Archive | January 25th, 2011

Palestinian Traitors Position Regarding 1967 Border (11)

Meeting Minutes: Borders with Erekat, Qurei and Livni

Summary
 

Palestinians presented their position regarding borders: 1967 borders along with all areas occupied by Israel in the 1967 area, West Bank with No Man’s Land and East Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley, Gaza Strip and the Dead Sea. Palestinians also presented maps for land swaps – swaps by the ratio of 1:1 (same size and value).

Full text

Meeting Minutes

On Borders

 

Jerusalem, King David Hotel

4 May 2008
20:45-21:30

 

Attendees:

 

Palestinians side: Ahmad Qurei (Abu Ala’)

  •  Dr. Saeb Erekat
  •  Dr. Samih al-Abed
  •  Khaled Elgindi
  •  Salah Ilayan
  •  Zeinah Salahi

 

Israeli side: Tzipi Livni

  •  Udi Dekel
  •  Tal Becker
  •  Dani Terza

 

Livni: Based on what I have heard in the trilateral meeting with Condoleeza Rice, I believe that your offer will not be exciting.

 

 

Saeb: I hope you will like what will be proposed to you. Abu Ala’ will begin identifying principles on whose bases we have drawn the maps.

 

Abu Ala’: Our definition of the land includes the following: (1) 1967 borders which includes all the land Israel occupied in 1967 whose total area is 6,238 square kilometers; (2) the West Bank including No Man’s Land and East Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley, etc.; (3) the Gaza Strip; (4) the Dead Sea.

 

Livni: Part of the Dead Sea.

 

Abu Ala’: Part of the Dead Sea.

 

Livni: Is this a concession?

 

Abu Ala’: – A big one for that matter.

 

  •  The safe passage
  •  Sea borders
  •  1967 borders are the only basis for the two-state solution. Palestinians have made a historic concession by accepting 242 UN Resolution for the two-state solution. By accepting the resolution, Palestinians have recognized the state of Israel, which was in fact a viable, contiguous and sovereign state along 1967 borders with 78% of the area of historic Palestine.
  •  Both of us agree that the settlement enterprise has a very negative effect and that the evacuation of settlements is for the good of both sides. Settlements confiscate large areas of Palestinian land, deprive Palestinians of many development spheres, impede communication and destroy Palestinian economy. Settlements were meant to artificially change the demographic structure and change realities on the ground, as well as to ensure that no viable Palestinian state would evolve. Now that you have accepted the idea of a Palestinian state, such a state must be geographically contiguous, viable and sovereign. But in order to make this a reality, the Israeli settlements must be evacuated. The issue is not whether evacuation should take place, but which settlements should be removed in order to be able to implement the two-state solution. Unlike the Palestinian state, the removal of settlements will not affect the viability of the state of Israel or its contiguity or security. Besides, if any of the settlers wish to live under Palestinian sovereignty, they have to be subject to the Palestinian law.
  •  For us, all settlements are illegal and their construction was a violation of the international law, and thus they should be evacuated. We are not the only ones who think this; this is also acknowledged by the rest of the international community. On the other hand, we understand that in order to reach a two-state solution in spite of all the Israeli measures that were taken in order to change realities on the ground, there is common interest in keeping some settlements. This is the concession that we make for the purpose of meeting your legitimate interests and making the two-state solution feasible. Thus any amendments on 1967 borders – the main basis for  a two-state solution – should also meet our interests and keep geographical contiguity, viability and sovereignty of the state within the context of swap by the ratio of 1:1, with the same value and size.

 

Livni: Do you have any suggestions about the areas for swap?

 

Abu Ala’: – You will see that on the maps.

 

  •  In order to meet Palestinian interests, swap of land with the same value and size and by the ration of 1:1 should take into account the following factors: (1) Any settlement included in the swap should not impede geographical contiguity especially with and within Jerusalem. This partially means that any settlement swapped to Israel should be near 1967 line. Therefore, any settlement swapped to Israel should be dealt with individually not as settlement blocs or individual houses. (2) All areas should be equal; in other words, all areas included in the swap should be in the same area (that is, land in Jerusalem for land in Jerusalem). (3) Areas swapped ‘from’ should not impede Palestinian development, and areas swapped ‘to’ should support Palestinian development, in accordance with the plans, and allow for urban expansion of Palestinian cities and towns. (4) The value of agricultural land should be preserved. (5) The Palestinian state must have adequate land, capabilities and resources to absorb Palestinian refugees who do not prefer to return to Israel, and those who hope to return to Palestine. (6) Areas of religious, cultural and historical significance for the Palestinians should not be included in the swap. (7) In any swap, there should be access to quality water and other water interests. (8) Civilians will not be included in any swap; in other words, land inhabited by Palestinians will not be subject for swap. (9) Empty land shall not be swapped to Israel. (10) Security is not a condition for land swap because there will always be borders between Palestine and Israel. (For example, no agreement will provide strategic depth because of Qalqilya and Tulkarem, etc.). Peace is the only means to provide Palestinians and Israelis alike with peace.
  •  On the basis of these factors, some settlements cannot be included in swap under any condition, including the settlements of Maa’le Adumim, Giv’at Ze’ev, Har Homa (Abu Ghneim), and Ariel. These negotiations are not a market, and the issue is not that of numbers for compromise and or disagreements. We want to meet the interests of both sides.
  •  We suggested that 63% of all settlers be included in less than 2%. This suggestion meets the interests of all parties.

 

Livni: Is this with Jerusalem or without it?

 

Abu Ala’: With Jerusalem.

 

Saeb: After reviewing your proposition during last meeting, we reviewed the areas and took into account your needs. Accordingly, we put suggestions in a manner that meets the interests of both sides.

 

Abu Ala’: Dr. Samih will start the presentation.

 

Samih: – We tried in the proposition that we will present to you to be more fair than the proposition that was presented to us.

 

  •  Negotiations about land:
    •  1967 line is the only basis.
    •  Swap by the ratio of 1:1 with the same size and value.
    •  Comprehensive, including Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley, etc.

 

Livni: What do you mean by the same value?

 

Abu Ala’: If annexation was in Jerusalem area then swap will take place in Jerusalem area.

 

Tal: How can we measure this? Land has the same value.

 

Livni: Or is it only a slogan?

 

Samih: It is not a slogan. I do not wish to have land in the Dunhiyyeh desert area for land in Jerusalem, for example.

 

Saeb: The value of the land determines how the other side will benefit from it.

 

Livni: Will the Safe Passage have the same value of what is going to be annexed to Israel?

 

Samih: You are talking about the Safe Passage, but the value of the Jewish Quarter in Jerusalem is inestimable.

