton what he expected them to do. I asked him what would happen if his men didn’t receive salaries for 15 months and he answered that he’d lose his army.

 

You can’t compare the quantity and quality of the arms that Hamas has in the Gaza Strip with those of the Aurhority.

 

We’ve to learn from the experiences of the years 1996 – 2000 that were great years in order to be able to talk about the future. We’re doing well in the West Bank today but you don’t appreciate what we’re doing. We made arrests, confiscated arms, and sacked security individuals affiliated with Hamas, but you keep on deterring our efforts, and this is what’s happening in Nablus.

 

Livni: D’you see any possibility of changing the situation in Gaza without the interference of Israel?

 

Hazem: With military power you can achieve nothing.

 

Abu Ala’: If you give us a safe passage we can.

 

Livni: You’re a good negotiator.

 

Gilead: The years that you’re talking about 1996 – 2000 weren’t like what you’ve said. In 1998 we caught a terrorist cell and its archive. In addition, a number of suicide attacks took place. Therefore, every lesson we learn is related to the future.

 

Saeb: D’you deny the training and rehabilitation that we conduct for our security individuals?

 

Gilead: What training are you talking about? You trained 300 instead of 500 individuals as it had been decided in Jordan. In Egypt you trained 500 individuals.

 

Saeb: 404.

 

Gilead: Then you told them to sit at home.

 

You’re not fighting against terrorism in the West Bank I’m talking about facts. You were angry when we went into Nablus. You complained to Rice, Livni and Barak, and I appreciate you ability to protest and shout, but we’ve found a number of laboratories for manufacturing weapons.

 

Abu Ala’: What laboratories are you talking about? You always exaggerate. You spoke about catching a truck loaded with arms at Huwara, and it was found that everything wasn’t true.

 

Gilead: I’ve reports that prove this, and you’ve to admit some facts. You’re also following the turnstile policy in your arrests. We must show our protest against everything.

 

Hazem: Why don’t you give us advice?

 

Gilead: I’m not here to make you angry. We want to speak frankly.

 

Abu Ala’: I believe that the precondition to security is peace and not vice versa. Reaching an agreement will be the most important element and weapon in our hands to impose security. Thus I want to know what the prerequisites will be when we’ve a state. What d’you want from the state? This is what we want to discuss. At any rate, Livni insisted during preparations for Annapolis Conference on adding the statement ‘the implementation of any future agreement is preconditioned by the implementation of our obligations stated in the first phase of Road Map’. I opposed this strongly.

 

I know that Israel wants security and it’s a major concern for her. But sometimes I feel that you exaggerate the whole matter and at other times that it’s part of a policy of conspiracy and the imposition of new realities on the ground or for the purpose of confiscating more land or dictating new conditions. Recently, Dimonah operation took place and you knew who carried it out and those who were responsible for it, and you did nothing except assassinating one of the most important Fateh Khalil al-Wazeer (Abu Jihad) leaders because one of his followers crossed the main road in front of Dimonah nuclear plant and you considered that such an act t a threat to the plant. Perhaps you feel now incompetent as a result of your practices and due to the occupation and its policies. Let’s talk about security in light of a Palestinian independent state that has full sovereignty side by side with Israel and leave the problems of today to Salam Fayyad and Barak.

 

We want to talk about the future; what should we do?

 

Gilead: There are 3 US generals working on the issue of security. If you ask Rice, she’ll be ready to send more. But this isn’t what we want. What we want is only general broad ideas: reliable intelligence and security apparatuses–their number is not what matters but their efficiency, and an efficient police force not only for the imposition of security and law.

 

Livni: I won’t propose the list of demands now, but what I’m saying is that there are demands that must be fulfilled before the establishment of the state. I don’t want to put obstacles before the negotiations but the demands serve a common interest for the imposition of security and law.

 

We need to have a demilitarized state, and I won’t talk in more detail about this.

 

Gilead: Building 2 or 3 security institutions. Performance is what matter not number.

A demilitarized or not demilitarized state.

 

Saeb: We can say proper armed security that has the capacity to perform duties.

 

Livni: Is there a difference?

 

Abu Ala’: Let’s say with limited militarization and not demilitarized.

 

Saeb: What’s been agreed upon is to have a properly militarized state with common agreement.

 

Abu Ala’: This won’t be a problem in our negotiations. We’ll see what fits you and us.

 

Gilead: The IDF is the only army.

 

Livni: Inside the state of Israel. What’s the idea of international forces?

 

Abu Ala’: In order to give you peace of mind until we build our own security capacities.

 

Saeb: So that we won’t be under your mercy and in order to guarantee that no one will mess up our own security. The international forces will also monitor the implementation of our obligations.

 

Livni: We’ve no position yet regarding the international forces because we haven’t discussed the matter over.

 

Saeb: President Abu Mazen and Prime Minister Olmert have discussed the matter and we’ve put 3 elements for security. We want international forces because we don’t want to see Israel reoccupy us. We want to guarantee that our apparatuses will be able to receive proper arms to be able to perform their tasks. The UN will authorize the international forces whose tasks will be to prevent Israeli from messing up our territories, to defend us against any attack or threat, and to monitor the implementation of our obligations.

 

Abu Ala’: We’re talking about having international forces when we’ve peace so that they’ll monitor the borders and defend them and help us build our security capabilities. The tasks of the forces will be determined by you, us and them as well.

 

Livni: You’re talking about defending Palestine against any threat from the east. Are we a threat to you from the west? We don’t want the state of Palestine to threaten the state of Israel. I pushed towards the deployment of international forces in southern Lebanon and you know our problems with these forces.

 

Abu Ala’: I’m talking about international forces such as the ones that exist on the Golan Heights. The international forces will give you peace of mind that there’s security in our territories. The tasks of the international forces are an issue that we’ve to discuss and agree on. We need to discuss the tasks as well with the international party that will be in charge of the international forces.

 

Saeb: We don’t want to lose the West Bank and we want you to help us build our security capacities without corruption.

 

Livni: When I meet with international delegations, they ask me about my position regarding the presence of international forces in the Palestinian territories. My answer to them is that our position with regard to international forces depends on the role these forces are going to have and whether they’ll put an end to terrorism otherwise they’ll just be like the UNIFIL forces in southern Lebanon.

 

Abu Ala’: And it’ll put an end to settlement activities as well.

 

Livni: I’ve no guarantees that after signing an agreement and celebrating it the White House and returning home that we’ll see the desired peace. If the international forces reduce our capacity to respond then we’ll have a problem. We’ll authorize no party to defend us.

 

Abu Ala’: We’re in a stage of discovery of all issues. D’you accept the principle?

 

Livni: I don’t know. I want to know more about this subject.

 

Abu Ala’: The purpose of the forces is to give you more satisfaction from a third party that we agree on and whom you trust. The international forces will remain for a certain period of time until we build our own capacities and enhance trust between us.

 

Livni: The details affect the position.

 

Abu Ala’: If you refuse state-to-state dealing on equal terms, then we can either have an independent state with full sovereignty whose borders, security and crossings we manage, or a third party we agree on can do that.

 

Gilead: All international forces have failed except in the Golan Heights because we’ve a common interest.

 

Livni: Why d’you want international forces?

 

Saeb: Because I don’t want Israel to send its forces into our territories. You don’t send your forces to Jordan or Egypt and you don’s ask for that, and thus what must I do to stop you from sending your military forces into our territories?

 

I want international forces so that you won’t ask to set up early alert stations and emergency deployment locations, unlike what’s happening now when you go into Palestinian cities any time you want.

 

All the arms available in the West Bank come from Israel.

 

Abu Ala’: What we want after the establishment of a Palestinian state is to coordinate with you in the security sphere. We want police and security forces that can impose law and order and fight against terrorism; forces that can defend our independence and protect us and our borders from extremists. Otherwise we accept to have a third party we agree upon so that we can guarantee security. We’ve no conditions about the number of the forces or its goals. We sit together and discus the matter.

 

Livni: Early alert stations won’t affect your sovereignty.

 

Abu Ala’: They can’t be an alternative to international forces especially after war strategies have changed and Iran started to threaten you with rockets.

 

Saeb: What d’you think about the role of Jordan?

 

Gilead: We trust them without borders.

 

Abu Ala’: What d’you want from Jordan?

 

Livni: A Palestinian state. This is a joke. I didn’t mean that.

 

Gilead: Jordan’s the strategic place that’s most stable.

 

Abu Ala’: Without our stability your stability is threatened. We’re proud of our relations with Jordan; it’s a relation based on trust and full coordination, and we respect their organization and capacity. We’re happy that you also appreciate their capacities and consider it the most stable place.

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PA and Russian Diplomat (20)

NSU Email Re: “Off the Record” Details from Blair Meeting

Summary

 

An e-mail from Rami Dajani with details from a meeting between a Russian diplomat and Tony Blair. Blair says it will take two to three years to “get anything major accomplished on the economic front,” and says the lack of any political progress since Annapolis is “discouraging and will have bad consequences.” The email also includes information on Russian views and chances for a Moscow conference.

Full text

 

From: Rami Dajani
Sent: Sunday, February 10, 2008 3:32 AM
To: LPU; Andrew Kuhn (Compuserve)
Subject: some “off the record” information (this is hearsay so is not confirmed and not for sharing etc)

 

According to a Russian diplomat who attended the Blair meeting with the Quartet on Friday:

 

Ultimately, the main focus is not on the economic front, as Blair thinks it would take 2 to 3 years to get anything major accomplished. Nevertheless, he told the Quartet he has a good relationship with Barak, and is continuing efforts at the trilateral level. In particular he has been telling Barak that the present approach to Gaza is wrong and needs to change immediately.

Blair is mainly focusing on the political front. The lack of any progress since Annapolis is discouraging and will have bad consequences. [The diplomat said he got the impression that Blair was talking like Bush’s representative on the ground, trying to set something up for Bush’s follow up visit].

 

As to the Russian view and the chances of a Moscow conference:

 

The US has effectively succeeded in “marginalising the Quartet”

Russia is seriously considering withdrawing from the Quartet, as it is now increasingly a cover for US policy (citing the de Soto report)

The US has rejected any Russian role in the Road Map mechanism, saying the Palestinians have demanded an exclusive US role. Essentially, the US does not envisage any Quartet role at all.

Russia places responsibility (at least in part) on the PA for excluding it from the process. He criticised the PA approach of only working with the strongest power. He said it was illogical given overwhelmingly pro-Israel positions taken by US over decades (citing record 32 vetoes in the UNSC).

Moscow conference will only take place if it is “comprehensive”.

US saying there will be no meaningful Syrian role as long as Syria supports Hizbollah and Mishaal sits in Damascus.

Russia considering lowering its participation (ie no conference) as it has many other foreign policy priorities (Kosovo to name one)

Leading up to the Quartet meeting in Berlin, only communication US State Dept has been making is asking to confirm Russian attendance. “A pure formality”.

Posted in Palestine AffairsComments Off on PA and Russian Diplomat (20)

Zio-Nazi Bargaining Chips (19)

NSU Email Re: Refugees and Jerusalem Issues – Bargaining Chips

Summary

 

Email from Ziyad Clot to NSU staff regarding strategies on refugee and Jerusalem negotiations.  Clot says that potentially damaging negotiations from Palestinians on the refugee issue (e.g. Abbas offering an extremely low proposal for the number of returnees to Israel; dangerous exchange of papers between Erekat and Becker) have led the Israelis to believe they can get a good deal on the issue.  Clot stresses that the Palestinians should hold off negotiating at all on refugees until they receive a serious commitment from Israel on negotiating Jerusalem issues. 

“Abu Mazen offered an extremely low proposal for the number of returnees to Israel a few weeks only after the start of the process.”

“However, in the scope of the SE-TB track, we have not given away anything despite the pressure put by the Israelis, and now the US, and despite a very awkward and dangerous process (these exchanges of papers between TB & SE).”

“I remain convinced that the refugee file remains one of Israel’s main concerns but that they believe that they can get a good deal on this considering the Palestinian leadership’s weaknesses and the US recent involvement on the issue.”

“We have now reached a point where a lot of pressure is going to be put on Abu Mazen, Ahmed Qurei and Saeb Erekat on the refugee file, with the US acting in support of Israeli interests. There is clear risk that Saeb Erekat and Ahmed Qurei will have no choice but to comply with US instructions and discuss the issue under the conditions imposed by the US.”

Full text

From: Ziyad Clot
Sent: Thursday, July 24, 2008 3:59 AM
To: Ziyad Clot; Zeinah Salahi; LPU
Subject: RE: Jerusalem / Refugees: way forward

 

?

 

I understand that everybody is incredibly busy these days.

 

Still, I think this is important.

 

Merci !

 

Z.

 

 

 

From: Ziyad Clot
Sent: mercredi 23 juillet 2008 13:54
To: Zeinah Salahi
Cc: LPU
Subject: Jerusalem / Refugees: way forward
Importance: High

 

Zeinah,

 

  1.  Refugees

 

As you know, SE decided to share our position on refugees very early in the negotiation process with the Israelis. He was willing to show to the US the Palestinians’ serious intentions to engage on the core issues. At the same time, he also did not feel that he had the expertise to handle real (oral) negotiations with the Israelis on this and preferred to proceed via an exchange of Is/Ps with T. Becker.

 

In parallel, AM offered an extremely low proposal for the number of returnees to Israel a few weeks only after the start of the process.

 

However, in the scope of the SE-TB track, we have not given away anything despite the pressure put by the Israelis, and now the US, and despite a very awkward and dangerous process (these exchanges of papers between TB & SE). The Israelis have also recently accepted the structure we have suggested for the Article on refugees (recognition of refugee rights and then implementation, rather than implementation via the international mechanism).

 

I remain convinced that the refugee file remains one of Israel’s main concerns but that they believe that they can get a good deal on this considering the Palestinian leadership’s weaknesses and the US recent involvement on the issue.

 

Strategically, it is in our best interest to keep the discussion over the substance of the file until the end in order to avoid giving any guarantee to the Israelis before we have a more precise idea of what the PLO might be able to get regarding the other files (???), and on Jerusalem, in particular.

 

We have now reached a point where a lot of pressure is going to be put on AM, AA and SE on the refugee file, with the US acting in support of Israeli interests. There is clear risk that SE and AA will have no choice but to comply with US instructions and discuss the issue under the conditions imposed by the US.

 

  1.  Jerusalem

 

On the contrary, until now, the Israelis have not given us any indication as to what they could accept for Jerusalem.

 

It is the PLO position that Jerusalem is part of the package and that no agreement will be signed if this question is not included.

 

I think that it has now become urgent to say to the US and the Israelis that the Palestinians will not discuss further the refugee issue before the Israelis engage seriously on Jerusalem.

 

I would appreciate to have LPU’s views on this before tonight. This point could be made to SE during the meeting tomorrow. In my view, SE and AA should stick to this position during their meetings in DC.

 

Best,

 

Ziyad

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Zio-Nazi Obligation Under Annapolis (18)

Meeting Minutes: U.S.-Palestinian Bilateral Session

Summary

 

Ahmed Qurei tells US officials that “nothing has happened” on the implementation of Israel’s obligations under Annapolis or the Road Map. The parties go on to discuss settlements, refugees, and several other issues.

Full text

Minutes from Bilateral US-PAL Session

Post Annapolis

Wednesday, 16th July 2008, 11h00am to 1h00pm

State Department, Washington, DC

 

Attendees:

Palestinian 

  •  Ahmed Querei (AA)
  •  Dr. Saeb Erekat (SE)
  •  Zeinah Salahi (ZS)

 

United States

  •  Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (CR)
  •  David Welsh (DW)
  •  Jake Walles (JW)
  •  Jonathan Shwartz (JS)

 

Meeting Summary (not verbatim):

 

CR:

  •  I’d like to first hear where you are, then push through and try to find a way to get this done.  
  •  We see this in two phases – first before the UNGA in September.  Something that shows substantial progress to hold the international community’s attention.  
  •  Then the UNGA to the end of the year.
  •  At the end of the meeting we can discuss – how do you see the product that would be reached by the UNGA, and that at the end of the year?

 

AA:

  •  Will you come to the region?

 

CR:

  •  First there will be a trilateral – you and TL will come here around the 30th.  I will go around the 15th of August.

 

AA:

  •  Can you postpone a week or so?

 

CR:

  •  It will be hard.  [Explains travel schedule.]

 

AA:

  •  I talked to TL in Paris, she can come for one day.  I thought it would be good to postpone to give us a little more time to prepare… But whatever you decide we will work out.

 

DW:

  •  First meeting will be on the 30th. Then a second meeting on the 19th or the 20th.  

 

AA:

  •  If it is in August there is more time to make progress. I told her [TL] that we need to start to write.  She is reluctant but…

 

CR:

  •  My view is that we can do all of those.

 

AA:

  •  I want to explain the details and where we are.
  •  1. After Annapolis – where are we? We agreed on two things – the first phase of the Roadmap, and the Peace process.  
  •  On the first phase – nothing has happened. There are daily violations.  [AA notes recent announcements regarding housing. Also notes the extreme detrimental impact of the prisoner release to Hizbollah. Later in the meeting hands CR an article on factories being built in Ariel, and the last monthly report. She notes she has already gotten the monthly report.]   Everyone is saying look at what they get from violence, etc.  Even Yaser Abd Rabbo – who is one of us — is saying we need to stop negotiations.  Please – we need your help on settlements [i.e. freeze] and the other phase one obligations – roadblocks, outposts, etc.
  •  I tried at the last meeting to discuss the terms of reference. TL responded that you are taking us back to pre-Annapolis.  She doesn’t want to discuss. It is different for a permanent status agreement.  242, 338, Roadmap, Bush vision, Arab Peace Initiative…  
  •  We repeat – no issues to be excluded or postponed. [i.e. Jerusalem]
  •  We agree on everything or nothing.
  •  We agreed that [we are reaching] a whole agreement – not a state with provisional borders, or another interim.  
  •  We are talking about a comprehensive agreement.  We don’t want to go to arbitration a week after [like Egypt had to with Taba]. The agreement must include all of the dates and timelines for implementation. Otherwise it will be another shelf agreement.   
  •  AM is committed – he hopes as much as possible to have an agreement by the end of the year. And we will continue under all circumstances.  We are talking about an independent sovereign state – with all the sovereignty like states everywhere else in the world. What we are talking about is [with respect to] all the issues.  [If we talk about full sovereignty, we mean if there is water in Jericho it is Palestinian water.]
  •  We start from the 1967 border.  Any modifications in or out, we can talk about.  Israel starts from the status quo.  Jerusalem with their annexation, the settlements.  I think without this understanding we will not be able to get any agreement.    We consider the 1967 border is already the biggest concession we made in our history.  Modifications, etc. on a swap basis we are willing to discuss.  If the 1967 is approved as the basis for the discussions, we can move forward.  [If they insist on starting from] the status quo – we can’t go anywhere.
  •  242, 338, the Roadmap – all make it clear.  If you, or the Security Council, can make it clearer that would be great.
  •  Olmert offered 7.3 – where, why he needs 7.3… we don’t know.  5 or 7.3 – we can’t accept it. It will turn the Palestinian state into cantons.  [Discusses the negative impact of Ariel on Palestine.]
  •  We offered 1.9%.  It is reasonable.  We included the settlements inside Jerusalem – Psgat Zeev, etc.  It’s the first time!  
  •  The territory we are talking about is the West Bank, Gaza, Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley, the Dead Sea. The No Man’s Land – they don’t have the right to take it without negotiations. Just like the safe passage connecting the West Bank and the Gaza Strip – when we talk about a comprehensive agreement, need to take all these things into consideration.  On a one to one basis.  The gap is not about the difference in percentages, it is not about comparing the maps.  The question is how to reach an agreement? What is the basis that we are negotiating on?  This is the problem.
  •  Jerusalem – the last meeting we had we talked about it. She couldn’t respond.  [AA notes the distinction between sovereignty arrangements, and cooperation/modalities in Jerusalem.]  East Jerusalem is part of the 1967 border.  Anything [discussed] there should be part of the swap.
  •  Unfortunately, what we heard from Olmert is that he can’t stop building because it is Jerusalem.  
  •  Water – it should be easier if the other issues are agreed.
  •  Refugees – On responsibility – TL refused. It is important for Israel to recognize its responsibility.  On the right of return – the API says a just and agreed upon solution in accordance with 194.  This means that the Arab League authorized the PLO to negotiate.  Therefore if we talk about the number of refugees over the number of years, that would be good.  
  •  There are many other issues – the host countries. I know your position regarding the precedents.
  •  The Fund – the Absentee Property Fund – this is a good basis for compensation.  I know that TL and Shlomo Ben Ami both say not one single dollar exists in the fund.  I cannot accept it. Therefore it is important when we talk about the international fund, that this be the basis of that fund.
  •  Security – the third party will be under the UN or NATO, and will help with the borders, training Palestinian security forces, etc.  [The key is no Israeli presence.]
  •  The problem is that Israel thinks about the situation as it is today when they think about the day after.  
  •  Demilitarization versus limited arms – we say limited arms.  We can discuss what kinds of things might be excluded.  
  •  Prisoners – Olmert in Paris said to AM that 120 will be released.  We said that this not enough.  They need to be pre-Oslo prisoners.  There are 364 pre-Oslo prisoners.  If there is a release for Hamas, they need to release for AM both before and after.  