 

Livni: I understand that it is difficult to calculate the value.

 

Khaled: It is also important to see that we are talking here about all the areas. In other words, we cannot agree only on part of the borders because it is impossible to know the meaning of the part without knowing the nature of all the borders.

 

Livni: You mentioned Jerusalem. Do you think this is our hidden agenda?

 

Samih:  Interests:

 

  •  Palestinian interests: 

 

  •  Political recognition.

 

Livni: I hope you will say the same thing when you talk about our interests.

 

Samih: Wait and we will come to that.

 

  •  Sovereignty and control.
  •  Viability and geographical contiguity.
  •  Jerusalem.
  •  Security

 

  •  Israeli interest:

 

  •  Reduction of political and financial cost.
  •  Jerusalem.
  •  Security.

 

  •  1967 borders.

 

  •  East Jerusalem  (square km)
  •  No Man’s Land (Latroun, Jerusalem)

 

Livni: Latroun was not occupied. Anyways, this is your position.

 

Samih: – Part of the Dead Sea.

 

  •  The Gaza Strip.

 

Other land related issues:

 

  •  Land contiguity (Safe Passage).
  •  Water borders.

 

Swap:

 

– swap in area # (1)

Bethlehem:

– From Israel:

Area: 8.12 km

 

– From Palestine:

Area: 22.95 km

 

# of settlers: 40,019

 

# of settlements:

Alon Shvut 3,346

Bitar Illit 31,481

Elazar 1,498

Gva’ot not available

 

Kfar Etzion 463

 

Neve Daniel 1,836

 

Rosh Tzurim 493

 

Bat Ayin 900

 

 

 

Terza: The population of Gush Etzion is 50,000 people and the road near Jaba’ is not included in the swap.

 

Livni: The problem is the road to Gush Etzion.

 

Samih: As you can see, there is a large area of empty land, and we think that Batir can be a suitable area for crossing and trade and others. As you probably know, there was a railroad there.

 

 

Swap in Area # (2) south of Jerusalem:

 

From Israel:

 

Area 0.37 km

 

From Palestine:

 

Area: 6,68 km

 

# of settlers: 41,504

 

Settlements          # of settlers

East Tel Piot           11,962

Jewish Quarter

(Old City)                2,507

Gilo

  27,071

 

 

Livni: Doesn’t Har Homa exist?

 

Khaled: The interest is to reconnect Jerusalem and Bethlehem. Such reconnection has a social, religious, economic and tourist significance. It is even more important than the connection between Jerusalem and Ramallah. The area is also important for the expansion of Beit Safafa which has become an isolated town between Gilo and Har Homa settlements.

 

Abu Ala’: To address natural growth.

 

Livni: Now we are talking about natural growth?!

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Swap in area (3) North Jerusalem:

 

From Palestine:

Area: 15.14 km

# of settlers: 136,204

 

Settlements             # of settlers

French Hill                    6,511

Ma’alot Dafne (east)     3,665

Mt. Scopus                     1,157

Neve Ya’cov                   20,085

Pisgat Ze’ev                   42,253

Ramat Eshkol (east)      3,050

Ramal Eshkol (west)     3,368

Ramat Shlomo               15,162

Lamot Alon 41,053

 

 

Samih: There is empty land, but do not rush. Do not go tomorrow to take it and build a new settlement.

 

Saeb: We are building for you the largest Jerusalem in history.

 

Khaled: This area was the most difficult to delineate.

 

Tal: How can Pisgat Ze’ev settlement be connected with the French Hill?

 

Samih: A bridge can be built to connect them.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Swap in area (4):

 

From Israel:

Area: 9.06 km

 

From Palestine:

Area: 1.66 km

 

# of settlers: 2,673

 

 

 

Dekel: You have overstepped everything. Is it on your side or our side?

 

Abu Ala’: It is on our side with Ma’ale Adumim and Ariel.

 

Terza: There is a kibbutz on this side near Beit Iksa.

 

Samih; Not exactly.

 

Saeb: The intention is not to take even one Israeli.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Swap in Area (5) the Latroun Area:

 

From  Palestine:

Area: 18.19 km

# of settlers: 63,206

 

Settlements         # of settlers

Hashmonaim         2,450

Kfar HaUranim    2,220

Kfar Rut                237

Lapid                     2,291

Macabi’im             15,600

Matityahu              1,349

Modi’in ‘Illit          38,677

Shilat                      382

 

 

Samih: We have drawn the line in a manner that keeps for you the main road connecting Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Latroun Monastery is important for us but it is with you because the road is important for you. We have taken into account your interest by keeping connection between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

 

Swap in Area # (6) Qalqilya:

 

From Palestine:

Area: 13.1 km

# of settlers: 18,646

 

Settlements                   # of settlers

Alfi Minasheh                 5,984

Uranit                              5,934                   

Shi’ar Tikva                    3,793

 

 

Khaled: The interest here is to maintain geographical contiguity between Palestinian areas. It will be difficult to include more settlements without creating Palestinian enclaves.

 

Livni: This area and more to the left is the most complicated. Where is the Turkish enterprise located?

 

Terza: Not here; it is in al-Muqeibleh.

 

 

 

Swap in Area # (7) Beisan:

 

From Israel:

Area: 35.7 km

 

 

 

Terza: Again, there is a kibbutz in this area.

 

 

 

Swap in Area # (8) Gaza (with borders)

 

From Israel:

Area: 55.27 km

 

With borders: (52 km)

 

From Palestine:

Area: 21.97 km

 

 

Livni: It is Dahlan again in all places.

 

Samih: Leaving the northern area from the Gaza Strip until Wadi Herbia as part of the swap with the area of Abassan al-Kabira and al-Saghira; in addition to the eastern area as part of the swap.

 

Livni: This area is approved of with the Egyptians.

 

Khaled: We know that the northern area has been swapped for the area of Abassan al-Kabira and al-Saghira.

 

Samih: We want to verify and stabilize this on the maps.

 

Khaled: According to 1950 Modus Vivendi agreement, the armistice line has been changed. The whole matter depends on who has access to reliable data on this subject.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Summary of suggested borders modifications:

 

Land from Palestine:

119 square km (1.9%)

 

Land from Israel:

119 square kilometers

 

Total # of settlers to Israel:

302.250 (63%)

 

 

 

Livni: It is clear that Ma’ale Adumim, Giva’t Ze’ev, Har Homa and Ariel do not exist.

 

Samih: Real peace cannot be reached with an 18-km long enclave inside Palestine. We do not want to create problems in the future. We do not wish to hurt peace.

 

Saeb: Can you imagine that you accept for the sake of peace to have Jews as citizens with full rights in Palestine like Arab Israelis?

 

Livni: But how can I provide Israelis living in Palestine with security?

 

Saeb: Can you imagine that I have changed my DNA and accepted a situation in which Jews become citizens having the rights that I and my wife have. Can you imagine that this will happen one day?

 

Dekel: I do not have such fancy.

 

Livni: I have to think about this. I do not know. You have proposed something, but I believe we have to be creative. My problem is that of security. Some said to me that there would be violence among my people if I evacuated them, but the pressure will be less if I give the right to choose. I cannot bear the responsibility of their life in case they are exposed to danger and then the army will have to interfere. It is a legitimate question but we need to think about it.

 

Dekel: What is missing here is Ma’ale Adumim, Har Homa, separation between the Jewish clusters in Jerusalem, Gush Itzyon, Giv’at Ze’ev, and Ariel.

 

Livni: What will you take for the Safe Passage?

 

Saeb: 5 square km, but if we use another track the area will be smaller.

 

Livni: If we suggested something else you would have stood up and shouted. You have to understand the complexity of this issue. Perhaps you would appreciate their interests more. In Ariel also some areas have to be annexed.

 

Samih: We have done our best to include the largest number of settlers.

 

Livni: I want to say that we do not like this suggestion because it does not meet our demands, and probably it was not easy for you to think about it but I really appreciate it. I think we have a reason to continue.

 

Abu Ala’: We understand how hard it was for you as well.

 

Saeb: In Jerusalem it was hard for us but we decided to give you.

 

Livni: Can we have the maps?

 

Saeb: I want to say something. I am from the leadership headed by Abu Mazen and the leadership does not accept the facts on the ground.

 

Livni: That is why I said what I have said.

 

Saeb: This is not the Koran. Gabriel did not come down from heaven and revealed it to us. We have taken your interests and concerns into account, but not all. This is the first time in Palestinian-Israeli history in which such a suggestion is officially made. What we are doing no one will do for us, not the Americans or the Europeans.

 

Livni: I know about this.

 

Saeb: And since you have not given us your suggestions …

 

Abu Ala’: Not for this reason only.

 

Saeb: We will examine the matter. We have lots of internal complications. I wish that you would give Abu Ala’ a chance to decide. But you deserve to have a copy of it. What matters is that we have begun to participate and cooperate.

 

Abu Ala’: We will think, and you think, too.

 

Livni: Perhaps the next thing we will do, after knowing the position of each of us, is to have the experts sit together and discuss the gaps and differences between the two maps.

 

Abu Ala’: They have to do this.

 

Terza: We only need to have the file and there is no need for the map.

 

Livni: I suggest that you sit together, review and discuss the map. You may also want to correct parts of it such as the kibbutz that Terza said they exist in area for swap.

 

Saeb: We have no intention to include any Israeli.

 

Livni: The question is how to be creative.

 

Saeb: Do you want to sit together tomorrow and exchange maps?

 

Livni: Once again, I appreciate how hard it was for you to make this suggestion.

 

Abu Ala’: We want to achieve progress in the issue of security, and we also want to start with the issue of refugees.

Posted in Palestine AffairsComments Off on Palestinian Traitors Position Regarding 1967 Border (11)

ZIO-NAZI REGIME & EAST JERUSALEM (10)

Meeting Minutes: Borders – Ahmed Qurei, Saeb Erekat and Tzipi Livni

Summary

 

Meeting minutes on border. Palestinians stressed the 1967 border. The question of East Jerusalem and territories around the 1967 border. Qurei’a reacts to Israeli proposition, “This solution is not the two-state solution. It is the five-state solution: a state in Gaza, a state in Jerusalem, a state for settlers, a Palestinian state and an Israeli state.” Livni’s reaction to 5 million Palestinian refugees, “We do not create a state for every refugee we create a concept.”

Livni: Let us be fair. You referred to 1967 line. We have not talked about Jerusalem yet. There are some Palestinian villages that are located on both sides of the 1967 line about which we need to have an answer, such as Beit Safafa, Barta’a, Baqa al-Sharqiyeh and Baqa al-Gharbiyyeh. There are also some settlements that were built behind 1967 line but expanded inside 1967 line illegally, such as Uranit settlement south of Hebron.

Qurei: In light of these circumstances and these unrealistic propositions, I see that the only solution is a bi-national state where Moslems, Christians and Jews live together. In Israel they do not realize our needs. Is our demand for the 1967 borders too much for us?

Erekat: I mentioned earlier that the establishment of the Palestinian state is the answer to the issue of 5 million Palestinian refugees, but this does not mean that you should make this state smaller.

Full text

Meeting Minutes

On Borders

 

Jerusalem

Inpal Hotel (Larome)

8 April 2008

11:30 – 13:30

 

Attendees:

 

Palestinian side:

  •  Ahmad Qurei’ (Abu Ala’)
  •  Dr. Saeb Erekat
  •  Dr. Samih Al-Abed
  •  Salah Ilayan
  •  Zeinah Salahi

 

Israeli side:

  •  Tzipi Livni
  •  Udi Dekel
  •  Tal Becker
  •  Dani Terza

 

 

Livni: I would like to say one thing before reviewing the maps. I know that what you will see will make you feel like we are taking it away from you. You will say that we are taking your hands and your legs, but I hope you will look at what there is on the other side. We are in need of it not because we want your land but because we do not wish to evacuate people from their homes. We are talking about 250,000 settlers living in the West Bank and we would like them all to remain living in a small area. I know that every inch hurts you.

 

None of us has touched the heart of the other yet (Jerusalem).

 

Before the presentation, I would like to understand one thing. Abu Ala’ talks about 1.5% for swap and Abu Mazen about 2%.

 

Abu Ala’: Abu Mazen revoked. He does not want any percentage for swap.

 

Livni: Does this percentage have any basis, or is it simply a generous donation from you?

 

Abu Ala’: Even though we do not acknowledge the realities on the ground imposed by Israel, the concession we made in Camp David is our willingness for swap by reciprocity and value. There was no talk about settlement blocs. There is talk about settlements in Israel only. We have never recognized these settlement blocs and therefore we suggested swap for a reasonable percentage and not a greedy swap, provided that we discuss how and where swap should take place. If you had asked today, we would have never agreed on swap.

 

Livni: I want to tell you about your needs and then translate them into a percentage. I will try to explain to you that it is need and not greed. If we do not annex them and if there is bloodshed after the establishment of the state then you will be forced to see our soldiers. This is something we do not want. We try to give an answer by reducing friction between both sides.

 

We will present our needs since we are still in the negotiation stage, and then experts will work to minimize them in some areas.

 

Abu Ala’: I cannot accept these principles. It is like taking all your money and then negotiate on how much to return to you. The beginning is half the end.