 

CR:

  •  I completely agree with you on that.  

 

AA:

  •  The other issues are going well.   Between now and the UNGA if you can solve the issue of territory, including Jerusalem…

 

CR:

  •  As I see it, the role we can play is 1. to step back and say what we think is possible.  2.  try to bridge the gaps.  This is why I want to see you alone. So I can tell you what I think of your positions, without hurting my role as the “honest broker”. The same with the Israelis.
  •  On security and borders – they need to come to you.  But on borders you need to move too.
  •  First on the ToRs and the Basis.
  •  On the ToR – just say it is based on Annapolis.  I worked hard, and David worked hard, to get the ToR at Annapolis.  Israel didn’t like it, but they came. [i.e. they agreed to it by coming since that is what Annapolis was based on.]
  •  The starting point for what is determining the borders – to create a state, a new state, starting from the occupation that began in 1967. I don’t think it matters much if you start from the status quo, or 1967.  What matters is where the borders end up.    They made an offer – it’s not good, but it’s not bad.  7.3 – 5 is 2.3, which leaves 97.7 percent of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the safe passage.  AM said he’d be prepared to count the safe passage.  
  •  Ariel is a problem, I told them – it protrudes down far into the Palestinian state.

 

AA:

  •  And for water too.

 

CR:

  •  We need to deal with the aquifer.  Also – it would be difficult for Israel to protect Ariel without a large perimeter.
  •  But are you really going to stop a Palestinian state on a few percentages?
  •  ‘67 is the point of reference.  [We all know it.]

 

AA:

  •  Just like Ariel, Maale Addumim is a problem. Jerusalem is out if they take Maale Addumim.  [AA notes the impact on the surrounding villagers who get squeezed out by the settlements around Jerusalem.]

 

CR:

  •  No – Jerusalem is not out!  Everyone understands that what is Jewish is Israeli and what is Arab is Palestinian.

 

AA:

  •  But we don’t want to fly to Jerusalem by helicopter!  

 

CR:

  •  I don’t think that any Israeli leader is going to cede Maale Addumim.  

 

AA:

  •  Or any Palestinian leader.

 

CR:

  •  Then you won’t have a state!  

 

AA:

  •  It’s like the refugees – they can live under Palestinian law.

 

CR:

  •  Both states will be ugly.  They will not be easily connected.  What we need to do is that instead of [arguing over base points] you are going to have to end up in a discussion.  
  •  I asked TL – are you talking about all the land within 1967? She said yes.  You won this argument!  [Discussion continues.]
  •  I think when we write this down we’ll find a way to reference 1967.  
  •  They were created – they do have some land that belongs to Israel.
  •  I don’t think that 7.3 is the number.  But 1.9 or 2.3 is not.  
  •  Yaser told me that one concern is Gaza – that it needs to expand because of long term growth.
  •  Maale Addumim can’t look like LA! [i.e. sprawling]
  •  I’d like to see you talk about how to make the connection to Maale Addumim useful.  

 

[SE shows the map of Israel’s proposed swaps.]

 

SE:

  •  It’s not LA it’s California!!!
  •  If you get them to clarify that we are talking about all of 1967…

 

CR:

  •  I will make it clear that the US is working on the assumption that it is all the territory occupied in 1967.   That their 7.3 is based on that.  7.3 and 5.

 

AA:

  •  On the swap – it needs to be one to one. Equal and equitable. Not Jerusalem for Gaza.  

 

CR:

  •  There are different ways to discuss value. There is no place to build around Jerusalem.  You can’t even move in Jerusalem!

 

AA:

  •  We have areas outlined.  [Noting that Palestinians have looked at areas they’d like to see swapped back.]  

 

[SE hands CR the map with the 1.9% and the swaps.  CR hands to Jonathan who keeps it.]

 

CR:  

  •  I believe that the assumptions should be, the US will [secure this].  Any swaps will be in reference to the area occupied in 1967.  When they talk about 7.3 they are talking about this.  You say one to one in quality and quantity. I would say you need to think more about what quality means.  [She alludes to their proposal to build up the agricultural value of areas to be swapped, but doesn’t reference it explicitly.]  

 

DW:

  •  We don’t want to get into theology.  But there needs to be a common reference.  We have good computer mapping on this.  We can use this as the basis.  [I.e. US would present a map depicting the positions on a common base map.]

 

CR:

  •  I think that you will have to find an answer to Maale Addumim.  And we will need to find an answer to Ariel.

 

SE:

  •  Your approach on the maps is good. We are using some of your satellite imagery already.   
  •  The agreement is that we are going to reach an agreement but not a treaty by UNGA.  [CR notes that she has received our timeline diagram.]
  •  The Treaty is the agreement plus all the annexes.  The trilateral needs to be guided by this assumption.  So we need dates, timelines, etc.

 

CR:

  •  I agree.

 

SE:

  •  Second, for example on security.   We said anything short of an Israeli presence.  Olmert implied that he appreciated [our flexibility on this].  For example, in the Jordan Valley – if there are any stations there can the Germans staff them?  

 

CR:

  •  They need to come to you on security.  I think Jones – we need the help.  There are some good ideas in the security paper you gave us.  The US will have to play a role.  Security is more than just strategic depth.  It is borders, [capacities], etc. To talk about airspace is amazing to me.  In the time it takes me to walk to the conference room, your airspace would be covered.  

 

SE:

  •  [Notes that if there is a presence of Israelis, it will be the basis of hostility from the Palestinian population. If it is foreigners, Palestinians will look for jobs there.]

 

CR:

  •  I need affirmation of – you are defining a demilitarized state or non-militarized – where principally you are looking at internal security, and you are defining the responsibilities?  [And then we can talk about what they need for those responsibilities?]

 

DW:

  •  You had a good presentation on roles and responsibilities – but you didn’t answer one question – is the third party on the Palestinian-Israeli border?

 

SE:

  •  The third party will help with compliance, passages, the operations room with Israel, Palestinian, Jordan, Egypt and third party, and regional issues and counter terrorism.

 

AA:

  •  [Could be, could not, we can discuss.]

 

CR:

  •  They are afraid that the third party and Israel will clash.  But we hear you saying that the relations between you and Israel will be non-military and peaceful.  There will be common threats against you both, and some of them will be in Palestinian. You will need a common response.

 

SE:

  •  Anything short of Palestinian forces going into Israel, and Israeli forces going into Palestine.

 

AA:

  •  [Notes recent Nablus example of Israel coming in and taking matters into their own hands, including stealing a computer.]  This cannot be for the future.

 

CR:

  •  No one thinks that that will be the future.

 

AA:

  •  [Notes prisoner issue again.]

 

CR:

  •  You see your forces – with limited arms, primarily internal? The roles and missions and arms are to be agreed?  The third party is not an interpositional force – you can write the agreement in such a way as to make clear that the incursions are not welcome.  No country will agree to be an interpositional force.

 

AA:

  •  [Notes importance of regional cooperation.]

 

CR:

  •  [Notes that there will necessarily be a transitional period, for withdrawal and capacity building.  The total withdrawal to no Israeli presence will not be the day after the agreement.]

 

SE:

  •  [Returns to the issue of refugees. Notes that Jonathan needs to be briefed by NSU.]

 

CR:

  •  On refugees: I read your side by side matrix.  It seems that the closest is on refugees – although it requires some decisions.  

 

AA:

  •  What if we postpone until after the UNGA?

 

CR:

  •  No – we need to discuss it.   
  •  I will come to the trilateral with some initial ideas on the mechanism.  
  •  [SE: we will be able to review and comment before you present anything right? We don’t want to be surprised!  CR/US team: yes of course.]
  •  By the way I did talk to the Jordanians at a very high level. They didn’t press the issue. I told them that international law will not help you because all the compensation is to the individual refugees.  There are no precedents where states get compensation.
  •  1. You need to decide soon that you will offer all Palestinians citizenship wherever they are.

 

AA:

  •  This I think will be done.

 

CR:

  •  2. Rehabilitation, relocation, help for families going forward.  I saw hints of this in both your positions.  [ZS notes that this is not a controversial issue.]
  •  I think that when you say that all Palestinians are citizens, the Lebanese will relax that it will not impact their confessional balance.

 

SE:

  •  For the Lebanese, but for the Jordanians – they will need to decide not to allow dual citizenship.

 

CR:

  •  I think that they may.  
  •  For individuals who have lost property, they have a right to claim.  [With Germany, all they had to do was show up with a picture of the house and we allowed them to claim.]
  •  Two things that are hard are:
  •  4. non- material damages. There is no precedents anywhere else for this. It will be a hard sell. [ZS argued that no other place has 50 years of dispossession supported by consistent and extensive state actions. CR responded Albania, and US with respect to the Native Americans.]
  •  5. responsibility.

 

AA:

  •  I accept what Yossi Belin said in his book.  [US: what’s that?] That it is Israel’s responsibility.  

 

CR:

  •  If you want to talk about responsibility it is the responsibility of the international community, not Israel.  They created Israel.  [ZS argues that Israeli actions post-statehood are clearly their responsibility.  This is dismissed by CR.]

 

SE:

  •  It is a nation interrupted!

 

CR:

  •  That is true – a nation’s development is interrupted.  You should [look to a solution that describes the conditions and tries to work from there.] Responsibility is a loaded term.  
  •  [Notes the example of reparations for slavery in the US.] I’ve always objected to it. It’s not forward looking.  Would I personally be better off? I don’t know. But I do support affirmative action.  [ZS argues that this is the same point – it’s as if we are trying to restore Palestinians to a status, similar to the post-civil rights movement. Except unlike in the US, Palestinians options are far more limited as we are not talking about unlimited return to Israel, and there is 50 years of suffering. In other words many of the elements of “moving forward” (such as affirmative actions programs) are missing in the solution here.  Key, in order for Palestinians to be able to compromise on implementation points, is that there be a recognition of responsibility. This also is part and parcel of the non-material damages point.]
  •  [Bad things happen to people all around the world all the time.  You need to look forward.]
  •  The first compensation is a state [describes state].
  •  Second is that the world and Israel accept that the Palestinians need help to get back on their feet.  [i.e. as evidenced by participation in the mechanism]
  •  Israel had to put away some of their aspirations – like taking all of “Judea and Samaria”.

 

AA:

  •  Do you think that the Israelis can implement an agreement?

 

CR:

  •  Yes. No one will run right of Ariel Sharon.  But it needs to be sellable to the Israeli people, just like to the Palestinians.

 

DW:

  •  You said you don’t want to be blamed, like post-Camp David. That will not happen.  Failure is also not an option. But we need to have some irreversibility to this process.  

 

CR:

  •  Israel needs to move on security.  You need to move on borders.
  •  On the reference point – it will be easier if you nail that down.  
  •  On the refugee mechanism, we will come with ideas.  
  •  On the narrative – you need to move to try to imply responsibility without using that word/saying it directly.

 

SE:  

  •  Five points I need to go through fast.
  •  1. What AA said now – we keep talking, but when we start writing is when we see movement. On the refugees, to help with this, we need Jonathan to come our way for two days to discuss.  
  •  2. Irreversibility – [we don’t want to create a situation where we keep climbing and are so close and then crash down the mountain like at Camp David.]
  •  3. Prisoners – [reiterates through an analogy that prisoner releases support Hanieh, and stresses the importance of releasing pre-1993 prisoners to AM].

 

CR:

  •  Pre-Annapolis Israel said that they couldn’t release prisoners with blood on their hands. This guy they released today has more blood than anyone!  I am very sympathetic to you on the prisoner issue.

 

SE:

  •  Jerusalem – the East Jerusalem consulate should remain open.  

 

CR:

  •  I wouldn’t worry about what people say in their campaigns. Bush said he would immediately start the process of moving the embassy to Jerusalem.  He is still “starting the process…”

 

SE:

  •  5. We have a major problem of visas to Palestinian officials.  [Discussion of Mahmoud Darwish case.]

 

[Side discussion of Syria and Iran.]

 

CR:

  •  I would like you [before the 30th] to keep – not to present to the Israelis – language on responsibility without using the word “responsibility”.  Forward looking.
  •  I will work on the basis for the map.
  •  They need to work on Ariel.
  •  You need to work on Maale Addumim.  
  •  On security – I think we’ll be ok.  
  •  July 30th a trilateral (DC).   I will try to make clear the basis.  I would hope that you would start to discuss the refugee issue. And Ariel and Maale Addumim.  
  •  August 20th another trilateral (Jerusalem). [DW notes that all these will follow the same format. Separate bilaterals with each side, and then the trilateral.]
  •  September, pre-UNGA trilateral (Jerusalem).  

 

Posted in Palestine AffairsComments Off on Zio-Nazi Obligation Under Annapolis (18)

Teaitor Qurei to Nazi Livni ” I Would Vote For You” (17)

Meeting Minutes: General Plenary Meeting

Summary

 

Minutes of meeting where the parties primarily discuss issues related to borders and Jerusalem. Palestinian negotiator Ahmed Qurei tells Tzipi Livni, “I would vote for you.” Livni tells the PA that Olmert’s offer to take 7.3% of the West Bank for Israel in exchange for a Palestinian state “is the most generous, and will be perceived by Israelis as the most fair.” The Palestinian Authority asks Israel to release some prisoners because Hamas was able to get that concession in a deal with Israel and PA officials are worried about how that will affect their popular standing with the masses.

Full text

Attendees:

Palestinian

  • Ahmed Qurei (AA)
  • Dr. Saeb Erekat (SE)
  • Salah Aleyan
  • Rami Dajani

Israeli

  • Tzipi Livni (TL)  
  • Udi Dekel (UD)
  • Tal Becker (TB)

 

Meeting Minutes:

TL:      [Discussion of internal Israeli party politics] Kadima primaries will be between September 11 – 19. We will know the exact date on July 10. I said it can’t be around the 18th because that is when the UNGA meets, and we need to be there to show achievements. The competition will start after that time [ie the primary].

AA:     I would vote for you …

TL:      Between Mofaz and me you don’t have much of a dilemma. The question is whether “he” will participate. He recently said [in Hebrew] “many will not be surprised by my decision” – which can mean anything. [TL discussed previous experience with Likud, particularly in 1999, with Sharon, Shitrit and Olmert]. Back to business…

AA:     We are meeting to evaluate what we have done and discuss how to proceed.

TL:      Do we work from the Saeb – Tal draft or by committees?

AA:     We go over issues and repeat the positions.

TB:      Do we go by committee or by issue?

SE:      By issues is best.

TB:      Let us start the preamble and general provisions. We put aside certain disagreements – in the preamble the “Jewish / Palestinian right to self-determination”.

TL:      I believe these can be solved once we get to a general agreement.

TB:      The general provisions are not controversial. On borders, we have not drafted. We have focused on the map and now the field trips.

TL:      We know the gaps, and now we are seeing whether we can minimize them – looking at the blocs and how we can relate that to swaps and also deal with the safe passage from the West Bank to the Gaza Strip.

AA:     [to TB] is this a joint document?

TB:      It’s what we have drafted.

TL:      So, on borders, let’s start with your position …

AA:     No, we need to go back to general things. We need to state the rules we agreed: nothing is agreed until everything is agreed; we will deal with all the issues and not postpone anything; there will be no negotiations through the media…

TL:      Except by your infrastructure committee head – in French.

SE:      He didn’t know … [discussion on public statements]

AA:     We need a comprehensive agreement, not a declaration of principles, or a framework, and not provisional borders. The negotiations are simultaneous with meetings on the implementation of the Road Map – on both sides, we on security on you on the settlement freeze.

TL:      Yes and with the implementation itself. You are talking about things that we postponed.

AA:     I am speaking about what we agreed. To continue: the meetings between Olmert and Abu Mazen to follow up and support the negotiations …

TL:      And they follow up closely …

AA:     Trilateral meetings with the US.

TL:      We said whenever they want—but we never agreed that trilateral meetings were part of the process.

AA:     I don’t want to embarrass you with the Americans.

TL:      When they ask we obey but not as part of an understanding. Obama is coming at the end of July [side discussion on Obama and potential meetings with both sides]

AA:     We also agreed for both sides to start drafting.

TL:      That they would draft what they can. As for the agreement itself, as I said in Berlin, it should provide for the interests of each side – with the necessary detail that this requires – in a manner that minimizes friction and problems.

AA:     Agreement needs to be clear – we don’t want to go to arbitration … it also needs timetables.

TL:      So this is simultaneous with the Road Map implementation, and after we reach agreement or treaty, then we start negotiations on implementation …

SE:      Mechanisms

UD:     Arrangements

AA:     So, for example, if there is agreement on dismantling a certain settlement, the implementation will deal with withdrawal, how long, phases – all this can be discussed.

TL:      [hands over Chart entitled “Peace Process – Time Line” to AA]

AA:     And we have the terms of reference: international legitimacy; Security Council resolutions 242, 338, resolution 194 …

TL:      Will not agree to 194 …

AA:     The Arab Peace Initiative; the Road Map; and international law.

TL:      I want to ask you: we’ve had these discussions before Annapolis, this is taking us back. We are now drafting – at the end we can go back to these.

AA:     But you asked us to evaluate.

TL:      But you are going back …

SE:      We are just citing the things we have put down.

TL:      But it will make it look like we disagree on terms of reference.

AA:     This applies to your approach to borders, where you said the baseline is facts on the ground – you don’t recognize the 67 borders.

TL:      We are now looking at what we have and where are the gaps. Without writing this down you know we are working according to 242 and 338. We are not talking about giving you all of 67, but when you look at the facts on the ground and the discussion on swaps, it is based on it. And we cannot accept 194.

AA:     You know how many refugees there are? You will accept 194.

TB:      4 million.

AA:     Now it’s 6 million. The API is important [cites language].

TL:      We are in the middle of negotiations …

AA:     I am just stating our position.

TL:      You are taking us back to pre-Annapolis. At the end, it can be phrased in any way. We are past that – I know that as part of the agreement you need the Arab Peace Initiative … to get the Arabs on board. I can understand that. This is something that can be dealt with in the end. So let’s go on to the next item.

AA:     Territory, borders: Our position is the 1967 line – the Green Line — the occupation that started in 1967. The West Bank and Gaza and one territorial unity, including Jerusalem, the Dead Sea, the Jordan Valley, and the No Man’s Land. West Bank and Gaza must be linked by a safe passage that is permanent, secured, and without any control or intervention by Israel. So the basis of the negotiations in 67; any modification must be minor and discussed as swap on the basis of equal quality and quantity. We do not accept the settlement blocs, but can study the case of Jews who wish to stay and live under Palestinian law.

TL:      I have a bad feeling, because we start from the beginning. We are making a mistake. Now you don’t even want to say “minor” – your map, for example, 1.9%. The idea is not to start with basic points. I know your position…

AA:     I am afraid you forget.

TL:      Believe me I want to, but I can’t. This makes me want to go back to my position at the beginning.

AA:     Did you change? It is the same. 7.3% — the same map.

TL:      This was reached after several discussions. We did not enter the negotiation with 7.3%. We discussed what is needed… My concerns, our concerns (both) are internal and with the international community. We both want an agreement reached. If I knew that we’re close to the end of the process, and a last compromise is needed, knowing it’s the end of the conflict, it’s different. Same with you, you could make a last compromise, for example more than 1.9%. Both of us don’t want to be without and agreement, but having made a compromise. So don’t go back to positions that we passed in the understanding. The 7.3% offer by Olmert is the most generous, and will be perceived by Israelis as the most fair.

AA:     Why?

TL:      Because it is almost equal.

AA:     The 5%?

TL:      I know it is important for you to keep the number to a minimum.

AA:     We have no problem with swaps, but the 7.3 position just does not allow a state to survive, and it takes all around Jerusalem, and gives to the south of the West Bank and next to Gaza.

TL:      Let’s ask from TB or UD or SE to assess where we stand.

TB:      We did not mean to assess, but to evaluate where we stand in the committees, to look at what is happening in each committee and see if there is something else we can start drafting or working on.

AA:     [re swaps] so for an area in Sheikh Jarrah, I have to see and equivalent area.

TB:      This is about making progress on issues on the table …

TL:      [re 7.3%] This is the offer. [adding to TB] Se we know where each sides stands. And for example on the safe passage, to identify a list of things – other articles in a future agreement.

AA:     So where do we concentrate?

TL:      One is things we know where we stand. Two is things we need to work on. So on security we know your position, international force, no Israeli presence – we need to continue working.

AA:     On refugees…

TL:      We have a gap on mechanism; the wording – for you “responsibility,” for us “suffering”; and return.

TB:      We meet on Wednesday to continue exchange of drafts. We are waiting for Palestinian response to our last draft.

UD:     Water. There will be an expert committee to investigate and come back to us.

SE:      They will be meeting on Sunday. You have a paper from us on an experts committee on water, so cut the red tape, let’s move to collecting all the required data.

AA:     Why don’t they meet earlier?

UD:     It’s hard to convene people, scheduling… [Discussion on Fadel Kawash being in Cyprus; discussion on security experts: Hazem Atallah away in Berlin and Amos Gilad sick in hospital].

TL:      Maybe SE and UD can sit on security. Without Hazem or Amos.

AA:     Hazem is back.

SE:      I am really worried about security. It is the backbone for both sides – the US has three generals here…

TL:      Maybe I should sit on it [security meeting]

AA:     Let SE and UD meet and discuss the paper. See what is agreed and not.

TL:      You are meeting anyway. See if Amos and Hazem can attend. Next is settlements.

TB:      We agreed that SE and I will draft something…

AA:     This is part of territory …

TB:      Eventually – the article refers to evacuation, time line, [unclear] “furnished or not” – these are arrangements regardless where the border is. Then we have the safe passage.

AA:     Refugees?

TB:      Waiting for response from SE.

SE:      Five issues will be decided.

TB:      There is the issue of the border regime and the passages – this is not just security.

TL:      Write it down as an issue. We’ll see where it will be.

SE:      We are one team; it doesn’t matter.

TL:      Regardless we need to define where it will be discussed.

SE:      On refugees, as I said to Condoleezza Rice and to you, there is a serious Jordanian concern on compensation.

AA:     Can they agree instead of ‘compensation’ to ‘assistance’ …

SE:      They won’t accept.

TB:      That’s our proposal.

TL:      We have a problem with the infrastructure committee.

SE:      Muhammad Shtayyeh and Hazai are meeting next week; after that we can bring them to AA and TL.

AA:     Muhammad is angry because you refuse to give an answer on Qalandia airport.

UD:     We told him, as we see it, this is not part of the committee. It is part of the passages.

SE:      No it’s for the plenary.

TL:      On to environment… [SE and UD agree it is going well].

SE:      We can start drafting once they have more meetings [SE noted and protested the lack of permits for 5 experts from Gaza to attend the workshop on environment].

TL:      State to state. A good meeting yesterday on health …

SE:      Yes. We meet again on the 8th: tourism, agriculture and health.

TB:      On health we can start drafting.

AA:     This is a mistake – tourism should be in the economic  committee. [discussion on placement of issues in committees]

UD:     On legal …

TL:      Can you start drafting?

TB:      Yes. The most controversial issues are going to be dealt with in other committees.

TL:      Culture of Peace is complete. Already written. Prisoners: [??] met today …

AA:     Your prisoner release to Hizbollah and Hamas – how many Palestinians to Hizbollah? Famous leaders?

TL:      To Hizbollah – over my dead body. I fought it yesterday, and only agreed after Ofer Dekel assured the Palestinians were few and not important. That was my condition. [Discussion on prisoner exchange]. I raised yesterday what you [AA] said in Berlin. When we need to release prisoners, we need to do it with the moderates – otherwise it sends the message that only way to release prisoners is by kidnapping soldiers …

AA:     Can AM expect 1000 released?

TL:      No. Let’s see. Did AM raise it with Olmert?

AA:     Yes.

SE:      And I raise it now with you. This is an important issue. I just met with families of prisoners, and this is very important.

TL:      The decision is not up to the committee, Abdel Razeq and Blass – it’s a political decision. I am thinking … can we do something that relates to a change on the ground, so it can be our “excuse” – let’s invent something.

SE:      You used “benchmarks” in Berlin. So let’s invent something – how about we are in this political process, as part of the process.

TL:      How about a link to the situation in Jenin and Shechem [Nablus] – areas with greater Palestinian security control. Can we release to those areas?

[Discussion on criteria for release, numbers, lists, Hamas list].

TL:      Just throwing ideas: let’s assume Hamas asked for a list – we release some to them and some …

SE:      Don’t link us. It is time to release prisoners as part of the political process.

TL:      If I give you “heavy” ones, I may then need to give Hamas “heavier” ones.

AA:     You can release some to AM before Hamas, and some after.

TL:      Most of the “big fishes” are on the Hamas list.

SE:      Hamas is doing that to show they are more responsible for the people than Fatah.

AA:     [Refers to an article by ? in the Israeli press] It argued that Israel responds more to terror. This is what you are doing.

TL:      In Israeli society, there is a strong feeling about the soldier in the hands of Hamas.

AA:     There are, daily, soldiers everywhere in the West Bank that can be kidnapped… you don’t want that to change.

TL:      This is perceived as a weakness by some in the Arab World, but we Israelis act like a big family – some perceive it as responding only to terror.

AA:     Due to the continuous requests of AM, and to move the process forward, and since we are now enforcing security and the rule of law, you must release a certain number of prisoners.

TL:      I am trying to think of an “event”.

SE:      Suggestion: I know the complexity of the lists, and the price will be the price. But if you want to tell Palestinians that is not the only way you function, look at the list of pre-Oslo prisoners. After the date of Shalit [release] we can have an event.

TL:      I prefer to release for the peace process than on a holiday.

SE:      This is a lose-lose situation – while Gaza looks ‘protected’ by Hamas, there are Israeli raids in Ramallah. What is the balance of having us irrelevant? If you want to sign an agreement – you want to make us weak… Now Manar TV is broadcasting your own reports with subtitles about how Israel was humiliated. The prisoner issue – Barghouti — was raised by AM in every meeting with Olmert. So instead of Hamas releasing Marwan Barghouthi, have AM do it – the same with the pre 93 prisoners. Like AA’s idea: before and after.

TL:      I understand that the Tahdi’a weakens you – and we agreed with Egypt that Rafah crossing will open only with PA.

AA:     There are reports that Hamas is involved.

TL:      No. Maybe we can connect Gilad Shalit, as we have done to Rafah, and as opening Rafah is connected to you – you get credit. That way you get credit for release of prisoners.

AA:     We ask for prisoner release and area C…

TL:      I wrote a letter to Barak on the issue in Abu Dis and he understands it’s serious. AA:        We have a lot of people wanting to invest – we have the labour force. So if we have areas we an offer to investors that we be a great help [discussion on investors and lack of space in Abu Dis, Ramallah] If there are places that can be agreed on, give them the facility to work.

TL:      This is something that Tony Blair has raised. [UD made a reference to Tarqumia].

SE:      Back to Shalit and Rafah Crossing: Do not link Shalit to Rafah. If I am negotiating opening Rafah and saying Hamas has nothing to do with the arrangement – think of the consequences of linking it to Shalit. Zahhar goes on Al-Jazeera and says if I send a letter to Egypt the crossing will be open. [Further discussion on area C – Abu Dis and industrial estate in Jericho]

TL:      There is another issue … “this city”, and then we can talk about implementation, and what we called “steps toward the establishment of a Palestinian state.”

AA:     I want to put to you our position on Jerusalem.

TL:      Since I cannot refer to it I wont say anything. I am going to just listen. [TL receives message that bill got preliminary approval in Knesset that would require referendum on giving up territory annexed by Israel].

AA:     Will the Israeli pubic vote in favour of returning the Golan?

TL:      No. Even though the Golan is not part of what we call the “Land of Israel” the majority of Israelis will not give it back to Syria. This law applies also to Jerusalem.

AA:     Jerusalem is part of the territory occupied in 67. We can discuss and agree on many issues relating to Jerusalem: religious places, infrastructure, municipal function, economic issues, security, settlements. However, the municipal borders for us are 67. This is the basis, and this is where we can start.

[Silence]

TL:      Houston, we have a problem.

AA:     Silence is agreement …

SE:      It is no secret that on our map we proposed we are offering you the biggest Yerushalayim in history. But we must talk about the concept of Al-Quds.

TL:      Do you have a concept?

SE:      Yes. We have a detailed concept – but we will only discuss with a partner. And it’s doable.

TL:      No, I can’t.

TB:      On process, we will continue drafting on settlements, refugees, end of claims, and culture of peace. The next topics we will start drafting are legal, environment and state to state – health. Water will meet on Sunday and perhaps we can start soon.

TL:      Next meeting? [Discussion – dates proposed are either Thursday July 3 in the morning, or Wednesday July 9).

[END]

Posted in Palestine AffairsComments Off on Teaitor Qurei to Nazi Livni ” I Would Vote For You” (17)

Palestinian Traitors and the Security of the Zio-Nazi Regime (16)

Meeting Minutes: Post-Annapolis Bilaterals and Trilateral in Berlin

Summary

 

Minutes of bilateral meetings between Israelis and Palestinians, and Palestinians and Americans, as well as a trilateral meeting with all three parties, in Berlin. Topics of discussion focused on security issues, international involvement in security mechanisms, and the impact of Hamas.

Full text

Minutes from Berlin Meetings

Post Annapolis

Tuesday, 24th June 2008

Berlin

 

MEETING:  BILATERAL (PALESTINIANS – ISRAELIS)

Intercontinental, 11h30am

 

Attendees:

Palestinian 

  •  Ahmed Querei (AA)
  •  Dr. Saeb Erekat (SE)
  •  Zeinah Salahi (ZS)

 

Israeli

  •  FM Tzipi Livni (TL)
  •  Tal Becker (TB)
  •  Udi Dekel (UD)
  •  Alon(?)

 

Meeting Summary (not verbatim):

 

[Meeting opens with a discussion of internal Israeli politics, and the vote that will happen the next day.]

 

TL:

  •  [Notes that Shas is holding out for allowances for the children. If they get it, they will vote against the dissolution, if they don’t – they will support it. Meanwhile the finance minister has promised to quit if Shas gets the allowances.
  •  Barak wanted to fix a date for the preliminary vote for early elections, to give Kadima an opportunity to change its leadership.  But then Olmert said if they vote for early elections, he will fire the ministers. He passed a note in the cabinet meeting.
  •  If that happens, Monday there will be a no-confidence vote. 15 out of 19 support the elections(?) from labor.  It is in the interest of Kadima to have stability, not to change the government.]
  •  I think that we can keep this process as a living one one way or the other.  If there are elections – I don’t think that there will be – in a coalition let by Kadima, clearly they will go on. The right alone is not enough – you need center something.  The process itself is something that is being supported.

 

[Side discussion of Sarkosy’s speech. All sides thought it was positive. Discussion then turned to Mohammed Shtayyeh and his Le Monde interview.]

 

TL:

  •  How do you see the ceasefire?

 

AA:

  •  Any release of prisoners for Hamas should be after a release for Abu Mazen.  Those released should not be criminals, but real prisoners.  [You need to show that violence does not yield results.] It may affect the negotiations. Please put this in your consideration.  Particularly the old prisoners from before Oslo.

 

TL:   [Starts to ask a question but is interrupted.]

 

AA:

  •  I want to speak about real prisoners that will be influential in the negotiations.  That AM is doing his best and is able to release real prisoners.

 

TL:

  •  I don’t know what will happen with Gilad Shalit but clearly the discussion started with Egypt and will be seen as a victory of some sort for Hamas. Two questions: 1. is it possible to create benchmarks between us? So that we can do the release (once some event happens)?  

 

AA:

  •  You mean like kidnapping an Israeli?

 

TL:

  •  You know when you are smiling you ask the most difficult questions.
  •  2. is there any possibility that AM can be involved in this, I don’t know how, but so he can get the credit?
  •  Is it crazy?   Right after the kidnapping there were some talks [i.e. about AM brokering the deal through the Egyptians].

 

SE:

  •  It wasn’t just right after it happened – for a whole year we tried.  But then Hamas sent messages to you through the press and Hamas decided they’d get more by keeping the card in their hand.   We agreed on the truce based on many things – Rafah, and that AM brokered it – no one mentioned that!  

 

TL:

  •  I made the point myself to the Egyptians! It’s their fault!
  •  On Rafah it worked – we worked together to come up with something creative for Rafah.  

 

SE:

  •  The message – today two Palestinians were killed in the West Bank.  Palestinians will read the truce – Hamas got Israel to promise not to kill our fighters, but we (Fatah, the PLO, etc.) cannot protect anyone in the West Bank! If you make it look like Hamas can protect their fighters, and get prisoners released, yet AM, AA can’t get anything, we won’t be left with much of a choice but to withdraw from the negotiations!   

 

AA:

  •  [You are basically delegitimizing the PLO in favor of Hamas.] It can’t be done without real generous steps from Israel.

 

TL:

  •  [Aside about Amr Moussa who made difficult statements in the Berlin security conference earlier in the morning about settlement expansion and that everyone is just “chatting” in the negotiations.]

 

AA:

  •  If you release 1000 prisoners it will be…!!!

 

TL:

  •  The prisoners that Hamas wants are the most difficult ones – blood not just on their hands, but all over!  I said Israel goes into Gaza, because they are attacking Israel; they target Israel, use terror and continue the ongoing smuggling of weapons.   If they stop we can stop. If they want the crossings, you need also Shalit. You are also connected with the Rafah crossing. Maybe we can find a way to link these.
  •  The other track is the bilateral track.  Not linked to kidnapping soldiers, it’s just related to – excuse me for saying so – but good behaviour.
  •  But it is related not just to numbers, but to quality.  So even if we release for you, if Hamas gets what they want they will still get more than you!  

 

AA:

  •  [If things continue like this, it is pretty clear that AM/we will lose the next elections – prisoners, settlements, roadblocks – none have been removed.]

 

TL:

  •  Our choice was between a massive operation, you would have stopped negotiations, or something else which undermines AM.  It is lose – lose for the PA!

 

AA:

  •  It legitimizes resistance, missiles, etc.

 

TL:

  •  Yes – how can we work together to cut the losses?  Esp. with this gathering today.

 

TB:

  •  Projects in Gaza – business as usual in Gaza [is what the international community is saying].

 

TL:

  •  So we need to make sure that Gaza and Hamas are not legitimized until they meet the conditions [i.e. not support new projects in the Gaza Strip, etc.].

 

AA:  

  •  The Quartet conditions, early elections, forming a government – these are AM’s conditions.  

 

TB:

  •  Are you telling this to the European governments?

 

TL:

  •  We need to make sure that the Europeans, etc. don’t start with projects in Gaza, etc.

 

AA:

  •  What do you want to do with Condi?

 

TL:

  •  I asked [i.e. not to come] – we have no time – complicated internal situation – etc.  In our former meeting we raised borders and security.  

 

AA:

  •  Now refugees.    Why not more on territory and security?

 

TL:

  •  They know our positions.

 

AA:

  •  It hasn’t changed?

 

[Side discussion on field tours.  AA asks if technical team went to Maale Adummin today. UD responded no, because Pal team wanted to go to Wadi Fukin. Discussion that field visits would be accelerated – with two full days next week to do entire map. UD argued it takes time. TL said, take your time but do it over one or two days next week – the area is not that big.]

 

TL:

  •  On security – last meeting was substantive.  Then both sides got busy.
  •  We need to address refugees. You wanted to address water also.
  •  I don’t know if it’s the right time to do it, but I wanted to speak to you about the process and what is needed – a timetable, not dates, but process.  
  •  [Explains that there are basically three phases – now negotiating on the terms of a peace treaty.  Once we’ve agreed that, we need to discuss the implementation protocols that will define the transitional period. Then there are issues that we may decide to defer until post statehood because they are essentially state to state issues that are not urgent or essential. Simultaneously Roadmap implementation will continue.]
  •  We can reach an agreement, only when it addresses the interests of your people and our people in a real way.