 

The basis is 1967 borders. You and the whole world including UN resolutions number 242 and 338 recognize this. Then we can talk about modifications. I will look at the percentage if it is 1% or 2%, but if it is more I will not look any more.

 

Livni: Then you already object.

 

Udi: The first meeting on economy was good do not spoil it.

 

Samih: The first depends on what is achieved here about the land.

 

Saeb: You presented your position. We will listen but only remember our position as it was presented by Abu Ala’. The 1967 borders are the basis for the two-state solution; and we can discuss swap.

 

No negotiation track in the world will be successful if this track will fail. The aim is to serve the interest of both sides and reach a win-win situation. The more realistic we are in our proposition, the more progress we will achieve.

 

Livni: I do not want to present to you what causes you grief and misery.

 

Abu Ala’: You said yesterday in a press statement that you have red lines. You answered this when you were asked whether we also have red lines that we cannot give up.

 

Next meeting they can continue to discuss many things, including means to remove settlements and others.

 

You have come with what you want and we have come with what is realistic. We hope they will continue to meet.

 

Terza: Of course, there will be the safe passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. There is no need to bring this up.

 

Livni: Look, this is the answer to smothering the West Bank with Ma’ale Adumim. The distance between Ma’ale Adumim and the Jordan Valley is 17 kilometers, and the distance between Tulkarem and the Green Line is 14 kilometers.

 

The instructions I gave for putting the maps are:

  •  to include the largest possible number of Israelis;
  •  to exclude Palestinians;
  •  to include constructed areas or areas under construction;
  •  to exclude areas that have been organized;
  •  to take into account security needs;
  •  to link between them and Israel.

 

Terza: This is the line for the terms of reference.

 

Livni: What you call 1967 line.

 

Abu Ala’: She cannot even say the word!

 

Terza: This is Gosh Etzyon area and it includes the settlements of Kfar Etzyon, Bitar ‘Illit, Ephrat, Daniel, Alon Shafot, Teqoa.

 

It includes all constructed areas in addition to plans currently under construction.

 

Abu Ala’: Does this mean that any area where there are no Palestinians should be given to Israel?

 

Terza: The area of Gosh Etzyon is about 544 square kilometers.

 

Saeb: What about the green area on the map?

 

Livni: I asked myself this question, and my answer was that it is for connection to create a vital zone. The problem here is topography.

 

Terza: Its area is 3.5 square kilometers and the population in Etzyon bloc is 50,000 people.

 

Livni: There are a number of small settlements for which we have to find an answer in the agreement.

 

The population in Gosh Etzyon is 50,000 people representing less that 1% of the West Bank area.

 

Let us now look at Ma’ale Adumim.

 

Terza: It includes Ma’ale Adumim, Kfar Adumim, Almon, Mitzape Yeriho, Alon, Kidar, and the industrial settlement of Mishor Adumim, and its area is 85 square kilometers. The population is 40,000 people and represents 1% of the West Bank area.

 

Livni: Today there are roads for the Palestinians and roads for the Israelis and all the roads are under Israeli control. We are talking about the next day and not the situation today, since we are living in the same area. In the future there will be roads in Palestine and each side will have sovereignty over its roads.

 

Saeb: What about the areas around Jerusalem?

 

Livni: We will discus this when we talk about the issue of Jerusalem.

 

Terza: Modi’in’Illit is 11 square kilometers and its population is 45,000 people.

 

28,000 people live in Ariel alone and the population living in surrounding settlements (Ariel bloc) which are like fingers (the fingers of Ariel and Kadumim) is 70,000 people and its area is 131 square kilometers.

 

Livni: I know what you are going to say: these fingers will pluck out your eyes. There are some small settlements that I exclude such as the ones near Nablus, for example.

 

There is no Israeli leader who will sign an agreement that does not include Ariel.

 

Abu Ala’: And there is no Palestinian leader who will sign an agreement that includes Ariel.

 

Livni: Let us be fair. You referred to 1967 line. We have not talked about Jerusalem yet. There are some Palestinian villages that are located on both sides of the 1967 line about which we need to have an answer, such as Beit Safafa, Barta’a, Baqa al-Sharqiyeh and Baqa al-Gharbiyyeh. There are also some settlements that were built behind 1967 line but expanded inside 1967 line illegally, such as Uranit settlement south of Hebron.

 

Abu Ala’: First, we cannot accept this proposition and I am sorry to hear it. This solution is not the two-state solution. It is the five-state solution: a state in Gaza, a state in Jerusalem, a state for settlers, a Palestinian state and an Israeli state. I do not think this will be the basis for any discussion.

 

Shlomo Ben Ami wanted to propose this to me but I told him no. Look how much Ma’ale Adumim has expanded since you suggested the swap. Thus if you want to be realistic and are concerned about the continuation of this channel, you have to come up with a realistic proposition.

 

I cannot look at you needs but I can look at swap by a realistic percentage.

 

If you want to terminate the PA with this proposition, we will leave it for our future generations to demand our rights.

 

Terza: Ma’ale Adumim was 64 kilometers in Taba.

 

Livni: At any rate, Taba is not a term of reference.

 

Saeb: I mentioned earlier that the establishment of the Palestinian state is the answer to the issue of 5 million Palestinian refugees, but this does not mean that you should make this state smaller.

 

Will what you need be swapped?

 

Livni: We do not create a state for every refugee but we create a concept. This is what happened in Israel when the state was created. The Jews came to the state and not to the land. There are things on the ground that you hate but they are there.

 

There is enough chance to reduce the needs that we have proposed.

 

Saeb: Will you compensate us for what you will take?

 

Livni: We will talk about the type of compensation.

 

I know that your position is for 1:1 swap. I said I cannot accept this percentage, but we will negotiate.

 

I know that Abu Mazen has proposed this to Olmert but Olmert refused it. I know that you have your ideas and I suggest that during next meeting you propose them.

 

Abu Ala’: I agreed to listen to your propositions because I thought you would come with realistic propositions.

 

In light of these circumstances and these unrealistic propositions, I see that the only solution is a bi-national state where Moslems, Christians and Jews live together.

 

In Israel they do not realize our needs.

 

Is our demand for 1967 borders too much for us?

 

Livni: I did not say it is too much for you.

 

Abu Ala’: Is it because settlers have come and settled in our land? Many countries occupied other countries and set up colonies but in then end they left them. The Soviet Union is the best example. They colonized many Islamic countries in Central Asia and left everything. There are many other examples from the world that shows this.

 

Livni: What you are saying is that there are no settlements you can live with?

 

Abu Ala’: For the sake of the Palestinian state I may be ready to swap for  small percentage.