 

SE:

  •  Let’s have a meeting on just this. This is important – but let’s go back to the question Abu Ala asked.  

 

TL:

  •  Refugees?

 

SE:

  •  [What to say to Rice.]  1. Tell her failure is not an option for any of us.  

 

TL:

  •  The problem is how do you define failure?

 

SE:

  •  Failure is post- Camp David 2000.  2.  We are agreeing on things.  3.  You talked about security and territory, today on water and refugees.

 

[Side discussion on OLM interview in an Arab newspaper where he notes we are working towards a comprehensive agreement and that he is against a state with provisional borders.]

 

TL:

  •  I agree that post-Camp David is a failure that none of us want.  The best option is to reach an agreement.  The worst is to try and fail [i.e. an administration on the way out does a big push (like Clinton)]. The medium – better than the worst – is that the peace process will continue.  
  •  The Russians, in Sept –

 

TB:

  •  The Quartet meeting in September they are talking about it as possibly being an assessment of the peace process by the international community.  

 

SE:

  •  Amr Moussa wanted to do this in the Arab League and we said no.

 

TL:

  •  Do we want it? Ok or no?

 

AA:

  •  Why not?

 

TL:

  •  Pros and cons…

 

AA:

  •  The Palestinian track and the Syrian track. [Side discussion on Syrian track.]  If now until August, there are indications of progress, then the whole world will support the multilateral negotiations.  This will give hope to the regions. [i.e. transparency may help.]

 

TL:

  •  The downside – if the gathering is one where we come and say all is good, we have the structure, support the multilateral track – fine.  The problems come when we start on territory – 1.9%, 7.3%, etc.; security – limited arms/demilitarized; refugees with the mechanism, etc.  Jerusalem – I cannot speak about it now.  We’ll say that there are gaps, etc.  [Public opinion will be up against us on all the issues.] This will end up at the end of Camp David.  We’re all going to be judged by the extremists.  

 

AA:

  •  By September, we should have some progress.  
  •  If we go and we are supportive of the process and each other then it could be good.

 

[Discussion that if the parties will go, it must be an agreed agenda etc. Discussion turns to water – TL promises to come to the trilateral with an answer to the Jordan River Basin issue.]

 

 

MEETING:  BILATERAL (PALESTINIANS – AMERICANS)

Hotel Adlon Kempinski, 2h30pm

 

Attendees:

 

Americans:

  •  Secretary Rice (CR)
  •  David Welsh (DW)
  •  Eliot Abrams (EA)
  •  Jonathan Shwartz (JS)

 

Palestinian 

  •  Ahmed Querei (AA)
  •  Dr. Saeb Erekat (SE)
  •  Zeinah Salahi (ZS)

 

Meeting Summary (not verbatim):

 

[Meeting opens with a short discussion about Amr Moussa’s comments in the security conference.]

 

CR:

  •  [Notes the minimum conditions for Hamas.]  Respect for the other party’s right to exist, renounce violence, and respect the Palestinian agreements that have been in effect for decades!
  •  Tell me where you are – then tell me what you want to talk about in the trilateral.
  •  [Notes some of these meetings are important to make progress and some to show that there is movement.]

 

AA:

  •  We met with TL this morning.  We talked about two issues – the Tahdiya and the prisoners – if Israel will release prisoners to Hamas, some of them old [i.e. pre-Olso], they will kill us!   It will give legitimacy to Hamas. Everyone will think that this is the way.  Before you do anything for Hamas – release to AM. Otherwise we cannot continue [the negotiations etc.].   
  •  The second – it is also time to freeze the settlements. If they do these two things, with your momentum [lists meetings CR has attended/facilitated] this will show seriousness. I am afraid of what Amr Moussa said today.  You can come and say if Palestinians agree, I support it. But to come [and speak against one party…]  Also, OLM was in Egypt – I don’t know what they talked about but this creates problems for us.  [Notes Sarkozy positively. And notes the difficulties in internal Israeli politics].
  •  On borders – nothing new. On security – we talked – we prepared a paper. I think that they will like it.  Today we will talk about refugees, water.  We wanted to talk about Jerusalem –

 

CR:

  •  But probably not today.  

 

AA:

  •  Ok. For now, not for tomorrow.  
  •  We agreed to meet Sunday and Monday.  We will see.  
  •  [Notes OLM interview.]

 

CR:

  •  I told TL and I’ll tell you. What I have to do is to prevent what people like Amr Moussa said – “we need to hear the details and if Annapolis fails we need to go to a unity government” – this is bad for all of us.  [In our last meeting] I learned a lot about the link between borders and security.  I want to go back to Gaza – our understanding – the opening of Rafah is based on the Nov 2005 agreement. Other crossings are mentioned there too – [we want to maintain] the Palestinian element – we are working with the Egyptians on this, to not let Hamas get the credit.

 

AA:

  •  If the people see progress in the West Bank and see the situation in Gaza improve for the people, the people will be – Hamas does not have the same popularity as before.  If people think that the peace talks achieve more than the kassams…

 

SE:

  •  In Gaza we’re in a lose – lose situation as the Palestinian Authority. [Notes that once Hamas is honoring the truce, they won’t have the funerals of martyr’s to rally people around, and it will become very apparent how badly their policies have failed.] How do we handle it? We can’t do more than damage control.  
  •  [They are going to release 450 prisoners – we want it, but without something similar for AM they will put us in an impossible situation. She mentioned benchmarks…]

 

AA:

  •  I said do you want me to kidnap another Shalit?

 

CR:  

  •  On Gaza – I don’t think that it has to be a lose- lose.  If there were high civilian casualties, that would be a huge loss.   Rafah – everyone knows that the 2005 agreement is with the Palestinian Authority and not Hamas.  

 

SE:

  •  If there is an area 10-15 km around Rafah, where the PA can be there.  I spoke to TL about it, She thinks it is a good idea.  AG is against it.  He doesn’t think it will work.

 

DW:

  •  Europeans came to us and said that they heard from you guys about a meeting with everyone – Egypt, plus Hamas to talk about Rafah. The Europeans won’t do it – they won’t go into an agreement with Hamas as a partner.

 

SE:

  •  I discussed it with Marc Otte – we’re on the same page.

 

CR:

  •  We’ll try to get the word out.

 

JS:

  •  On the pre-1993 prisoners – why were they not released?

 

AA:

  •  We agreed with Rabin, that they would all be released, gradually. But they were never released.

 

SE:

  •  We tried.  Israel hides behind the “ blood on their hands”. But now with Hamas – as TL said they have blood all over.

 

CR:

  •  When the Israelis come – we will talk about the time line. From now to the UNGA, the UNGA to the end of the year.

 

SE:

  •  Failure is not an option. TL asked me what failure means. I said post- Camp David.

 

CD:

  •  We have between now and the UNGA in September to see how much we can unlock.  At the UNGA, you will be under enormous pressure to get the support of the international community.  
  •  [We will talk to TL – maybe you can come to the US. Not together, but on separate bilateral trips in July.]
  •  Jonathan is keeping a record.  

 

AA:

  •  So that one day you can intervene? [i.e. in the process with a paper or something]

 

[All move to the trilateral room.]

 

MEETING:  TRIILATERAL (PALESTINIANS – AMERICANS – ISRAELIS)

Hotel Adlon Kempinski, 3h00pm

 

Attendees:

 

Americans:

  •  Secretary Rice (CR)
  •  David Welsh (DW)
  •  Eliot Abrams (EA)
  •  Jonathan Shwartz (JS)

 

Palestinian 

  •  Ahmed Querei (AA)
  •  Dr. Saeb Erekat (SE)
  •  Zeinah Salahi (ZS)

 

Israeli

  •  FM Tzipi Livni (TL)
  •  Tal Becker (TB)
  •  Udi Dekel (UD)

 

Meeting Summary (not verbatim):

 

CR:

  •  [Thanks all for joining, even though it was difficult.]
  •  We will resume on security. Talk some on refugees. Then something on water – which we couldn’t get to last time.  
  •  We are trying to make sure that I have a good mental record.  But first, I want to talk about the calendar. From now until the UNGA, then the UNGA to the end of the year.  What will you say to the international community? There is the possibility of coming to the Quartet together.  No one will let the process fail.  Before we go on, I’ll let you guys if you have any opening comments.

 

AA:

  •  Go back to territory and borders – we are discussing; we formed a committee to go around to all the blocks of settlements.  
  •  About water – there are two kinds of water – water aquifers – we need to see how to share the aquifers – and the surface water, like in the Jordan Valley.  There is little – but we have to share that too. If we start an expert committee…

 

CR:

  •  Before you continue – with refugees, if TL – do you have preliminary comments?

 

TL:

  •  When we explain to the international community [we sound better than when we talk to each other – because they comment on how we use the same words.] On security – it is best to just outline – if you want to explain your needs… [to the Pals].  Demilitarization, the airspace, the seaspace, to supervise and control the crossings between the Palestinian state and the third parties. [Notes lessons of Gaza, Rafah, etc.] We have some special security needs. We have to discuss the outcome of the needs.  
  •  On water – in our last meeting, I promised you an answer. Let’s speak about everything. We have some issues with respect to our agreement with Jordan – which we need a little time to check.  But meantime we can start with the aquifers.

 

SE:

  •  We agreed to have a committee of experts [TL: agreed] to collect data [TL: agreed] for them to come and tell me that because of Jordan we can’t discuss! So please don’t exclude anything in the collection of the data.

 

TL:

  •  You described something that was true. I think it’s an answer that was based on a mistake [i.e. the position at the technical committee].  I sent that message to the experts.  We can talk about water without waiting for [linking it to] territory etc.

 

CR:

  •  Do you have the expertise among you?

 

[All say yes.]

 

UD:

  •  WE agreed that first we have to understand the situation – but [notes that for allocation discussions, you need to involve others in the region].  

 

CR:

  •  [Notes she worked on the water treaty between the US and Mexico.] Sounds to me that you agreed several things:
    •  You will discuss everything.
    •  You need data.
    •  The aquifers and other sources of water…
    •  With respect to other parties – you can go as far as you can until you reach a problem and you need others involved.

 

AA:

  •  Next week we will have extensive meetings on water.

 

TL:

  •  Next week will be the tours.

 

CR:

  •  Are you keeping a calendar?

 

AA:

  •  Yes.

 

AA:

  •  Security – [MISSING]; no hostile military alliances.

 

SE:

  •  We know that the day after we will be independent, sovereign, etc. One thing we will do is take into account Israeli interests.  

 

CR:

  •  Is there an agreed list [of issues]?

 

SE:

  •  Nothing is agreed.  [SE summarizes the three major elements of Palestinian security, reading from security team’s paper.] The security forces will be governed by international standards.

 

UD:

  •  What are international standards with respect to security?

 

SE:

  •  Law and security are linked [like the conference today].

 

CR:

  •  We use this term a lot.  Standards for detaining and trying people, etc. Security forces should not act with impunity, etc.

 

SE:

  •  Whatever is agreed will be agreed with you – not others.  We want to learn from the experiences from other countries.  
  •  2. We know that we’ll have limitations – so we need the help of the third party.  [Notes examples of smuggling and capacity building. Notes that there are lessons that were learned from Gaza.]  Never again – excuse the term, but that’s how serious we are.
  •  We’ll agree the tasks/mandate with you.
  •  As far as your concerns – short of your military presence – what can we do?  EWS?  Can someone else operate them for you?  We don’t want [anyone] to feel threatened from us!  [We will worry about the security of the Israel soldiers if they stay from people rallying against them – the Palestinians will cooperate if it is third parties.]

 

CR:

  •  I’ve heard two very interesting presentations – there are lots to discuss.  It sounds like there is a place to start – what are the functions of the security forces?  I heard a good list. [Notes most of the basics from the Palestinian paper.] You can start the discussion next time. I had a question – on the day after how do you see it?

 

TL:

  •  [Explains timeline again. Notes that transitional arrangements are not just about security.]

 

TB:

  •  We have an article in the agreement – steps towards a Palestinian state.

 

TL:

  •  We just want to be discussing in the same language.  

 

[Notes joke from the earlier meeting, where TL noted that infrastructure was one of the issues that needed to be discussed when discussing transitional arrangements. AA noted that they wanted “the state to come furnished”!]

 

CR:

  •  It’s important to start now – you can see if there are things you need to do now.  Like the SF work with Barak – that’s basically Roadmap implementation. We said – like we said in Iraq and Afghanistan – once the Iraqis or Afghanis step up, we step back.  Since everything is subject to the Roadmap, you might as well start so you will be further along.  You need to do things [to Pals], I don’t know what you need to do for the settlers [to Isrs].  We’re going to talk in a minute about refugees.  You also need a list of what the international community will need to do for an agreement.  

 

AA:

  •  We’re talking about five main issues, and the sixth is coming. We need to start working more through the experts.  

 

TB:

  •  We see structure as this agreement, with implementation protocols. Not a 1000 page treaty after.  

 

UD:

  •  Sorry to go back to security.  Up until now you heard only the titles. Now we need to talk about the details.  Not just outlining the objectives. [We talked about the challenges, we discussed the objectives, now we need to define the missions.  We need enough details in the agreement itself to know what we need to do.]

 

CR:

  •  I agree. [TL: We all agree.]  We hope that they [the security people] will meet and say, what do we have to do?  For example on fighting terrorism – we used to always say you guys know a lot more about that than us. Now we can’t say that anymore, unfortunately.   It takes active intelligence, it also takes hearts and minds so that someone doesn’t end up in a madrassah and instead goes to a boys and girls club.  Maybe you can begin to develop subarticles on security.  For example, one on terrorism – what does it take to fight?  Then Palestinians will know what they need to do, etc.  In our experience, fighting terrorism is about the civil and the military working together.

 

AA:

  •  I don’t agree with UD.  We know the duties. We don’t want permanent agreements with conditions.  I commit myself to fight terror – but how is not to be in the agreement.   

 

CR:

  •  I want to understand. We have this kind of an agreement with Iraq and with Afghanistan. Why would you not want to define what it means to fight terror?

 

AA:

  •  We agree to fight it – but ten pages of details on it should not be in the agreement.

 

UD:

  •  We have with Egypt a security appendix.

 

TL:

  •  [If it’s about selling it to the people, we can put it in an annex.]

 

AA

  •  I don’t want to hide my obligations!  But I can’t write in the agreement that we will close shops, etc.

 

TL:

  •  [I appreciate your good faith in discussing this, I see that you appreciate and consider Israeli security concerns, and your words about Gaza. They were even moving. But it’s not enough.] I need to go to my people. At the end of the day they will criticize us anyway and say that this is just on paper.  [I understand what you say about your dignity, but…]

 

AA:

  •  No no, we are not trying to hide our obligations.

 

SE:

  •  This is just what Tal was saying – that we can put the details in the implementation protocols. [CR nods.]

 

TL: [Notes the details of their agreement on the Sinai.]

 

CR:

  •  I hear several things – one is that you will have a concept of security.  You will probably have a security appendix. But what I heard UD say is that it will maybe be useful to start having a discussion on how to do this, in the meetings.  For example, I can imagine that you will want to have some sort of counter-terrorism task force, with us, with others… etc.

 

[Discussion turns to Refugees. TL invites TB to speak on their behalf so as to not “ruin” the good mood of the room.]

 

TB:

  •  Our aim is to have a single document on refugees. To clean up the rest of the text, so that what is left is to isolate all of the decisions that the leadership has to make.  
  •  We have agreement on:
  •  Comprehensive solution. At the heard is the international mechanism to assist in three things:  1. options for the resettlement of refugees.  Here there are some options that we agree on, and one big one that we don’t.  We agree that a Palestinian state is part of the solution, but we disagree over whether all refugees will have Palestinian citizenship under Palestinian law.  We agree to look at third countries as well.  The role of the mechanism…

 

SE:

  •  Return.

 

TL:

  •  Return is people who lived there and now want to return. But you say for all Palestinians [i.e. decedents] and not just Palestinians who left.  It is the broadest definition of refugees in the world.  When you create your own law of return for all Palestinians, this will be the beginning of the end of the conflict.  [Pal side notes the law of return in Israel.]

 

TB:

  •  [A phasing out of UNRWA with the implementation mechanism.] 2.  Rehabilitation/ assistance for integration. Jordan is asking for retroactive rehabilitation assistance.  

 

[Long discussion on whether this was appropriate.]

 

TL:

  •  But when we raised the Jewish refugees, you said this was outside the scope of what you could discuss.  Do you represent Jordan on this?

 

CR:

  •  This is not an issue you can decide on your own – and it’s one where the international community will not want a precedent.  
  •  Compensating for past help [is problematic]. For rehabilitation, resettlement, going forward – I see. But retrospectively, the international community will have a view.

 

AA:

  •  If the Jordanians are satisfied with [the peace agreement – it is important].

 

CR:

  •  Also, there is a question of if the compensation will go to the refugees or to the states.  If the US is going to have a major role, we have a problem with funding the states for refugees.  
  •  Jordan now we are paying for some of the Iraqi refugees, through helping to cover some of the costs.  For example Lebanon – Lebanon won’t give so many Sunnis citizenship.  The living conditions [are awful.]… maybe the international community can contribute. We can start working quietly on this issue.  

 

TB:

  •  Compensation – we agree that there will be compensation; that we mechanism will establish the criteria, timetable and the mechanism for payment; that the mechanism is the only source; and that Israel will contribute.
  •  We disagree on restitution in kind – actual houses to owners; the kind of compensation and descriptive language there (i.e. total, comprehensive, etc.) and defining what it’s for (i.e. material, non material damages).  
  •  We have a major area of disagreement about responsibility. In our point of view this is basically asking us to take on their narrative.  No more responsibility with respect to refugees outside the agreement.

 

CR:

  •  Is this what I’ve heard about “end of claims”?

 

TB:

  •  Well this is related, but it is not it.  There is a separate clause for that, and for refugees.  

 

SE:

  •  We need to not anger Jordan if they are going to help us and support the agreement.  I can’t speak on behalf of Jordan.  We are getting Arab states to look after their interests.

 

CR:

  •  Those are good points. I spoke to people around the table at Camp David (Americans) and they disagree about a lot but they all agree that there was not enough Arab Support.  Jordan, Egypt etc.  and Syria not to obstruct.
  •  We would start thinking quietly about what the international community should do at the level of Jonathan. With your permission we’d like to start looking at this.  Jordan is our ally.  

 

[SE and ZS note large amount of NSU work on the subject. CR invites us to brief them, esp Jonathan, on the issue.]

 

TB:

  •  I forgot to mention that we agree that there will be an international fund.

 

CR:

  •  Maybe we will be able to find countries that can contribute in kind. Chile, Argentina, etc. (i.e. give land).  

 

AA:

  •  They are focusing on the easier stuff.

 

TL:

  •  This way when it comes to us we’ll just have the hard questions.

 

CR:

  •  On territory – you are going on the field tours. You know you have to discuss the swaps, the safe passage.  You are discussing the whole of the territory – you know what the denominator is.  Refugees looks like it is going well.  We’ll look at the mechanism.  Security you’ll look at – UD how did you put it?  [UD: Challenges, objectives, missions].
  •  UNGA on September 20th, September 19th it starts.

 

SE:

  •  TL said something about Moscow and I agree 100% with it.  I don’t want to get to the UNGA and have everyone evaluate us because then everyone will attack us.  We only need meetings that will support us.  

 

CR:

  •  I think that the Russians understand.  All that we will talk about about Moscow is a date.

 

TL:

  •  [You don’t want there to be unrealistic expectations.  So you need to include something in the statement like “in agreement with both sides”.]  

 

CR:

  •  There are three different things:  1. the Quartet meeting today. The Russians just want a sense of if people want to go.   2.  keep in mind the schedule of the UNGA.  [Not to go and discuss the details, x vs y percent.] Just intensify the meetings between now and August. Don’t think about what you want to tell people now.  [You can just say intensive meetings, etc. lists more process points.]

 

TL:

  •  Can it be said that the agenda etc. will be in agreement with the parties?

 

DW:

  •  The statement will be nothing that detailed, but we will say in agreement with the parties.

 

CR:

  •  I don’t plan to come to Israel the week of the 7th.  [Notes possible July visits to DC, separately, by the parties.]
  •  The Pressline?  We met, discussions continue. Serious, in depth. Looking for ways that the international community can help.

 

Posted in Palestine AffairsComments Off on Palestinian Traitors and the Security of the Zio-Nazi Regime (16)

Nazi Livni Refuses Compensation fot Occupation (15)

Meeting Minutes: Bilateral Post-Annapolis Plenary Session

Summary

 

The two sides discuss what they call a “gap” in their positions on core issues, from security and settlements to borders, Jerusalem and refugees. Israeli official Tzipi Livni refuses to agree on the issue of “compensation for occupation,” saying Israel will not pay for the damage done to the Palestinian economy as a result of her country’s decades-long occupation. Livni also suggests that an Arab village in Israel, Wadi Ara, could be swapped during the negotiations and made part of a future Palestinian state. PA official Qurei says “absolutely not.”

Full text

Minutes from Plenary Session

Post Annapolis

Monday, 21st June 2008, 3h00pm

Inbal Hotel, room 902, West Jerusalem

 

Attendees:

Palestinian 

  •  Ahmed Querei (AA)
  •  Dr. Saeb Erekat (SE)
  •  Zeinah Salahi (ZS)

 

Israeli

  •  FM Tzipi Livni (TL)
  •  Tal Becker (TB)
  •  Udi Dekel (UD)

 

Meeting Summary (not verbatim):

 

TL:

  •  Did she say what she expects? On the 30th?

 

AA:

  •  She wants an agreement by the end of the year.  I tried to tell her assistants let’s look at the alternatives. They said she doesn’t want to hear the word “alternatives”.

 

TL:

  •  Your boss either.

 

AA:

  •  Lets look at the gaps.  

 

TL:

  •  We know the gaps.

 

AA:

  •  No…

 

SE:

  •  It’s true – he doesn’t believe my assessment.

 

AA:

  •  I want to hear from you. I have a suggestion – let’s draft the entire agreement.  We can do it, then we can go through it…
  •  But let me ask first – do you want an agreement? Is it an Israeli priority?

 

TL:

  •  By definition an agreement is an Israeli priority.  We have [internal politics].  It is our priority to continue to advance this. It is our priority to prevent failure.  There are some problems with facts on the ground…

 

AA:

  •  You mean settlements, roadblocks, etc.?

 

TL:

  •  No – this is yours – I heard this from Gordon Brown. [Noting criticism Israel received on settlement expansion, etc.]

 

TB:

  •  He got the powerpoint.

 

TL:

  •  If it reflects Israeli needs, not positions…

 

AA:

  •  If we look at Israeli needs – they will never be satisfied.

 

TL:

  •  We feel the same about your positions.  [TL notes that it would be good to hear Palestinian understanding of Israeli positions.]
  •  We stopped confiscation of land in the last year. It’s the only thing we have done, but…

 

SE:

  •  He has a point. It’s not about just presenting Israeli positions and Palestinian positions.  He’ll let me do it [present positions] – but this approach is much better – to sit and draft together.  There are there ways [to proceed]:
    •  Exchange papers – lock in [positions] as we are doing.
    •  The Matrix
    •  The integrated approach with I’s and P’s.
  •  If we had not had to go to Washington, we would have gotten much further.  Look at the examples of the Culture of Peace, state to state, etc.
  •  The best way to reach an agreement is the integrated approach.  The differences and the options will be clear.  You cannot waste an agreement because you will see it [i.e. how close it could be].

 

TL:

  •  I think that there is a gap in our positions and the way they are perceived by you.  This is why it is good for me to hear.  In Berlin we discussed the nature of the agreement. Concrete enough on issues that are important to us. Issues you need in more details, and issues we need in more details. At the end of the day there will be issues that we can’t bridge by just putting something on paper. Others can be. The implementation will be in an annex later.
  •  Question – when you are thinking about any agreement – what are the things in a list that are crucial for you in an agreement?
  •  For example – my understanding is that on borders you need to know where the borders are. The connection between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. And where the swaps are.
  •  For us, on security we need the answer to – army, list of arms, passages, airport and seaport, electromagnetic spectrum, airspace [SE – the nine issues…].  
  •  Let’s say we reach an agreement on limited arms or demilitarization. It is not enough because we need to know [these other things].  
  •  We need to know that the agreement is the end of conflict. In other words, what needs to be in an agreement for the end of conflict? For example, water is for you, but not for us.  
  •  Culture of peace is important, but I don’t think it is a deal breaker.  
  •  Economy – is what is there enough?
  •  Prisoners, you need.
  •  Passages is something that we didn’t start to work on.   We need to agree today a team to work on it.
  •  Settlements – do we need a reference to the process after an agreement for evacuation? This is something that can be done.   That can help…

 

AA:

  •  We need seven packages.
  •  General provisions – they worked on it. We can add, correct, etc.
  •  Borders and Territory – within that we can set as sub-issues, settlements (once we define the border what is in, is inside, what is out is outside.)

 

TL:

  •  I need to understand – in order to have a treaty, I need to know the borders of a future Palestinian state – as a Palestinian?
  •  You say you need to address Jerusalem as well.  

 

AA:

  •  But there are many details on settlements.  How much time you need for an evacuation.  

 

TL:

  •  I’m trying to understand the structure and connect it to the essence.

 

AA:

  •  Timeline

 

TL:

  •  Ok on timeline in terms of gradual withdrawal.
  •  Jerusalem?

 

AA:

  •  Within the territory and the borders.

 

TL:

  •  The holy basin…?

 

AA:

  •  We’ll talk about the holy places – we can come to details on how to cooperate.  Yaani, there are two sides to Jerusalem. Territory and the modalities, which includes the holy places, etc. [lists some examples of types of modalities].  

 

TL:

  •  But are these needed in the treaty?

 

AA:

  •  Yes!

 

TL:

  •  I’m just trying to understand the basics for what needs to be…
  •  You rejected a committee on the holy basin?  

 

[Palestinian side indicates rejection.]

 

AA:

  •  Water – two sides.  Shared resources must be discussed. Western aquifer – part in each territory, the Jordan River is shared. What’s in Palestine is Palestinian.

 

TL:

  •  What needs to be in the agreement?  Resolution of the issue of water.

 

AA:

  •  Passages.

 

TL:

  •  What on the passages?

 

AA:

  •  What needs to be in the monitoring of the passages, etc.
  •  Security – I think they talked.  We need the details.

 

TL:

  •  On security, you don’t need anything. We need something.

 

AA:

  •  We need security for our people. We need a third party.  

 

TL:

  •  But you know the details that we need?

 

AA:

  •  Yes…

 

TL:

  •  Why the eagerness of the third party?  Why is it so important for you?

 

AA:

  •  It is important for both.  It will give us more satisfaction on security and you.  [i.e. to prevent an Israeli presence.]

 

TL:

  •  Your position on security is that you don’t want Israeli uniforms on Palestinian territory, so it’s not about the third party.   [AA agrees.] But if we reach an understanding that it [the third party] doesn’t help you, we don’t need it?
  •  Let’s assume that we don’t have any security needs, except no Palestinian army.  Let’s assume that the future Palestinian state is without soldiers. Palestinian or Israeli.  You need the 3rd party?

 

SE:

  •  Yes.

 

TL:

  •  Explain.

 

AA:

  •  We need, as a state, good security to maintain the rule of law and fight terror. And so we need a third party for at least part of the time.

 

TL:

  •  Why do you need them?

 

AA:

  •  On borders, on passages…

 

TL:

  •  Why on borders?

 

AA:

  •  We want to defend ourselves.  

 

[Israeli side has side discussion.]

 

AA:

  •  The fourth is on refugees.

 

TL:

  •  I’m not sure I understand your position better, but this is for Amos and Hazem to continue.
  •  Hazem is away for two weeks.

 

AA:

  •  The work will go on.

 

SE:

  •  We’ve explained many times – the third party is not there to fight Israelis.  We never said that.  Capacity building, monitoring implementation, crossings –

 

TL:

  •  You want to monitor it? Or you want them to?

 

AA:

  •  Both.

 

SE:

  •  You are not the only party on my border.  Egypt. Jordan.  I don’t have what they have [in terms of capacity/weapons].  

 

TL:

  •  This is new – it was not raised in the past? At Camp David?

 

SE:

  •  Yes, I raised it with Clinton. And we agreed on US troops!

 

AA:

  •  In Stockholm, Camp David, Taba…

 

TL:

  •  Amos is ok.  He has a sense of urgency to address these issues now.  

 

TB:

  •  There we two good meetings in the past two weeks.  

 

TL:

  •  I’m still not clear on why you need it.  

 

AA:

  •  We need [returning to the issue of refugees]:
  •  Responsibility
  •  Second — the right of return,
  •  Third — reparations for individuals
  •  Fourth — reparations for host countries
  •  Fifth – the international fund.
  •  And then the fund of absentee…

 

TL:

  •  This is crucial for you for an agreement?

 

AA:

  •  Because everything relating to Palestinian property should be deposited in this fund.  

 

TL:

  •  I would like to ask you something.  Reparations for host countries is not something that you want. It is something that the Jordanians want…

 

AA:

  •  We don’t want to keep the money!  But we are part of the host countries. Not you – it is your responsibility.
  •  End of conflict, and arbitration mechanism.

 

TL:

  •  Why do you need it?

 

AA:

  •  We can include in two paragraphs.  The first – the two sides will try to solve. If not, the second [will outline the arbitration mechanism].

 

TB:

  •  Sounds like the agreement with Jordan and Egypt.

 

AA:

  •  Generic issues – economy. If we can’t agree we can say two states will conclude an economic agreement.  

 

TL:

  •  Infrastructure?

 

AA:

  •  Should be solved inside the borders… what is inside –

 

TL:

  •  This is the furnished state that you want?   So we need to address it anyway.  

 

AA:

  •  Prisoners.
  •  I propose that the two gentlemen, with whomever they want with them, try to draft the positions.  I don’t know your positions on anything!   Maybe on Culture of Peace and economy.  

 

TL:

  •  Let’s see where we stand, not about the positions. But on what needs to be addressed.  I agree that:
  •  Real and concrete borders are needed.  
  •  A timeline with reference to settlements and gradual process of evacuation – the way Israel leaves the West Bank.  
  •  On these now, we are talking about borders.  In terms of borders we need to know exactly where exact borders are.  You know where we start in terms of positions.  The gap – with respect to blocs of settlements – is not a matter of percentages but about places.

 

AA:

  •  We don’t want to talk about blocs.

 

TL:

  •  I’m talking about my positions.    We need also to know – settlements.  What will happen with them, how will it be implemented, the timeline? To do it in a gradual way.  
  •  Of course the question of Jerusalem – it is important for you as part of an agreement. But there is a question that was raised not by us – if it can be…

 

SE:

  •  No. We answered.  

 

TL:

  •  Water is important for you, not us.

 

AA:

  •  Territory also not for you but for us.

 

TL:

  •  For us too! Your borders are out legitimate borders.  Jerusalem is important as a city…

 

AA:

  •  It is part of our borders.

 

TL:

  •  Not yet.

 

AA:

  •  Like the rest [of the West Bank].  

 

TL:

  •  Passages – security, customs, etc.  because otherwise there will be friction for access and movement.  

 

SE:

  •  Passage arrangements.  

 

TL:

  •  We need to establish the committee. Who will be there?

 

UD:

  •  Kamil Abu Rukin.

 

SE:

  •  We will get back to you.  

 

TL:

  •  Maritime/port?

 

TB:

  •  Part of passages.

 

UD:

  •  Airspace is part of security.  

 

TL:

  •  We need nothing to do with it, but we understand the need for details on the international fund. Instead of responsibility we can talk of suffering of both our people.
  •  By the way on responsibility – whose responsibility is it for keeping them in the camps? The Arab world!  Responsibility not just about the war, but what happened after. For creating false hope.  
  •  [We need to address also] the Jewish refugees.  Maybe as part of the international fund.  

 

SE:

  •  With all due respect – you had an agreement with Egypt. With Jordan. But we never caused anything to the Jews.  This will not be in an agreement.  

 

AA:

  •  All the Arab countries are ready to receive the Jews.  

 

TL:

  •  We don’t want the right of return. We want to stay!  
  •  We need to give them suffering plus giving them compensation.  We need as you said before that this is the end of conflict – but we need to address some of the other issues.  Economics, Culture of Peace – I think it is important. The question is how much details we need. On economy, I agree with you that we can have a formula, and the details later.  On infrastructure we need it to know what will happen.  On Culture of Peace, it is done, so include it.  
  •  On Prisoners, we don’t need it, but you need it.

 

AA:

  •  We cannot conclude any agreement without it.

 

[Israeli side has a side discussion on legal issues.]

 

SE:

  •  Leave the technical issues to experts. Some legal issues, you can’t live for a second [on the day after] without.  

 

TL:

  •  The most important issues for the gaps – water and infrastructure.  We need to focus on that.   [Side discussion on if environment is close.]

 

TL:

  •  Do you want to meet on water and infrastructure?  

 

SE:

  •  Udi and I will [meet on them once we get back from DC].

 

TB:

  •  We have started to draft the beginning of state to state so we can drop the others in.  

 

AA:

  •  We don’t want the whole agreement to be about state to state.   

 

SE:

  •  We agree on this.

 

TB:

  •  But we agreed that if there are principles that we want to mention…

 

TL:

  •  Settlements?

 

SE:

  •  We exchanged papers.  

 

TL:

  •  Go ahead.  

 

UD:

  •  We’d like to discuss settlements in the territory committee.

 

AA:

  •  One issue is compensation for occupation.

 

TL:

  •  Since you don’t know my position on anything, my position is NO.

 

AA:

  •  Look at all the other Arab states and where Palestine is.  

 

TL:

  •  With all the oil you have in the West Bank…

 

AA:

  •  Jordan –

 

TL:

  •  Look at where Israel would have been.

 

AA:

  •  [Yes – in a much worse position if it hadn’t been for all of the resources you took from the Palestinian state.]

 

TL:

  •  The answer is a dramatic NO.  We don’t want to put in [claims] for all the terrorism.  The Israelis killed.  

 

AA:

  •  OK. Let’s put the Palestinians killed, and the Israeli’s killed. [Implying that by the comparison Israel would still be required to pay significantly more compensation to Palestinians.]

 

TB:

  •  It’s not about success!

 

SE:

  •  You will [pay compensation].

 

TL:

  •  I’m sure we’ll do it, not under the headline of “compensation for occupation”.  
  •  It’s been raised in the past, but it’s new for our discussion.  

 

TB:

  •  It was raised in the beginning.  

 

AA:

  •  The mechanism of implementation and timetable… “steps towards the establishment…”

 

TL:

  •  Two issues related to the borders. When you talk about the line of 1967, there were some Palestinian villages separated by 1967.  I visited an Israeli Palestinian village on Friday – in Wadi Ara.  

 

AA:

  •  What were you doing there? Campaigning?

 

TL:

  •  There are 12,000 Palestinian members of Kadima.

 

UD:

  •  Israeli Arabs.

 

[TL defends using “Palestinians”.  She also notes that all they want are equal rights in Israel and “they deserve it”.]

 

  •  I said from the beginning that it can be part of the swaps.

 

AA:

  •  Absolutely not.

 

TL:

  •  We have this problem with Raja in Lebanon.  Terje Larsen put the blue line to cut the village in two.  [This needs to be addressed.] We decided not to cut the village.  It was a mistake.  The problem now – those living on Lebanese soil are Israeli citizens.  

 

UD:

  •  Barka, Barta il Sharqiya, Barta il [Garbiya], Betil, Beit Safafa…

 

AA:

  •  This will be difficult. All Arabs in Israel will be against us.  

 

TB:

We will need to address it some how.  Divided. All Palestinian. All Israeli.

TL:

  •  We will need to address it one way or another.  
  •  The safe passage.

 

AA:

  •  Of course – it is in borders and territory.  

 

TL:

  •  When you talk about quality and quantity [she notes the idea of investing in areas to be swapped to Palestine in order to increase their value].  

 

AA:

  •  1km in a place with 1km in another place [in the same area].  1 km in Jerusalem is not [going to be swapped] for 100km of desert land.

 

TL:

  •  It is not possible.

 

AA:

  •  Yes it is.  We know it [the areas that can be swapped].

 

TL:

  •  You showed up to 1.9%.  The agreement will be more.

 

AA:

  •  I want you to really think about the blocs of settlements.  [Explains the impact of the settlement blocs around Jerusalem.]
  •  Jerusalem is our petrol.  We expect 100,000’s of pilgrims to come from the East.  With the belt [of settlements], the pilgrims will not come.  

 

TL/TB:

  •  You make the belt – we don’t make it!

 

AA:

  •  We cannot accept this belt of settlements under any circumstances. We need the belt to be open.  

 

TL:

  •  Maale Adumim will be there.  

 

AA:

  •  Ok by power you can keep it.

 

TL:

  •  No, by agreement.  

 

SE:

  •  Have you thought seriously about Jews becoming Palestinian citizens? Or is it just out of the question? Have you asked your team for 50 year projections? Have they thought about it?

 

TL:

  •  Truly?  No.

 

SE:

  •  You are not willing?

 

TB:

  •  In previous meetings you though about the security aspects.

 

TL:

  •  Yes, the lynchings [i.e. the risk that they will happen post-agreement].   But do you really think that this is possible?

 

SE:

  •  Yes.  [Notes the long term positive impact of such integration.]  Think of all of the anti-discrimination laws we will have. It doesn’t cost you anything to think about it.  

 

[TL and SE debate if the conflict is one of sectarian clashes or national movements.]

 

TL:

  •  Can you think about quality in terms of places that are not exact places – around the Gaza Strip?  

 

AA:

  •  You want the agreement to be accepted, it needs to be in the same place. Jerusalem for Jerusalem.  Jenin for Jenin.  Tulkarem for Tulkarem.