 

Livni: I am not telling you to take this proposition or leave it, but what I am saying is that these are our needs.

 

Abu Ala’: In Oslo we said that everything should take place gradually.

 

Livni: I do not like gradation.

 

Abu Ala’: Now I do not like it but it was the only possible choice in Israel.

 

In one of the meetings with Abu Ammar and in my presence, Rabin said he would set up a fence around each settlement 50 meters far from the farthest house in it.

 

I said: Does this mean organization?

 

He said, “This is a decision.”

 

If negotiations continue and Olmert goes on with the implementation of settlement construction including Jerusalem then 15% of the territories will be cut out.

 

For us the territories mean the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including Jerusalem, the Dead Sea and No Man’s Land. This is what the final agreement should include, and in this way all Palestinian claims about territories come to an end.

 

Livni: Why will No Man’s Land go for you?

 

Abu Ala’: And it is not yours. We can negotiate on it.

 

Livni: The gap is not big. It is about 350 – 450 square kilometers. Future generations will blame us and never forgive us if we lose this opportunity because of this gap.

 

Abu Ala’: Then like what I said. The solution is a bi-national state from the sea to the river.

 

Livni: I suggest that during next meeting you present your ideas about this subject.

 

Posted in Palestine AffairsComments Off on ZIO-NAZI REGIME & EAST JERUSALEM (10)

Zio-Nazi Creating Enclaves for Palestinian’s (9)

Meeting Summary: 5th Meeting on Territory

Summary

 

Summary of the 5th Meeting on Territory. The Israelis presented their ideas on the additional areas they want in the West Bank. Israel refused to discuss details on land swap proposals, claiming no official decisions had been made. Both sides noted the lack of progress on territory issues.

Full text

Minutes of 5th Meeting on Territory

Monday, 7 April 2008, 18h10

King David Hotel, West Jerusalem

Attendees:

Palestinian: Dr. Samih Al-Abed [SA], Azem Bishara [AB], Khaled Elgindy [KE],

Nizar Farsakh [NF] and Fouad Hallak [FH]

Israeli:          Udi Dekel [UD], Dani Tirza [DT], Leah Arad [LA] and Kamil Abu-Rukn [KAR][1]

Overview:

  • The Israeli side presented their ideas on the rest of the areas they want in the West Bank (basically the wall with minor modifications—see attached map). While they claimed they are opposed to creating any “islands” or enclaves, their definition of contiguity is quite different than ours.  Thus, their solution to the problem of Palestinian localities that are cut off by their proposed blocs is to build alternate roads and tunnels to ensure connectivity (i.e., “transportation contiguity”).  In a few cases, however, some Palestinian localities remained inside the blocs, for which they did not provide any clear explanation.
  • Parallel with this, the Israeli side informed us of still more areas of the West Bank they wish to take out of the Territory committee. Thus, along with the “Greater Jerusalem” area and areas to be decided after security like the Jordan valley, the Israelis are now insisting that Hebron and Qiryat Arba’ also be discussed by the leadership first, before being addressed by Territory.
  • According to the Israeli side, the sum total of the “bloc” areas presented (which excludes the Jerusalem area, the NML, the Jordan Valley and certain other settlement areas) was less than 600 km2(which represents more than 10% of the West Bank).  However, as noted above, overall Israeli territorial demands are going to exceed 10%.
  • The Israeli side resumed their original highly rigid position with regard to landswaps.  When asked which lands they were prepared to give in return for what they are demanding, the Israeli side claimed there was no decision by the

 

leadership to discuss swaps—despite the fact that Livni herself had said that they would engage on swaps.

  • Given the Israeli side’s persistent rejection of 1967 as a basis and the concept of landswaps, and their increasing territorial demands, the overall tone of the meeting was not constructive.  The Palestinian side expressed displeasure with the Israeli presentation as both unconvincing and indicative of a lack of good faith, and reiterated the position that 1967 is the basis, that all settlements are illegal and must be removed, and that Jerusalem must be part of the discussion on territory.  The response by the Israeli side was to accuse us of taking an “all or nothing” approach, which was not conducive to negotiations and would ultimately lead to the Palestinians receiving nothing.
  • Given the current deadlock and lack of progress, both sides agreed to bring the matter to the plenary level and urge them to give new instructions on how to proceed.
  • Finally, we asked them to clarify the position they took in the previous meeting in which they threatened to continue expanding settlements everywhere if no agreement was reached on borders, and whether this was the official position of the GOI.  However, the Israeli side refused to respond or reiterate that position as a matter of record.

 

END TIME:  19h40


[1]It was unclear what KAR was doing in the meeting.  He was not on the list of people provided to us by the Israelis and the Israeli side seemed surprised by his presence as well.   

Posted in Palestine AffairsComments Off on Zio-Nazi Creating Enclaves for Palestinian’s (9)

Zio-Nazi Land Swap (8)

Meeting Summary: 5th Meeting on Territory

Summary

 

Summary of the 5th Meeting on Territory. The Israelis presented their ideas on the additional areas they want in the West Bank. Israel refused to discuss details on land swap proposals, claiming no official decisions had been made. Both sides noted the lack of progress on territory issues.

Full text

Minutes of 5th Meeting on Territory

Monday, 7 April 2008, 18h10

King David Hotel, West Jerusalem

Attendees:

Palestinian: Dr. Samih Al-Abed [SA], Azem Bishara [AB], Khaled Elgindy [KE],

Nizar Farsakh [NF] and Fouad Hallak [FH]

Israeli:          Udi Dekel [UD], Dani Tirza [DT], Leah Arad [LA] and Kamil Abu-Rukn [KAR][1]

Overview:

  • The Israeli side presented their ideas on the rest of the areas they want in the West Bank (basically the wall with minor modifications—see attached map). While they claimed they are opposed to creating any “islands” or enclaves, their definition of contiguity is quite different than ours.  Thus, their solution to the problem of Palestinian localities that are cut off by their proposed blocs is to build alternate roads and tunnels to ensure connectivity (i.e., “transportation contiguity”).  In a few cases, however, some Palestinian localities remained inside the blocs, for which they did not provide any clear explanation.
  • Parallel with this, the Israeli side informed us of still more areas of the West Bank they wish to take out of the Territory committee. Thus, along with the “Greater Jerusalem” area and areas to be decided after security like the Jordan valley, the Israelis are now insisting that Hebron and Qiryat Arba’ also be discussed by the leadership first, before being addressed by Territory.
  • According to the Israeli side, the sum total of the “bloc” areas presented (which excludes the Jerusalem area, the NML, the Jordan Valley and certain other settlement areas) was less than 600 km2(which represents more than 10% of the West Bank).  However, as noted above, overall Israeli territorial demands are going to exceed 10%.
  • The Israeli side resumed their original highly rigid position with regard to landswaps.  When asked which lands they were prepared to give in return for what they are demanding, the Israeli side claimed there was no decision by the

 

leadership to discuss swaps—despite the fact that Livni herself had said that they would engage on swaps.