 

SE:

  •  There are precedents.  Saudi – Jordan. Iraq – Jordan.  Peru – Ecuador (for sovereignty versus jurisdiction example).

 

TL:

  •  The structure we can share together with the Americans in DC.

 

SE:

  •  It is agreed.  Maybe we can agree to start putting the skeleton of the agreement.  We started…

 

AA:

  •  When will you freeze settlement activity?  This will kill us.  You want to help Hamas on our account?  

 

TL:

  •  There is an AM-OLM meeting. You can raise it.

 

AA:

  •  They will freeze it?  

 

TL:

  •  No but you can raise it.   All these leaders come speak in the Knesset and raise it.  [Because they go see you before they see us.] We can’t freeze in parts of Jerusalem.

 

SE:

  •  What else can we discuss in the US?

 

[SE and TB meetings noted that day and the next day.]

 

AA:

  •  The structure of an agreement.  Agreed/disagreed.
  •  Settlements – I will raise it everywhere.  And other issues of the first phase of the Roadmap.
  •  The Roadmap.  

 

[Discussion of DC logistics and timing.]

Posted in Palestine AffairsComments Off on Nazi Livni Refuses Compensation fot Occupation (15)

Zionist Puppet Delegation in Annapolis Negotiations (14)

Meeting Minutes: Trilateral – United States, Israel and Palestine

Summary

 

Minutes of meeting among US, Palestinian and Israeli delegation in Jerusalem for Annapolis negotiations. The sides discuss whether they can reach an agreement before the end of 2008. The conversation primarily focused on the use 1967 borders as a baseline, East Jerusalem, settlement annexation and related issues.

Full text

Trilateral Meeting Minutes

 

Jerusalem – Inpal Hotel (Larome)

15 June 2008

16:15 – 18:15

 

Attendees

 

American side: – Condoleeza Rice

  •  David Walsh
  •  Eliot Abrams
  •  Jamal Hilal

 

Palestinian side: – Ahmad Qurei (Abu Ala)

  •  Dr Saeb Erekat
  •  Salah Ilayan

 

Israeli side: – Tzipi Livni

  •  Tal Becker
  •  Udi Dekel

 

Rice: – I thank you for this meeting. Our last trilateral meeting was very useful. These meetings are important for evaluating the negotiation process. The US wants to see what it can do to help both sides achieve progress in this process.

 

  •  I think that it possible to reach an agreement by the end of this year.
  •  I understood that at this time three issues must be dealt with: borders, security, refugees.
  •  I do not want to hear each side separately, but I want to discuss each issue together so that we can reach a decision concerning the mechanisms that we need in order to achieve progress in each issue and how to relate it to other issues.
  •  We start with borders, then we move on to security and refugees. Perhaps we will not be able to discuss these three issues today, but we can do that at another time, may be in Berlin.

 

Abu Ala’: – We hope to reach an agreement by the end of this year, and therefore both sides must work seriously.

 

  •  The issues are difficult and need decisions, but there are serious clashes in the negotiations. We must see together and not separately how we can reach an agreement about each issue .
  •  Other difficulties that we face include the continuous settlement activities. This is a deadly point for us. Settlement activities have cornered us and if they continue they will embarrass us before Palestinian public opinion and the Arab world which is urging us to negotiate but at the same time is demanding us not to make the negotiations an umbrella for the continuation of settlement activities.
  •  We spoke with Olmert and Livni about settlement activities, but the activities go on. Each day bids to build settlement residential units  in Jerusalem and the West Bank are announced.
  •  I hope that these settlement activities will stop immediately until we see what will happen at the end of this year.
  •  There are the other issues that are being discussed in the trilateral mechanism between Fayyad, Barak and Dayton regarding commitment to the first stage of Roadmap. We talked about this also with Olmert and Livni.
  •  There are C areas that surround restricted Palestinian areas where Palestinian civilians cannot expand in spite of the existence of large empty land in and around Area C. We talked with Olmert about Area C that surround Abu Dis and Ramallah, and he promised to study that. So far we have gotten no answer.
  •  We asked the Israelis to allow Palestinians set up tourist facilities on the Dead Sea like Jordan and Israel, but we have gotten no answer about this.
  •  These issues are not part of the negotiations, but they help create better ambiance for the negotiations and reinforce public opinion. We must have an Israeli response about these issues.
  •  As for the negotiations, we have talked about all the issues and focused on three main issues. We agreed to start drafting the Palestinian and the Israeli position regarding each issue. Then Abu Mazen, Olmert, Livni and I will sit together. We will also ask for your help to fill in gaps.
  •  If we started drafting, then we would move from the brainstorming stage to the practical stage.
  •  I will start with the land issue. If a breakthrough takes place in this issue then other issues become easier, because defining the land will determine our future.
  •  Our position is that the two state solution should be based on 1967 borders and this includes the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley, No Man’s Land, the Dead Sea and the Gaza Strip. 1967 borders are internationally recognized. Since the beginning we said we are ready to make slight amendments on the borders provided that these amendments do not undermine Palestinian rights and interests. Swap should be for the ratio of 1:1 and for the same value and area.
  •  The Israeli position is that there are facts on the ground and thus let us see what can be removed. This attitude creates disagreement between the two sides. Israel proposed to annex 7.3% of the total area of the West Bank according to Israeli estimation. The Israeli prime minister proposed in exchange 5% from the land of Israel in the desert area located south of Hebron and north of the Gaza Strip.
  •  We proposed that the ratio of swap should not exceed 1.9% from the total area of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, and that swapped land should be located on 1967 borders.
  •  As for settlements, we proposed the following: Removal of some settlements, annexation of others, and keeping others under Palestinian sovereignty.
  •  This last proposition could help in the swap process. We proposed that Israel annexes all settlements in Jerusalem except Jabal Abu Ghneim (Har Homa). This is the first time in history that we make such a proposition; we refused to do so n Camp David.
  •  We cannot accept the annexation of Ma’ale Adumim, Ariel, Giv’at Ze’ev, Ephrat and Har Homa settlements.
  •  There is a settlement belt around Jerusalem and work is done everyday to complete it. Only yesterday Minister of Housing Ze’ev Boim announced a plan to build  1300 residential units on land in Beit Hanina in order to connect Giv’at Ze’ev settlement in Jerusalem. This is not a way to achieve progress in the negotiations.
  •  We focused on our work and gave clear directives to experts; and I think we could achieve progress in the issue of borders.
  •  There is also the Safe Passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. I think it is in the proposition presented by Olmert.

 

Livni: There will be a Safe Passage.

 

Abu Ala’: If we agree on the concept, I think that in three weeks we can reach an agreement on borders and land issues.

 

Livni: I want to understand one thing, since you have come back to 1967 borders. At that time there was no Palestinian state. Today we want part of this land and we think that you deserve to be compensated for what we want. My question is: Do you have a problem because of the area of Ma’ale Adumim or its location?

 

Abu Ala’: Our problem is not in the kilometers, but the settlement block Jerusalem from the East, and from the south there are Kidar and Jabal Abu Ghneim settlements that block Jerusalem. There is a settlement belt around Jerusalem.

 

Livni: I think I mentioned in the last meeting on borders that there is a misunderstanding and the idea we have is not to block Jerusalem completely.

 

Abu Ala’: – We do not want to live in enclaves. We want people to live in peace and to fight against terrorism.

 

  •  Perhaps Ma’ale Adumim will remain under Palestinian sovereignty and it could be a model for cooperation and coexistence. We may also have international forces and make security arrangements for some time. It is the location of Ma’ale Adumim not its size.
  •  There is also Ariel settlement which was set up on the largest water basin. It was not set up simply to provide Israeli with housing units but rather to control the water basin.

 

Livni: – The idea behind our desire to annex Ariel settlement was not to get more water but because thousands of people live there. We want to have an answer for those who have lived there for forty years.

 

  •  Future borders will be complicated but clear. I have seen in Yugoslavia how areas can be connected. The matter is not simply giving a passport to settlers.

 

Abu Ala’: Having Ariel under our control means also that the water basin will be under our control.

 

Livni: We have said that even if we agreed to have Ariel under Israeli control, we have to find a solution to the water issue.

 

Abu Ala’: We find this hard to swallow.

 

Rice: – Let us put Ma’ale Adumim and Ariel aside. I am not trying to solve them here.

 

  •  Let us go back to ratios. You are not taking mere land but taking land that cannot be dealt with as ratios. Most settlements can be dealt with in terms of how much will be annexed and how much will be compensated for. But there are some locations that pose certain problems and must be dealt with creatively.
  •  There are settlements whose location poses a problem. But there will be a Palestinian state and Israel will annex part of the land of this state and give compensation for it.
  •  Let me ask Tzipi: There is part of the land that will be annexed and part that will be compensated for. We must start with the land occupied in 1967 and I believe that the basis is all the land that was occupied in 1967. Let us now leave Ma’ale Adumim and Ariel because their location is problematic.

 

Livni: – When we decided on the annexation, we made it clear to the Palestinians that we will not compensate them with land that is part of Israel now.

 

  •  The issue now is that the Palestinians will not accept that some locations become part of Israel.

 

Rice: This is exactly what I am saying.

 

Livni: Are you talking about two locations only?

 

Abu Ala’: There are more than two locations. There are Ma’ale Adumim, Ariel, Ephrat, Giv’at Ze’ev, Jabal Abu Ghneim (Har Homa).

 

Livni: If we exclude Ma’ale Adumim and Ariel, how would the ratio be 1.9% only?

 

Saeb: Take it and study it.

 

Abu Ala’: Our experts made a positive and constructive proposition that fascinated me.

 

Saeb: According to aerial pictures, the ratio of constructed areas is 1.2%. We suggested in our proposition the inclusion of the largest number possible of settlers. We found that most settlers live in Jerusalem settlements, Gush Itzyon and Latroun.

 

Abu Ala’: Ariel goes for 19 kilometers into the West Bank, and this impedes geographical contiguity and enables Israel to control water resources.

 

Saeb: Our proposition will allow for the inclusion of 70% of settlers, that is about 310,000 settlers.

 

Rice: Did you see their proposition?

 

Livni: We looked at it. There are no Ma’ale Adumim, Ephrat, Ariel, Giv’at Ze’ev or Hara Homa (Jabal Abu Ghneim).

 

Saeb: Why do I not say the opposite, that there are Zakhron Ya’cov, the French Hill, Ramat Eshkol, Ramot Alon, Ramat Shlomo, Gilo, Tal Piot, and the Jewish Quarter in the old city of Jerusalem.

 

Rice: – It is useful to talk about ratios and swaps. It is good to say also that some areas are important because of their locations and because they have natural resources. They are also important because of geographical contiguity. The question is how to find a creative way that would meet the needs of Israel by annexing these areas, on the one hand, and your control of natural resources and geographical contiguity with Jerusalem, on the other.

 

  •  If I come back in two weeks I will ask about the mechanism that you will agree on to solve these issues.
  •  Did you start talk about that?

 

Livni: Yes, we did.

 

Rice: My father used to say that if I asked something of him and I wanted an answer today then the answer was ‘no’, but if I waited for an answer till tomorrow, then the answer would be ‘maybe’.

 

Livni: And if you ask me today, my answer is nigh to ‘no’, and the means to get to ‘maybe’ is to go together in a filed tour on the ground.

 

Rice: Are you working on that?

 

Saeb: We want to do this, but until now we are not convinced that you need these areas. We go together to see the areas and you have to try to convince us that you need them.

 

Rice: I divided the problem into two parts: annexation and compensation; the rest is the state of Palestine. There are two sites that create a problem and they are Ma’ale Adumim because it prevents connection with Jerusalem, and Ariel because of the natural resources. My question is about swap, and it seems to me that it is not necessary now to know the areas for swap. But did you suggest to them the areas designated for swap?

 

Saeb: We did that on our part, but they have not suggested anything to us.

 

Livni: I think that before we talk about the areas for swap we must focus on the future of Ma’ale Adumim and Ariel.

 

Saeb: We presented our suggestion in full, and it includes the areas for swap because we want to prevent the market mentality of bargaining.

 

Livni: I believe we have gone beyond that.

 

Abu Ala’: The problem is that if you take any settlement and its distance from 1967 borders, you will find out that the Israelis want to annex the settlement, the infrastructure and security areas around it. Therefore the easier way is to annex the settlements near the borders.

 

Rice: When will you go on the field tour?

 

Udi: We will arrange for this soon.

 

Saeb: All we ask from you is to present to us a logical and convincing offer. I don not wish to present to the minister the Israeli proposition made to us about the borders. This is your task.

 

Livni: We agreed that there will be no agreement before agreeing on everything.

 

Abu Ala’: And not to inform the media about what is going on in the negotiations. All the issues are put for discussion, and we are working to reach a comprehensive agreement, this is our reference.

 

Livni: – We are not working to reach an interim agreement, and until now we have been talking about the land that you will take. ‘Take’ is perhaps not the right word; the land that will be the state of Palestine. You offered 1.9% and stopped there.

 

  •  As for drafting and regarding the issue of borders, all we need to write is one phrase: Borders as shown in the annexed maps.

 

Abu Ala’: – It is not that easy. There is the issue of evacuation, withdrawal and dismantling military bases, the timetable for doing that, and the supervisory party.

 

  •  As for security, the gaps are not big, but the Israelis have put conditions which are cards for bargaining.
  •  The suggestion we offered in this field is that we are ready to fulfill the Israeli security demands without any exaggeration and in a manner that will reduce the Israeli presence on our land. Transparency in dealing with the Israelis in this field is more efficient than military bases and alert stations. We will also be the bridge for Israel to all countries in the region.
  •  The problem in Israel is with security personnel and not with politicians because they consider the current situation and build up on it. They do not look to the time after independence.
  •  We said that Palestine will be an independent state, with limited militarization but not limited dignity, and it will have sovereignty and full control over its land, air space and regional water.
  •  In order to fulfill our internal security needs, our security forces must be equipped with arms and other equipment so that they can perform their tasks and responsibilities in enforcing the rule of law, order and fight against terrorism.
  •  We want no more and no less than any other state that is able to protect its borders from any external threat, but Israel says that we want this to protect ourselves from her.

 

Livni: Yes.

 

Abu Ala’: – We do not want an army. We want the army of a third party to help us build our security capabilities and protect us.

 

  •  Israel wants to have security areas and alert stations and control our air space and monitor crossings and borders.

 

Rice: Tzipi will present Israel’s security needs.

 

Livni: We have a common interest in enforcing the rule of law and order, but we cannot accept protection from outside because we see that as a protection for you from Israel and not from Jordan and Egypt. Therefore we have disagreement about the main concept of security.

 

Saeb: If we find a solution to the security issue then we will be in good condition. We demand security forces to enforce the rule of law and order; one authority and legal arms. We specify the appropriate arms in order for our forces to be able to perform their tasks and duties. Abu Ala’ did not talk about our need for a Palestinian army.

 

Abu Ala’: Why not?

 

Saeb: – We heard ideas about preparing a ‘yes’ list for allowed arms and a ‘no’ list for disallowed arms. We said that if we do that we will be lost, and we also said that we will seriously take any Israeli worry regarding security so that their stay on our land will be shortened. A third party will monitor the implementation of the agreement, take part in its implementation, monitor our obligations in the agreement, and protect us from any external threats. We do not want borders that have Israeli forces.

 

  •  We suggested to you to present us with ideas on how to shorten your stay on our land but you never came back to us. You are following the British model in the negotiations and that is to tell us about things we cannot have. We also said that if external threats reach Jordan then they will reach us as well and that is why we asked to have US forces. The idea of a third party emanated from this.

 

Livni: We agreed to prepare a list including the needs of your security apparatuses to be able to enforce internal security, but you added a third party on the borders.

 

Rice: Let us not leave the issues and talk about potential threat. At this time there is no threat from the east because our forces are in Iraq and will stay there for a long time.

 

Saeb: For a very, very long time.

 

Rice: – The potential threat comes from terrorism and smuggling, and I think there are solutions to these threats by including other parties to these efforts and not by the model of international peace forces.

 

  •  There is no state that can confront terror threats by itself; all countries cooperate to prevent threats.
  •  Another point for you Abu Ala’: There will be a Palestinian state but it will not be friends with Israel. Usually the generals that sit together in a general staff meeting do not plan for possible peace but for a war that might break out. They meet to put a good system to confront something bad that might take place. When we talk about sovereignty, the Palestinian state will have sovereignty. America is a sovereign state but there are certain procedures in our dealing with Mexico concerning the issue of borders. Germany is a sovereign country, but it committed itself to have no more than 370,000 of its forces on the borders. I am not talking about restrictions on sovereignty.

 

Abu Ala’: What we need is a state capable of providing security for its citizens and controlling its air space and borders. We understand the Israeli worry and sensitivity for security, but it should not be that kind of security that breaches our right for sovereignty and the establishment of a truly independent state.

 

Rice: You air space is too small not like the American air space. How long does it take to fly from Jordan and enter into your air space?

 

Udi: Two minutes.

 

Rice: We have to identify the threats and the goals and then decide on the scenarios that fulfill the goals.

 

Udi: Unfortunately, at the other side they think that mere reaching an agreement will bring about peace between us and that Hamas will disappear and that we will live in peace and security.

 

Abu Ala’: You have a stronger force.

 

Rice: – I try to put myself in the Israeli and Palestinian security. You have to think, after having your own state, that the situation will be different, and we will help you think of choices and different scenarios.

 

  •  Even we do not deal with our air space in the same way. I was with President Bush at the emergency center on September 11 and it was the hardest time in my life when we issued an order to drop down any airplane that enters our air space. How can I issue an order to drop down a civil airplane carrying 200 passengers. I was a bit relieved to know that our air forces did not drop down the civil plane that fell in Pennsylvania but that it fell by itself.

 

Livni: – I want to be able to live with the decisions that I take. I am not an expert in everything and I do not know if we are in need of alert stations. It is not our army only that decides. I supported withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.

 

  •  Hamas has missiles in the Gaza Strip because we are not there, and there are no missiles in the west Bank because we are there. We have to take into consideration the possibility of a threat that might come to the future state of Palestine; Hamas might control the situation. We have the example of Philadelphia Crossing and Lebanon. I admire Siniora and how he faced Hizbollah. But at the time that he sits as a head of government, there are arms that come to Hizbollah, and these arms are a threat to Siniora himself and to Israel.
  •  We have to think about what might happen if we do not reach a peace treaty. The choice is that the army is there. What will happen the next day is crucial to the decisions that I will take regarding the land and the borders because I have to live with the decisions that I will take.
  •  Potential threat will not come from Jordan but from Palestine. I understand your dignity but after signing a peace agreement we will face the threat of opponents to this treaty, and this is a common interest.
  •  In the meantime, you do not face any external threat and therefore we asked for the preparation of a list including the arms and equipment that you need to enforce the rule of law and fight terrorism. But you have added something else and that is the third part to protect you from external threats. The only external threat is Israel.

 

Saeb: Not true.

 

Livni: Now in Gaza we have the same problem, and it is not a question of fancy but a reality in which we are living. I do not want to convince myself that the Palestinian state does not constitute a threat because I do not want to reoccupy you. We want to leave and not come back. I want to trust that terrorism will not come to us from your state.