  • Given the Israeli side’s persistent rejection of 1967 as a basis and the concept of landswaps, and their increasing territorial demands, the overall tone of the meeting was not constructive.  The Palestinian side expressed displeasure with the Israeli presentation as both unconvincing and indicative of a lack of good faith, and reiterated the position that 1967 is the basis, that all settlements are illegal and must be removed, and that Jerusalem must be part of the discussion on territory.  The response by the Israeli side was to accuse us of taking an “all or nothing” approach, which was not conducive to negotiations and would ultimately lead to the Palestinians receiving nothing.
  • Given the current deadlock and lack of progress, both sides agreed to bring the matter to the plenary level and urge them to give new instructions on how to proceed.
  • Finally, we asked them to clarify the position they took in the previous meeting in which they threatened to continue expanding settlements everywhere if no agreement was reached on borders, and whether this was the official position of the GOI.  However, the Israeli side refused to respond or reiterate that position as a matter of record.

 

END TIME:  19h40


[1]It was unclear what KAR was doing in the meeting.  He was not on the list of people provided to us by the Israelis and the Israeli side seemed surprised by his presence as well.   

Posted in Palestine AffairsComments Off on Zio-Nazi Land Swap (8)

Zio-Nazi Annexation of Bethlehem (7)

Meeting Minutes: 4th Plenary Meeting on Territory – March 31, 2008, 2:45 pm

Summary

Members of this meeting discussed the potential Israeli annexation of the area southwest of Bethlehem (the Etzion bloc) and minimizing the number of Palestinians living in this territory. Despite the settlement freeze, Israeli members of the committee argued that they were not building new settlements, but rather building upon what is already theirs in Jerusalem and within the blocs, which they believed was sufficient to meet their Roadmap obligations.

Khaled Elgindy (Negotiations Support Unit, Palestinian Authority): When you say tunnels, would you consider connecting your settlements with the same kind of tunnels that you propose – and are actually building on the ground – for Palestinian villages that are separated?

Dani Tirza (Israeli official): Yes. We can consider

Elgindy: So why aren’t you connecting them using tunnels? Why take empty land to connect the settlements?

Tirza: Because we have security concerns. Tunnels are present a security concern. We don’t frighten you…

Nizar Farsakh (PA): Well, we beg to differ on this with you.

Elgindy: You should ask the people in Gaza and in these villages whether they are frightened of you or your settlers.

Full text

Attendees:

Palestinian: Dr. Samih Al-Abed [SA], Khaled Elgindy [KE], Nizar Farsakh [NF] and     

Fouad Hallak [FH]

Israeli:          Udi Dekel [UD], Dani Tirza [DT] and Leah Arad [LA]

Overview:

  • The Israeli side presented their ideas on the area southwest of Bethlehem (the Etzion bloc) that they want to annex and the criteria they used in drawing the line: number of settlers, security, topography, road connection, land use (agriculture, commercial, industrial, tourism, infrastructure, recreation, schools transportation) and minimizing the number of Palestinians included and the overall effect on Palestinians in the area. They said it was approximately 54 km2 in size and contains some 49,000 settlers. They said they are flexible on the delineation of the bloc and are not taking an ‘all or nothing’ approach to the issue.
  • The Israeli side continued to insist on deferring Jerusalem and the eastern border and restated that they reject approaching modifications to the border on a reciprocal basis insisting that they are not giving back something that is ours.
  • On contiguity they agreed that it is important for both sides but they argued that tunnels and underpasses should be used to provide contiguity to Palestinians not to Israelis because tunnels present a security risk and the risk to the Israelis is always greater. They also suggested that they would not consider isolated settlements that are deep in the West Bank.
  • In terms of the settlement freeze they argued that they are not building “new settlements”, but only in Jerusalem and the blocs, which they believe is sufficient to meet their Roadmap obligations. They followed this with a thinly veiled threat that in the event that current negotiations do not succeed, they will resume settlement construction everywhere else as well.
  • In the next meeting, the Israeli side will explain the rest of the “settlement blocs” and the other areas they are interested in. There is concern that the Israeli side is trying to drag out the process and procrastinate.

 

Meeting Minutes (not verbatim):

NOTE:     Text in square brackets is either an interpretation (in regular text) or a description (in italics) of what was being said. 

UD:     Last time we spoke a little about “areas of settlement”; I’m not saying “blocs”. We would like to explain to you our position, what we mean by those areas so that you understand better what we mean when we say “settlement area”. So we have prepared a presentation with maps. Like last time we mentioned the Etzion area; we are going to present to you what is Etzion.

SA:      we are ready to listen.

DT:      [Projects  a map of Etzion bloc using ArcMap software and begins describing the various lines and colors, adding layers as he speaks.] This is the reference line, or whatever you want to call it [points to their ‘West Bank Outline’ line]. And this is the line of the settlement area, the area where all the big settlements sit on one part of the land [points to line delineating bloc]. These are not exact lines, but just to give an idea. We can later define it accurately, but for now we are using straight lines. The green lines are the major roads which are used by Israelis and connect them to Jerusalem. All their services are in Jerusalem.

The main road here is Road #60. But we have a problem there. It goes close to Khader and that presents a security problem. We have 49,000 Israelis living in this area with only one road connecting them, which has a security problem. So we have to use another road as an alternative [points to Road #367 which runs south of Etzion] that goes to Beit Shemesh. Betar ‘Illit is using another road that goes north [points to Road #375]. Most people in Betar ‘Illit work in Jerusalem; their life is in Jerusalem.

There are also many agricultural villages that have a connection between them for day to day life. This polygon [referring to entire bloc] is 1% of the land [i.e., the West Bank] as it is approximately 54 km2. There are no Palestinian villages in this area. There are some Palestinians living in the area, but it is not a village. It is only a small hamlet, Khallet Zakariya, and some lonely houses for agriculture.

FH:      You know there is an old man living there. He is more than 100 years old.

DT:      Yes, I know him. Very nice man. But I don’t want to talk about history because if I start we will stay here forever. I like history a lot.

[Adds layer of settlement built-up area] This is the urban area: houses already built or under construction, not the planned areas. We can show you the plans later. Because we believe settlements in the area have to have natural growth.

[Adds  layer of areas that have approved plans] All these are the ones that have permission to build, so they can build on it if they secure the money for it.

[Adds layer of municipal areas] This is the municipal area; you can see some of it does not have planned areas in it. This is the area from which taxes can be collected and where people can build if they get permission from the authorities.

But if we’re talking about settlements in an area we also have to talk about security. So this line shows the 500 meters from the current built-up area, from the last house [adds layer showing 500 m buffer zone around built-up area of each settlement], only what is already built. This is the security area. If Palestinians live within that area we can do nothing about it, we cannot move them. Note, I did not make a security area [i.e., 500 m buffer] for the settlement area as a whole, but we have to consider that. 

We also have to consider the use of the land: agriculture, commercial, tourist industrial, recreational [adds layers showing each designation]. You also have electricity and water infrastructure.

So now you are going to ask me, ‘what about these areas without any land use designation’? [points to the remaining area in the bloc that does not have any land use designation]. Well, we need to make connections. We need to have continuity in this area, so they are not isolated from each other. The lines marked are not exact; we can define them on the ground later. We tried to minimize the Palestinians within this area. Here you see the connection of the area to the rest of Israel and to Jerusalem. [points to area on map] Here you can see this land; we know it is [Palestinian] agricultural land, so we kept it out. We try to minimize the amount of land taken for the corridor connecting Gush Etzion to Jerusalem.

Here you see an illegal outpost [points to Neve Daniel North (Sde Bo’az)] . I know you say all are illegal, but to us this one is illegal and we do not consider it in our area, only legal settlements.

UD:     So the outposts are not drawing the map.

DT:      But we have a problem about connecting Betar ‘Illit with Jerusalem. The main problem in this area is Wadi Fukin because it is an enclave between Beitar Illit and Tzur Hadassa. We don’t want to put any Palestinians in this area. There is a road connecting it to Husan so we exclude it from Gush Etzion.  There are 49,000 Israelis live in this area, and some Israelis come from outside to study here also.  It is about 1% of the West Bank.

SA:      It’s less than 1%, right?

DT:      Yes, less than 1%.

UD:     [jokingly] We are not allowed to say percentage.

SA:      How many settlements are in this area?

DT:      About 10—I don’t know all the names, but it’s not… one minute [adds layer showing settlement names, 9 in all]. There is another one that you don’t see here. It is Geva’ot. It is not a settlement. It’s like a…

NF:      A nahal?

DT:      … a big school.

LA:      A school or place of study, an educational center.

DT:      No, it was a nahal. Now it’s an educational center.

SA:      You have another line there on the map. There is a separate area there with empty land [points to area of the bloc extending northwards along Road 60]. What is it?

DT:      For security; we need to protect the road. We need height to control the area. It dominates the road so we need to secure it.

UD:     This area is connected to Jerusalem.

SA:      Everything in the West Bank is connected to Jerusalem—even Jenin.

UD:     Yes, and by the same road. If you want to connect Jenin with [MISSING].

SA:      One question about security: will these areas be part of Israel?

UD:     Yes, we need to secure the area. We would like it to see it with Israel.

SA:      We want to understand this issue of security. On the other side of the line, is there security concerns there too?

UD:     Yes, of course. We need to protect our citizens from some terrorist and extremist groups that do not want peace and want to attack us.

SA:      But we will have peace. We are talking after the agreement.

UD:     We talked for many years about peace but people tried to destroy it and in 2000 started violence against us.

SA:      ok, you can move them to other side and they will be secure.

UD:     But we are speaking about this area. We’re trying to explain to you what we mean by “area of settlement”. It’s not just built-up area, but the whole area they need in order to live. We prepared this to show you an example of the areas we discussed before.

SA:      What areas? Show them to us.

DT:      We are only speaking about one area today.

UD:     The areas we mentioned: this one (Gush Etzion), Modi’in ‘Illit, Shomron/Ariel, and some other areas adjacent to the line.

SA:      That’s what we want to know. Where are those other areas.

UD:     As I told you before, the main idea is that most Israelis―80% of the settlers―to stay where they are, and not to have to move them.

SA:      It is your decision?

UD:     It is our objective. Since 10 years and since 15 years.

SA:      [MISSING]

UD:     80% of the people, not the territory.

SA:      So you’ll keep building more and more, and you will keep asking for the same percentage?

UD:     We would like those people to continue to live in the same kind of community as they are now living.

SA:      OK, and this villages—Husan, Battir and Wadi Fukin—don’t you think they want to live together in the same community?

UD:     Yes. We want to keep contiguity for you as well.

SA:      Nahhalin. How do you connect it to them main road, to Jerusalem and Bethlehem?

DT:      Yes, they have a road to connect them, an underpass or tunnel. So it can access Bethlehem.

KE:      When you say tunnels, would you consider connecting your settlements with the same kind of tunnels that you propose—and are actually building on the ground—for Palestinian villages that are separated?

DT:      Yes. We can consider

KE:      So why aren’t you connecting them using tunnels? Why take empty land to connect the settlements?

DT:      Because we have security concerns. Tunnels are present a security concern.  We don’t frighten you…

NF:      Well, we beg to differ on this with you.

KE:      You should ask the people in Gaza and in these villages whether they are frightened of you or your settlers.

SA:      Think of Nahhalin.

DT:      Well, there are Palestinians in this areas who prefer to be on the Israeli side, but we’re not talking about that now. We have to see the needs of not just Israelis, but of the Palestinians who live there as well.

SA:      What is this purple area outside [points to area designated as municipal area of Efrat but is not included in their line for the bloc]?

DT:      This is Giv’at Eitam. It has an approved plan so they can build on it, but it is not being implemented. We know it is big. We are trying to minimize the impact on people there, so we left it out.

UD:     Let’s say this: if we agree on a line, then this will not be part of the settlement area. But if we don’t, we will continue to build in these areas. But we won’t include it for now. It only signifies that there is permission to build.

SA:      [laughing] So you are blackmailing us now.

KE:      How do you reconcile this with Olmert’s commitment, which he made before the entire international community, to freeze settlement activity?

UD:     This is not a new settlement. We said we will not building any new settlements. But we are not going to wait. We are moving all the time. If we reach an agreement then if it is on our side we will build. But if we don’t reach agreement then we will not stop building; we will continue and proceed. This is why we built a security fence. We did not want to build it at first because we said we need to agree the border with you, but then we decided we cannot wait any more and so we built it. But now that we have a process, we are not going to do anything in this area.

FH:      In Jaba there are no agricultural areas, it is empty land, so why did you include it in the bloc?

DT:      It is not empty. It is for topography. We need it to be able to go from Gush Etzion to the west.

SA:      What is the problem with topography?

DT:      It is too vertical. You can build if it is horizontal, but you cannot built in a vertical area.

SA:      So this justifies that you include it? So even topography is working against us.