 

Saeb: – I respect your ideas and analysis, and I do not ask to be like Jordan or Egypt or Israel armed with thousands of warplanes and tanks. But do you agree that my air space be denied to all planes and my land is void of tanks? Do you want me to inform the Arab League, in which I am member, that the agreement forbids me to use my air space.

 

  •  What Abu Ala’ means by the army of a third party is defense borders and whatever shortens your stay on our land.

 

Rice: We know that to confront terrorism we have to use the intelligence apparatuses.

 

Livni: I agree.

 

Rice: – We have to work to improve the performance of the intelligence. Even America cannot protect its borders without cooperation with Canada. What is the way then?

 

  •  Israel defeated some armies and we defeated others. Then armies do no pose a threat but terrorism does.

 

Livni: – Those who oppose an agreement in Israel want us to stay there and not to depend on Palestinians in our intelligence.

 

  •  The Palestinians have a choice either to remain under occupation or get enough independence and dignity—not through slogans. I think the latter is the better choice.
  •  I do not accept Palestinians who do not support Israel in what she is doing to confront our and their own common enemy, i.e. Hamas.
  •  When matters have to do with principles, I know how sensitive you are about the land and Jerusalem. Why then do you feel surprised at our security needs?

 

Rice: Technology has changed the situation. I already mentioned that sovereignty means the same for all countries, and I gave the examples of Mexico and Germany.

 

Saeb: All that I am asking is to shorten your stay on our land. Do you accept not to have any presence on our land?

 

Livni: Abu Ala’, does Saeb represent you?

 

Rice: The most important thing in relation to borders is the customs and smuggling, and these call for enormous efforts from joint intelligence.

 

Abu Ala’: The problem is that Israel wants to do the whole thing by herself. Since 2000 and during the Intifada, Israeli demolished all security quarters and equipment thinking that this would provide her with security; but it did not.

 

Livni: I remember the joint patrol in the Gaza Strip in which an Israeli soldier of Ethiopian origin was killed.

 

Abu Ala’: I am talking about security.

 

Livni: There will be an interim period.

 

Rice: – The issue is that even if Israel has full trust in you, you are still incapable.

 

  •  I have full trust in Nouri Malki, Iraq’s Prime Minister, but he is incapable. Canada has sincere desire but there came a time when Canada was incapable of controlling the borders.
  •  I have not heard from both sides about a defense force, but the Israelis have to be convinced that there will be no deterioration in the security situation, and you have to convince me that you will have a real state.

 

Abu Ala’: They left the Gaza Strip and kept it under siege.

 

Saeb: Because this had happened unilaterally, and because I will build my capabilities gradually with the assistance of a third party, like what the Americans are currently doing in Nablus and Jenin.

 

Rice: Shall we try again in the next meeting.

 

Saeb: What do you suggest?

 

Rice: Berlin. I think Livni will be there.

 

Livni: I will consult with Rice and Abu Ala’ about this.

 

Saeb: Let us prepare a matrix about the positions regarding the different issues.

 

Livni: I am worried that it will be leaked to the press. If we achieve progress in the issues of borders and security we can then start drafting. We want to agree that the ratio of 1.9% is not final.

 

Rice: Do you have a paper on the refugees.

 

Livni: – Saeb and Tal drafted 7 issues related to the refugees.

 

  •  Drafting positions and having others take part in it is against our interest. We agreed that the agreement is bilateral and that we should not have others take part in it.
  •  In the issue of security, we are still in the beginning.

 

Saeb: Ami Ayalon is a minister in your government and he made press statements about an agreement on swap land between the two parties.

 

Rice: – You can trust that we will have no one take part in what is happening between you.

 

  •  We will not announce Berlin meeting but we may announce about it after it takes place.

 

Livni: We will see what will happen between Abu Ala’ and me, and then decide about the meeting.

 

Rice: It will be helpful to declare that the negotiations are achieving slow progress and that there are calls to convene international conferences since Annapolis has been torn apart.

Posted in Palestine AffairsComments Off on Zionist Puppet Delegation in Annapolis Negotiations (14)

Zio-Nazi Regime & UNSCR (13)

Meeting Minutes: 8th Meeting on Territory

Summary

 

The Palestinians affirmed their position that negotiations are based on UNSCR 242 and 338, while the Israelis continued to assert their claims to land within the 1967 line and stressed they are not “giving” anything back. The Israelis backtracked on swaps and would not discuss swaps unless Ma’ale Adumim, Givat ze’ev and Ariel are discussed. 

Samih Al-Abed: …[T]hese negotiations didn’t come out from a vacuum. They’ve been discussed in Camp David, Taba and Geneva. There is a history of talks. You can’t come up with a proposal as if there was nothing before. If we do not consider these talks, we cannot move forward… You exaggerated your demands on us that it is not even close to previous agreements.

Udi Dekel, Israeli Official: Since 2000, something happened in those 8 years so we are not at the same starting point. You started a terror war on us and we created facts on the ground. This is the reality that we live in today, so we can’t go back to Camp David. Circumstances changed considerably since then.

I don’t think it is part of our group to discuss resolution 242 interpretation. You believe 242 says rights and that settlements are illegal, we don’t. We believe we have rights in these territories…We are not of the position that we took something from you that we have to give back.

(later)

Dekel: This short discussion between us shows that we cannot bridge our narratives. I do not want to convince you, but the background for our discussions is not the same either. We couldn’t agree on the principles…. I cannot speak of swaps unless I know from you Ma’ale Adumim is on the table, Givat Ze’ev is on the table, Ariel is on the table.

Samih Al-Abed: Swaps is a principle. You cannot make this a precondition. It’s not a starting point at all.

(later)

Al-Abed: We can’t go forward without Jerusalem on the table…So let’s start somewhere with your map as a whole.

Dekel: We presented it many times.

Al-Abed: It is not acceptable to us.

Dekel: Yours is not acceptable to us. Ok, so you close the discussion. We should eat the food and enjoy ourselves.

Hala Rashid, Negotiations Support Unit (PA): With all due respect, if it were up to us, our proposal would be the 1967 line. But in the interest of peace and in good faith and with all sincerity, we presented something we thought addressed our interests and needs and rights, and also addressed your interests.

Dekel: We do not accept 67 as a baseline.

(later)

Dekel: I do not have permission to discuss Jerusalem without knowing what arrangements will be in Jerusalem.

Al-Abed: And Abu Ala said we cannot discuss Ma’ale Adumim.

Dekel: So let’s each lunch together, and let them [leaders] decide what to do.

Full text

 

Minutes of 8th Meeting on Territory

Thursday, 29 May 2008, 12h00

King David Hotel, West Jerusalem

Attendees:

Palestinian:  Dr. Samih Al-Abed [SA], Azem Bishara [AB], Hala Rashed [HR], Fouad Hallak [FH], Nizar Farsakh [NF]

Israeli:          Udi Dekel [UD], Dani Tirza [DT], Lea Arad [LA], and Kamil Abu Rukun [KAR]

Overview:

  • We reaffirmed our position that negotiations are based on UNSCR 242 and 338, and other international standards. Meanwhile, the Israelis continued to assert that they have rights and claims to the land within the 1967 line and that they are not “giving” anything back.
  • We also asserted that we need to discuss the border both in terms of its entire length (including in the Jerusalem area) and in terms of the areas that Palestine would annex from Israel.
  • At one point, the Israelis appeared to backtrack on swaps, saying that they could not discuss swaps unless we agreed to discuss Ma’ale Adumim, Givat Ze’ev and Ariel. But they later engaged, albeit briefly, on problems they have with the areas we proposed we annex from Israel (Bethlehem area, Bisan, Qatanna area).
  • At another point, the Israelis alluded to having “many options” and said that right now, they preferred to advance the option of negotiations with us.
  • On the question of whether or not we are continuing from where we left on in Taba, the Israelis said that because of what they described as “your terror war” in 2000 and of their facts on the ground, we cannot continue from where we left off in 2000-1. They also said that those previous negotiations did not involve Israeli officials.
  • We got the breakdown of how they calculate the areas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

 

 

Meeting Minutes (not verbatim):

[Started at 12:15]

SA:      You going to show us something new today?

UD:     No.

Okay, let’s start. After the last territory meeting, from my point of view there were two main obstacles. One, we understand your narrative but we do not accept it and I know you won’t change it and we have our own narrative and we won’t change it either. We can spend a meeting speaking of our narratives if we think this is important.  But it is not an argument that we can use in negotiations because we won’t accept your narrative and you won’t accept ours.

            Our mission is to find a bridge between the gaps to give our leaders ideas and recommendations on how to deal with these gaps. Now there is your position, the 1.9% map. All discussions recently were focused on it, but if we are to negotiation we have to go some of the way towards your position, and you have to come some of the way towards ours. Otherwise, there are no negotiations.

SA:      Thank you for your remarks. I want to say something about narratives. This is not an issue that can be dismissed simply.        There are internationally recognized resolutions. Your government already accepted them – 242, 338. These are well-known nationally and internationally. Officially your government agreed to these and UNSC resolution 242 and the 67 line, it is not a narrative.

Second, I do understand your position and you understand ours, but your approach of narrowing gaps is not going to work because you presented something that is unrealistic.

            I suggest you present something we can live with if the goal is to come to a solution. If you expect we can go with your proposal you will find that our leaders and not even our people will accept that.

            Plus, these negotiations didn’t come out from a vacuum. They’ve been discussed in Camp David, Taba and Geneva. There is a history of talks. You came up with a proposal as if there was nothing before. If we do not consider these talks we cannot move forward. If this is the case, then we will not have an agreement. So at least, let’s start from what we talked about since 2000, even if we hadn’t agreed to it. This is how I see things if we want to be able to present something to our leaders since we are not decision makers. [MISSING]

            You exaggerated your demands on us that it is not even close to previous agreements.

UD:     Since 2000, something happened in those 8 years so we are not at the same starting point. You started a terror war on us, and we created facts on the ground. This is the reality that we live in today, so we can’t go back to Camp David. Circumstances have changed considerably since then. Facts have changed. So we can’t freeze time and consider that we are in 2000 reality. The Middle East has changed.

            All the discussions you motioned and past talks were not officials, at least not from the Israeli side. We don’t forget everything but also we cannot go back to Taba or Camp David. This is the concept behind our thinking. I don’t think it is part of our group to discuss resolution 242 interpretation. You believe 242 says rights and that settlements are illegal, we don’t. We believe we have rights in these territories. The way we see it we need to make mutual concessions. We don’t see that we have something to give back to you. We are not of the position that we took something from you that we have to give back.  We want to create a Palestinian state because it is in our interest; we cannot take a ‘giving back’ approach.

SA:      I don’t want to make political statements, but I need you to know that we do not accept your narrative, for as you know many from our people consider all of Palestine is our right and that we already gave 78%.

We are here to discuss the border. This land is occupied, and it is known that this is the border.

            When we presented, this is what we can afford. You need to tell us what areas you want to take, and we need to see what you will compensate us with. This approach we think is the best to get to a solution to draw the line for the border of Palestine. Second. The things after 2000 were with officials. Yes, some initiatives were not official, but Taba and Camp David were official. And even in some 2ndtracks, officials participated.

            We do not have people who commit terror against you on this table, and we have endured over 40 years of terror. Occupation is terror for us. We need to end it because it cannot remain forever. You can’t overrun the people’s life. So we came in peace to create a state.

Now, we can look at the map and try to decide the border. But let’s see the whole line. We can’t do it in bits and pieces.

UD:     This short discussion between us shows that we cannot bridge our narratives. I do not want to convince you, but the background for our discussions is not the same either. We couldn’t agree on the principles. So now we do technical work. I cannot speak of swaps unless I know from you Ma’ale Adumim is on the table, Givat Ze’ev is on the table, Ariel is on the table.

SA:      Swaps is a principle. You cannot make this a precondition. It’s not a starting point at all. We need to be convinced that this won’t harm our interests. You can’t impose on a certain localities or areas that you want to take.

UD:     So we agree, we do not want to put preconditions. Last week, you said everything east of Road 60 is off the table.

SA:      If we give you that area, it will be very harmful for us.

NF:      What Dr. Samih is trying to say is that since we are all trying to get to a solution that works for both of us, what you presented is highly unlikely that it will be accepted by our leadership. So when Dr. Samih says that we cannot accept any map that takes anything east of Road 60 that is because it is highly unlikely that you will find any Palestinian leader that would sign off on it just as much as it will be highly unlikely that we will find any Israeli government that will give up areas west of Road # 40. So we are trying to short cut the process and not engage in areas that are highly unlikely to be accepted so that we do not spend time arguing back and forth on areas that are not constructive. We know Ariel, Givat Ze’ev are not acceptable to our leadership.

UD:     We also have directives from our leaders to speak about these places .

SA:      We can’t go forward without Jerusalem on the table.

UD:     We say that Jerusalem is on the table but we have to agree what kind of arrangements will be in Jerusalem before discussing the borders.

SA:      Discussing it will help the leaders draw the line in Jerusalem. It is part of the picture as a whole and will help leaders see the whole line.

            If we want peace we know that there are areas  which are very harmful for us and that we cannot accept .            So let’s start somewhere with your map as a whole.

UD:     We presented it many times.

SA:      It is not acceptable to us.

UD:     Yours is not acceptable to us. Ok, so you close the discussion. We should just eat the food and enjoy ourselves.

SA:      TL said that the area of Maale Adumim reflected on the map of your proposal is not accurate and Dani said that you did not present it.

UD:     She said it does not close Jerusalem from all over

SA:      Yes it does. That’s what you showed us but you did not talk about it. If you want to continue like this, I don’t think we can.

UD:     The rules of the game now are not this is our position take it or leave it. You want to convince us to come to your proposal. We won’t do that We need to engage. .

HR:     With all due respect, if it were up to us, our proposal would be the 1967 line. But in the interest of peace and in good faith and with all sincerity, we presented something we thought addressed our interests and needs and rights, and also addressed your interests. We presented something we thought was reasonable in order to minimize the back and forth and the bartering between us.

UD:     I appreciate that, and thank you for considering our interests but you don’t understand our interests as we do not understand yours. We do not accept 67 as a baseline.

            There are some things that are very important to us. For you it is important for you to establish a Palestinian state

            If you want, we can present Ma’ale Adumim again. It’s the same as before.

AB:     I believe that in the meeting in which we presented our proposal we agreed at the end that you will study and consider it and that you will come back to us with your feedback on the proposal from both sides of the line. If we missed anything tell us. The best way to move forward now is hear your feedback on our proposal.

UD:     Many times, Abu Ala said he could not look on our proposal.

We have many options and I am not referring to one state of course. We would like to develop this option with you now. But it has to be an open discussion.

            So we can go back with a few comments.

We started last time with Gush Etzion and gave you our feedback and told you that we don’t accept. We can go to Ma’ale Adumim, we can go to areas around Jerusalem.

SA:      you cannot omit Jerusalem, it is part of the territory.

UD:     I do not have permission to discuss Jerusalem without knowing what arrangements will be in Jerusalem

SA:      And Abu Ala said we cannot discuss Ma’ale Adumim.

UD:     So let’s eat lunch together, and let them [leaders] decide what to do.

[UD consults with DT in Hebrew and DT suggests to make a list of all the gaps in all of the area. Go area by area systematically and list the gaps and problems.] Danny says lets go area by area and mark down the difference between our proposal and yours, and go back to the leaders.

SA:      You know our position on this. We cannot see areas only without the whole line.

[Both sides engage in side discussions. DT projects the Israeli proposal for areas to be left for the Palestinian state that does not include areas to be taken from Israel and has the Jerusalem municipal border hashed, indicating that it is not part of the discussion in this Committee. The title of the computer window was “7.3%”, however, the legend next to the map had a layer titled “6.5%” which was not shown. Mostly likely, the Israelis have a 6.5% proposal prepared but they are not showing it to us]

SA:      Jerusalem is hashed.

AB:     So you define Jerusalem by the municipal line?

UD:     No, I explained it so many times. We do not have permission to discuss Jerusalem

AB:     My question is how do you define Jerusalem. Is it the municipal line or does it include Ma’ale Adumim and other areas?

UD:     No. It’s the municipal lines.

SA:      This is not the whole map. Where is the Latrun?

DT:      This is it. In our proposal, we have the Latrun on our side.

SA:      I can’t look at this.

UD:     This is what we are going to give you, not what we are going to take!

NF:      What is the total sum of the area you are showing us here?

UD:     We gave it to you before.

NF:      Just because there was a problem with percentages in the plenary meeting, and I believe that is because we use different numbers to calculate. So it would help if we have the area.

DT:      5129 sq km.

UD:     If you are good, we will give you more [joking].

SA:      Yala, where are the other areas?

UD:     This is all. Not enough? We can’t present more now.

NF:      We need to see the whole picture in order to provide our assessment. We are not just interested in local impact, but national impact.

[DT projects Gush Etzion map.]

UD:     We said we cannot accept roads, Efrat [MISSING]. With Wadi Fukin, we can find places to give you land in this area. The other swap proposal, the big on, is a problem because of the railroad, because of the infrastructure.

FH:      Last time, the part south of Road 347 near Jaba was not included [annexed]. Why the change?

UD:     [Consults with DT in Hebrew and asks about the difference. DT says that what he is showing now it is the Wall and this is the map. If needs be we will change it. We did not show them this before because we just showed the blocs] Last time, we focused on Gush Etzion block, it did not include this. That is true.

AB:     Did you have a chance to look at the Bisan area and asses our proposal?

[DT projects Bisan area map.]

DT:      Yes. In Beisan area [area that the Palestinian proposal suggests to annex to Palestine] one problem is that it is very near Israeli villages inside Israel.

SA:      How near?

DT:      A few metres. It creates security problems.

AB:     vicinity should not be a problem. Look at where Qalqiliya and Tulkarm are located, on the green line.

DT:      It cuts the main road that goes to Gilboa area.

UD:     We didn’t have enough time to do assessment on our side. We have to go and discuss it with people there. We need more time. We sat so far with people from our Planning and Mapping Centre We need more time to finish the research and negotiate with them internally .  

NF:      How long do you need?

UD:     [UD consults with DT in Hebrew and DT says two weeks but it depends if we can talk about it] Two weeks

NF:      And, Danny, to the extent that you say we have mistakes in our map, we’d be grateful for you to correct them.

SA:      We also do our homework.

[DT projects Qatanna area map.]

DT:      This swap area is right next to a kibbutz. Maale Ha Hamesha.

NF:      What is the area of the Dead Sea?

UD:     We don’t include it.

NF:      But what is the area?

DT:      185 sq km.

NF:      Gaza?

DT:      360 sq. km.

UD:     We explained our map many times. It does not include Gaza, Dead Sea and municipal area of Jerusalem. It is the map of Cairo agreement of 1994 that we have been using all along since.

NF:      And Jerusalem? It excludes Mount Scopus?

DT:      Yes.

[DT turns off projector.]

UD:    

            End of story, we need to agree.

SA:      Maybe don’t change your map every time we come.

UD:     I can explain the details to you later.

DT:      NML 49.9 sq. km., including in Jerusalem. EJ: 67 sq. km., not including Mount Scopus.

NF:      How much is Mount Scopus?

FH:      One sq km.

DT:      I don’t have the exact number for it but it is the larger area.

UD:     We have to go back to our leaders.

SA:      Who is yours?

UD:     I have 2 leaders. I work for the PM, but I also work with Foreign Affairs. Situation now in Israel is very sensitive but we want to ensure that negotiations continue and I hope we will find a way to continue our negotiations.

SA:      I want to, but take time to think whether what you are proposing is feasible at all. What kind of a state will it be if you want to annex the Jordan Valley

We have your security interests, and your territory interests. Take your security considerations and your territory considerations, and look what state we are going to have.

UD:     Our responsibility is to bring recommendations to our leaders, and they will decide. I will go back, and I’ll coordinate you.

SA:      Let’s put an agenda.

UD:     We sat for more than 5 minutes. Abu Ala said we only sit for 5 minutes.

SA:      That’s Saeb.

[UD asks to talk privately with SA so the two leave the room]           

UD:     about the issue that FH raised, the difference in the Jaba area in the map shown today compared to the one you saw before, this is because this is what we presented to AM.

SA:      You didn’t present a map to AM, you just talked about it to him.

UD:     I don’t know.

Now, about the field trip to the Modiin area we do not want to publicize it. We think it is best if only four of us go: me and KAR and you with someone else. We will stay in the car, we won’t get out of the car.

SA:      OK, we’ll get back to you.

END TIME:  13h15

Breakdown of West Bank and Gaza Strip Areas According To Israel

Sector Area in sq km
Latrun No Man’s Land 49.9
East Jerusalem Israeli-defined Municipality 67.0
Hebrew University (Israeli territory to be subtracted from total sum). They use the larger area but they couldn’t give us an exact figure. Probably 2 sq km 2.0
Dead Sea 185
Gaza Strip

Posted in Palestine AffairsComments Off on Zio-Nazi Regime & UNSCR (13)

Zio-Nazi regime Decision to Negotiate with Traitor Assad (12)

Meeting Minutes: Post-Annapolis Plenary Session on Territory

Summary

 

Minutes of a post-Annapolis plenary session on Territory. Both sides discussed news reports regarding Israel’s decision to negotiate with Syria over the return of the Golan Heights. However, the majority of the conversation focused on border and territory issues, particularly those regarding East Jerusalem and No Man’s Land.  The Israeli side presented their assessment of the Palestinian land swap proposal.

Qurei: There are 30,000 people in Ma’ale Adumim. They can live under Palestinian rule.”

Livni: “You know this is not realistic.”

Qurei: “So take them [out], like you did in Gaza.”

Livni: “We are going to [take out many settlers].”

Qurei: “If you want peace…I was against this, but Saeb and Samih said we should do it. They put Jerusalem settlements, but this was never done in Camp David.”

(Later)

Erekat: “I agree with Tzipi. We want to continue on a needs basis. We don’t want Palestinians to become Israelis and we don’t want Israelis to become Palestinians.”

Qurei: “I don’t mind if Israelis become Palestinian citizens. Let them stay.”

Livni: “You know this is not realistic. They will kill them the next day.”

Full text

Minutes from Plenary Session on Territory

Post Annapolis

Monday, 21 May 2008, 1:30 pm

Inbal Hotel, West Jerusalem

 

Attendees:

 

Palestinian 

  •  Ahmed Querei (AA)
  •  Dr. Saeb Erekat (SE)
  •  Dr. Samih il Abd (SIA)
  •  Khaled Elgindy (KE)
  •  Salah Elayan (SA)
  •  Zeinah Salahi (ZS)

 

Israeli

  •  FM Tzipi Livni (TL)
  •  Tal Becker (TB)
  •  Udi Dekel (UD)
  •  Dany Tirza (DT)

 

 

Meeting Summary (not verbatim):

 

Following a brief discussion of recent news reports regarding Israel’s decision to negotiate with Syria over the return of the Golan Heights, the meeting focused primarily on the Israeli side presenting their assessment of the Palestinian landswap proposal.  

 

AA:

  •    First, let me say congratulations on Syria.

 

TL:

  •  It’s not official. Talks are going on through Turkey.

 

AA:

  •  Who will be first [to sign a deal with Israel], us or the Syrians?

 

TL:

  •  Our priority is to end the conflict with you.
  •  Was there some reaction to this in the Arab world?

 

AA:

  •  I think everyone will welcome it.
  •  There is also the agreement among the Lebanese.

 

TL:

  •  It’s being perceived as a victory for Hizbollah.

 

AA:

  •  This is the perception, yes.  It’s a kind of revolution what they did… There are things that they were asking for before but were not possible, which they now got.

 

TL:

  •  This will strengthen Syria.

 

AA:

  •  I’m not saying that, but it’s in favor of Hizbollah. So [by extension] it’s good for Syria and Iran.

 

TL:

  •  Negotiations will help?

 

AA:

  •  You mean with Israel? No, I doubt it.

 

SIA:

  •  It will help Hamas as well.

 

AA:

  •  No, I don’t think so.

 

TL:

  •  I would like to ask something about the kilometers [i.e., area], because I think there is a kind of misunderstanding.  When I talked to the Americans, [I began to understand what you meant]. Now, I think it is less important to be exact about which areas we relate to, but it’s important for me to understand what this area [issue] means for you. [i.e., it is better to speak in terms of kilometers, instead of percentages.]

 

AA:

  •  This is just a calculation.

 

TL:

  •  When you work on numbers, what is the calculation?

 

AA:

  •  It is well known to everyone.

 

TL:

  •  I ask because I’m told that that we didn’t include certain areas. But even when we count everything everything [i.e., the whole OPT], we came up with 6,202 [sq. km].

 

SE:

  •  You’re not counting the Dead Sea.  What’s your number for the Dead Sea?
  •  I think we should just use the lines of the 1949 armistice agreement and the 1950 modus vivendi line [to guide the discussion]. I do not want to impose this on you but [as a starting point].

 

TL:

  •  Yes, Saeb, there is a problem with that…

 

SIA:

  •  6,238 sq km.

 

TL:

  •  So where is the gap from?  What is your [area for the] NML?

 

SE:

  •  66 sq. km.

 

TL:

  •  We have 67.

 

SE:

  •  When you divide the NML in half, you have 33…

 

AA:

  •  Why is this important?

 

TL:

  •  I’m told there is confusion about the percentage we use.

 

AA:

  •  It will not make a big difference in the percentage.

 

TL:

  •  Okay.

 

AA:

  •  But what should be well understood is…

 

TL:

  •  Sorry, I made a mistake. 67 [sq. km] is East Jerusalem.  The NML is 49 [sq. km].

 

SE:

  •  That’s the difference then.

 

TL:

  •  So we decided not to have this argument on numbers. But can I ask, what is the difference on the NML coming from?

 

SE:

  •  Let’s just use the lines of the 1949 armistice agreement.  Is there a problem with that?

 

TL:

  •  Come on, Saeb.  Yes, there is a problem with that… I’m just trying to check about the Prime Minister’s offer [to Abu Mazen], whether it’s the same number.

 

AA:

  •  It is in the Latrun and East Jerusalem… and also the Golan Heights.  We want a safe passage to Banyas as well.

 

TL:

  •  What is the best way now to continue?  I think we have the Palestinian proposal on our map…

 

AA:

  •  We want two things. We want to see what was offered by your prime minister – personally, I’m not interested in maps; I was against this [exchanging of maps] – and second, we want to see what you think of our very constructive proposal.

 

TL:

  •  Let’s take your suggestion and see where the gaps are [between our proposal and yours].

 

[DT projects map of Israeli proposal (map shows hashed block over Jordan Valley area)]

 

SE:

  •  What is this striped area?

 

TL:

  •  The stripped area means it will be discussed after security.

 

AA:

  •  As long as you’re not going to annex it.

 

TL:

  •  I would like to annex it, but it is not to be discussed here.

 

SE:

  •  But we’re not discussing security today so can we remove it?

 

TL:

  •  [Asks DT to remove the hashed area, which he does.]

 

DT:

  •  This is the 7.3% map [projected map is virtually identical to what Israeli side presented previously in Territory Committee].

 

SE

  •  7.3% according to what?

 

UD:

  •  According to our calculation [i.e., minus Latrun NML and East Jerusalem areas].

 

TL:

  •  In our discussion, we saw areas [that were not included in your proposal]. Clearly, we have huge difference, one being Ma’ale Adumim.

 

AA:

  •  This is not Ma’ale Adumim.

 

ZS:

  •  Is this red and white line the Jerusalem municipal line?

 

DT:

  •  Yes.

 

TL:

  •  What we’ve done is taken your map and ours, so we can see the differences.  Jerusalem is not included [on our map] because it’s not being discussed here, but clearly we know it has to be discussed.

 

[News comes in of 286 new units to be tendered in Betar ‘Illit.]

 

TL:

  •  We’re giving up the Golan so we need more in Betar ‘Illit.

 

AA:

  •  Yes, you make us pay the price.

 

TL:

  •  Let’s where we are and what the differences are.  The good news is that all of this area in yellow [we do not have disagreement on].  It is the beginning of something [we can work with].
  •  We have four huge differences: (1) on what we call Ma’ale Adumim, and I accept what you said before, but it’s not only the built-up area…

 

AA:

  •  It’s not even [limited to] the built-up areas.

 

TL:

  •  I know…

 

AA:

  •  If you go there today and look, you will see thousands of new units being built.

 

TL:

  •  It’s not new.

 

AA:

  •  We can go there, after the meeting, and I will show you.

 

[Discussion on whether or not there is significant construction going on in Ma’ale Adumim.]

 

TL:

  •  This is a place where we have big differences – it’s including the built-up area, but not just the built-up areas; also we have some smaller places [i.e., settlements], industrial areas, and areas of strategic importance…
  •  Then we have Giv’at Zeev, which is very important… Then we have what we call the fingers of Ariel and…

 

UD:

  •  Qedumim

 

TL:

  •  … Qedumim and all these places.
  •  We also have big differences when it comes to the swap.  The way Olmert told me is it’s going to be near Gaza.

 

SE:

  •  Olmert said, Gaza and the southern West Bank.

 

SA:

  •  The swap is to be next to Gaza and the southern part of the West Bank.

 

TL:

  •  We also have some differences in the line.  I would like to ask a question… Of course, we have to count the safe passage also [in the swap], as this is an issue of compensation.

 

AA:

  •  No – compensation [i.e., in equal territory] is important but not as important as you explaining why you need so much land.

 

TL:

  •  Jerusalem is not being mentioned here, but that doesn’t mean it is not going to be discussed.

 

AA:

  •  It seems that Nayef Hawatmeh, of the DFLP, knows more about the Israeli position than us. He is saying the Israelis are proposing to keep the Jordan Valley and all of Jerusalem… How does he know this?

 

[DT zooms in on area of Bethlehem/Etzion]

 

DT:

  •  The main difference is that Efrat and Migdal Oz are out, and all the roads, so there is no way out for Gush Etzion.

 

TL:

  •  What are the differences in percentages and sq. km?

 

DT:

  •  Gush Etzion is about 1.2%…

 

SA:

  •  And 54 sq. km.

 

DT:

  •  And about 54 to 57 sq. km.

 

TL:

  •  And yours is?

 

SA:

  •  23 sq. km… It’s not about percentages.  You want to take all this empty land, and the way to Jerusalem can be cut…

 

AA:

  •  We don’t want to go into these details.

 

TL:

  •  Well…

 

AA:

  •  Actually, when I see your map, I advise you to go to Syria [first].  It will help us. We cannot accept Ma’ale Adumim, Giv’at Zeev and Ariel… If this is your proposal, let us wait… I am serious.

 

TL:

  •  I could have said the same thing when you showed us your map.

 

AA:

  •  But I gave.  You take.

 

TL:

  •  I think we are on the path of minimizing the gaps.  This is important.  There are places we need.  The differences are not that much of a problem. The real problem is Ma’ale Adumim…

 

DT:

  •  [MISSING]

 

TL:

  •  Ma’ale Adumim building area [MISSING]

 

SA:

  •  This is not Ma’ale Adumim…

 

AA:

  •  This is all of Jerusalem, to close off all of Jerusalem.  If this is what you have, we can wait.

 

TL:

  •  I think this would be a historic mistake.
  •  I said Jerusalem is something that will be added.  Now I’m trying to see the problematic gaps.  When it comes to Gush Etzion, [there are some gaps].  But my question is on Ma’ale Adumim. [To DT] How many people are there?

 

DT:

  •  32,000.

 

TL:

  •  We can discuss how to minimize [the area].

 

DT:

  •  Sorry, it’s 38,000.

 

TL:

  •  This is one.  The other is Giv’at Zeev, which is something that can also be minimized.  It’s not the building area.

 

KE:

  •  This is far more than the built-up area of Giv’at Zeev [referring to Israeli proposal line (same as wall line) on the map].

 

TL:

  •  I know. It’s not only the building area.

 

ZS:

  •  Why do you have to have the roads, as opposed to access arrangements?

 

TL:

  •  We can discuss it. But generally, they are for security considerations.

 

ZS:

  •  Do tunnels have the same security needs?

 

TL:

  •  I think tunnels are safer. Is that right? [To DT/UD, both of whom agree.]

 

AA:

  •  There are 30,000 people in Ma’ale Adumim. They can live under Palestinian rule.

 

TL:

  •  You know this is not realistic.

 

AA:

  •  So take them [out], like you did in Gaza.

 

TL:

  •  We are going to [take out many settlers].

 

AA:

  •  If you want peace… I was against this, but Saeb and Samih said we should do it. They put Jerusalem settlements, but this was never done in Camp David.

 

TL:

  •  I know but…

 

AA:

  •  Okay, so we wait.

 

TL:

  •  The problem [in that case] is that you’ll see more and more on the ground.
  •  My question is why you cannot have a state that represents most of your aspirations?  You will get some compensation.
  •  Maybe the right thing to do is let the experts continue the discussion.

 

AA:

  •  Maybe they will be more practical.

 

TL:

  •  Why do you insist on 98%? Why not 92%.

 

AA:

  •  That’s why I’m saying, I hope peace with Syria is a success.  Maybe it will help us, maybe not.  [Our situation in the region is difficult.] Iran is against us. Qatar is against us…

 

TL:

  •  If this is the proposal, you think the Arab world will say no to 90-something [percent]?

 

AA:

  •  The Arabs and Muslims, they will say [it’s not for you to give away Jerusalem].
  •  Even Mubarak said he will not accept any agreement that is unfair to Palestinians.

 

TL:

  •  I know that you are going to get – not most – almost all of your desires, and compensation for things you don’t get. Saying there will be no state unless it’s 1967, would be a shame.

 

ZS:

  •  That’s not the point that Abu Alaa is making.  [Notes the main underlying interests, and the only one Palestinians agreed to accommodate was minimizing the number of settlers that need to be evacuated, which the Palestinian proposal does.] You are taking all these empty areas for roads, and so on.  But if it’s about roads, there could other arrangements made for access, etc.  You rely on annexation instead of exploring other options – like access arrangements to roads or tunnels from the settlements.  Have you looked at alternatives?  It’s about the big picture.

 

TL:

  •  I understand, and I don’t underestimate how hard it is for you to do this.  

 

AA:

  •  I was against this, but Saeb and others they convinced me.

 

TL:

  •  I said “narrow” [the gaps].  It was not done yet.  So maybe the thing to do is for the experts to meet and work on narrowing the gaps.  I don’t know if the gaps can be bridged, but narrowed.
  •  Maybe that should be done by you [the experts], and knowing that it will be up to Abu Alaa and me whether or not to accept it.  Of course, it will be the prime minister who will decide.

 

SE:

  •  I appreciate what you’re saying, Tzipi. But these experts – us – we heard your prime minister and Abu Mazen talk about 7.3%…

 

TL:

  •  We didn’t speak about percentages, but basically it’s the same position.

 

AA:

  •  One position, the Israeli position.

 

SE:

  •  Now, what is the Jordan Valley and Dead Sea are shaded for security. They’re not included in the percentage, and Jerusalem…

 

TL:

  •  It is not mentioned here but it will be discussed.

 

SE:

  •  But it’s not calculated in the percentage.

 

TL:

  •  The percentage doesn’t change dramatically.

 

SE:

  •  So the Dead Sea and Jordan Valley are included [in the 7.3%]?

 

TL:

  •  Yes.

 

SE:

  •  And the Latrun?

 

TL:

  •  No.

 

SE:

  •  And when you say, go work.  Are these discussions going to take a needs-based approach?

 

TL:

  •  Yes.

 

SE:

  •  So what Zeinah is saying about the roads…

 

TL:

  •  Yes.  This is the best question I heard to today.

 

SE:

  •  And this area around Ariel, it is essential for water, especially since it is on the western aquifer.

 

TL:

  •  Yes. Now I have a better understanding of something than I did before.

 

AA:

  •  Here is Giv’at Zeev.  They put a boulder on the road to Beitunia. [MISSING]

 

TL:

  •  Please put up Giv’at Zeev. I need to see it.

 

DT:

  •  Here is Giv’at Zeev.

 

AA:

  •  [MISSING] close to the Wall.

 

UD:

  •  This is a security fence.  It is not a border. Don’t take this as [MISSING].

 

AA:

  •  How? But they will take [even] Abu Mazen out of his car and make him switch to another car.

 

UD:

  •  This was another reality, built under conditions of terror.

 

TL:

  •  Our interest in the area is people.

 

SA:

  •  There’s not many people there.

 

TL:

  •  How many?

 

SA:

  •  And your line is basically the same as the Wall.

 

TL:

  •  The Wall takes about [MISSING].

 

SA:

  •  If it’s a question of security, why have special security arrangements?  It is going to be part of Israel, so the security should come from Israel.

 

TB:

  •  [There are security implications on the ground.]

 

SE:

  •  I agree with Tzipi.  Unfortunately [MISSING]. We want to continue on a needs basis.  We don’t want Palestinians to become Israelis and we don’t want Israelis to become Palestinians.

 

AA:

  •  I don’t mind if Israelis become Palestinian citizens.  Let them stay.

 

TL:

  •  You know this is not realistic.  They will kill them the next day.

 

SE:

  •  If we’re going to make an agreement, we need to minimize the differences.  I really believe this.  But not to take the “souk mentality”…

 

TL:

  •  [Talking about Jerusalem] In adding it to the common denominator you don’t change the percentage. Anyway it looks like you will get some of it.  
  •  I want to ask also: in some places, if we take 1967, it cuts Palestinian villages and families.

 

AA:

  •  We can talk.  We said some modifications to the line.

 

SE:

  •  Let’s take a needs-based approach.  Are we going to be guided by necessity?  Can we say water aquifers and [Palestinian] population cannot be prejudiced?

 

TL:

  •  To take into consideration our needs and your needs.

 

SE:

  •  Okay. Yes.

 

[END]

Posted in Palestine AffairsComments Off on Zio-Nazi regime Decision to Negotiate with Traitor Assad (12)

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