KE:      The edge of the area you showed us, at Efrat, is roughly 8km deep into the West Bank. Would you accept a similar intrusion into Israeli territory?

UD:     This is not one of the parameter for us. The parameters are facts on the ground. We have to find ways to deal with that reality. We are not interested in poking you in the eye, or making deep intrusions, like you say. Because this is the situation that exists on the ground, and we need to understand it.

NF:      The point Dr. Samih is making is that that reality is fluid and constantly changing. So how do we deal with it if it keeps changing?

UD:     This reality already exists. One or two more houses will not change that reality. There are areas of what we call national consensus that we will keep. As I said before, if we can’t reach agreement, we’re going to go forward [with building everywhere.].

NF:      So, that’s how you define the freeze: not to build new settlements?

UD:     As Olmert said, we will not build new settlements. But in Jerusalem, and in these areas, we will continue to build for the natural growth of these areas.

KE:      Even though the Roadmap says freeze “all settlement activity, including the natural growth of settlements”? How do you reconcile that?

UD:     When we see you fulfill your Roadmap obligations we can talk about ours. You cannot expect us to move only on our obligations. Until then we will do the same. This is now the facts. My opinion is not important. And I’m sure you know that.

SA:      What is the relation between this line and the wall? Can you overlay the two to see the difference?

DT:      It’s a fence. It’s almost the same.

SA:      Show us.

DT:      [Adds layer of the wall and indicates which sections are completed, planned or have pending court cases. The wall line matches the bloc line in all areas except Jaba’ in the south, which is included in latter but not the former, and in the north from Nahhalin to Walaja. (see attached rendition of Israeli map.)]

SA:      So it’s the same.

DT:      It’s mostly the same, because we took the same considerations [as the wall] when we did this line. It’s a balance between security needs and the rights of the people there.

UD:     As you know, during decisions on the fence, we have to use the principle of proportionality to balance between security and the needs of the people. And many times it goes to the court to see this balance.

KE:      So Har Gilo is not part of the bloc?

DT:      It is part of the area of Jerusalem. It is not inside Etzion, even though it is part of the Etzion regional council. Like Qedar, which is in Etzion regional council too, but is not in this area.

UD:     As we said, we are not discussing Jerusalem, up to Battir. We need the leaders to agree.

NF:      In the previous meetings you mentioned that these are the main areas that you are interested in but that there also others that were less important. Can you give us examples of those?

UD:     If there is an Israeli settlement, without any Palestinians or any Palestinian activity there, and they are just on the line, we’d like them to be part of Israel.

DT:      Like Har Adar and Oranit. They are close to the line.

UD:     Just on the line. It is areas where a slight change in the border will save us having to move Israelis.

SA:      What is the depth that you are considering this?

UD:     We are not considering depth. We speak here of realities on the ground. So it is not only Efrat; it is not because it is 8km into the West Bank but because there are all these settlements in this area with connection to Israel.

SA:      No matter how deep it is?

UD:     This is theoretical. We want to move as little as possible of the settlers. We will not ask for an isolated settlement that is deep inside the West Bank. We understand you have problems with Ariel and Ma’aleh Adumim, but we have no parameter to go deep inside [the West Bank].

SA:      You said there are 50,000 Israelis living in this area and that it is 54km2, so that means you are giving each person 1000m2.  What is the density inside Israel?

UD:     I don’t know. This doesn’t mean anything. You can play many games with numbers.

SA:      You mentioned some areas owned by Jews. What is the ratio of land in this area that is owned by Jews?

DT:      We are not talking about private land. There are many lands on both sides that are owned by both people. This is not the issue; we will tackle it later.

SA:      But it is for us. We cannot take somebody’s land and tell them we gave it to the Israelis. He will ask us how we can do that.

KE:      Even your own laws don’t allow you to build settlements on private land—at least in theory, since about 40% of settlements are built of private Palestinian land. So shall we take all those settlements off the table from now, since they are even against your own laws?

DT:      Oh no, not 40%.

KE:      What ever the number, a significant proportion of settlements are built on privately owned land.

DT:      We have to find

UD:     In making the line we try to minimize private land being taken and also minimize the number of people that will need to cross the line to the other side for their livelihood.

SA:      But that will not work if it is at the expense of other people. We have to consider this.

UD:     We each have our realities. It’s not the same. Everyone looks at history in a different way. We are creating a new state. It is something new, that didn’t exist before. Israel already exists.

SA:      And keeps expanding.

UD:     You say “expanding”. I say something else.

KE:      You mentioned your interest in including 70-80% of the settlers. What total number of settlers are you basing this percentage on? Are you saying 80% of the total 480,000 settlers, or only some settlements?

DT:      [to UD] He’s including Jerusalem.

UD:     No, not counting Jerusalem.

NF:      What is the number?

UD:     We don’t have it now. Will have to check

FH:      Do you prioritize your settlements? For example, within a bloc do you consider that a certain settlement is more important? Here in the bloc you took out Tekoa.

UD:     First of all we do not have a policy of prioritizing. And second, if we had, we wouldn’t share it with you.

KE:      Is the area you designated on the map a single organic and indivisible unit, or are you flexible on it? In other words, is it ‘all or nothing’?

UD:     We don’t accept an ‘all or nothing’ approach and we the same from you. So of course we are going to negotiate with you and try to find solutions. We hope you are in the same position. Otherwise there is no point in talking. We like you we can have a nice chat.

SA:      OK, can you talk in specific terms on other areas, like you did for this one?

UD:     No, we’re not ready for that.

SA:      If this is the only area you want, OK, we can consider it.

DT:      [laughing] “We can consider it.”

UD      Would you like us to present this picture for all the other areas?

SA:      Yes.

UD:     Let me check [consults with UD and LA]… They support the idea. But that doesn’t mean it will happen. [laughing] We need to get permission to do that from the upper echelon.

SA:      We will try to talk to our leaders as well. But try to include Jerusalem. We are talking about borders, not just arrangements. We need the full picture including Jerusalem so that we understand what you are taking from us and then we tell you what we want in return. This will shorten the time, instead of just bits and pieces here and there.

UD:     As you know, we are trying to present to you [MISSING]

SA:      You are demanding these areas from us.

UD:     I am not demanding anything from you. We are not taking anything from you.  I just describe our position, our concept, give you information you need to understand our position. It is important for us to describe for us which areas you thinking about it.

SA:      we need next time to see the full picture, to go through all the areas so that we can come back with our proposal.

UD:     I understand… Next time we would like to hear from you. Abu Alaa has said that there are some settlements that you can accept. We would like to hear from you about those areas.

SA:      After you go through all of the areas.

UD:     I agree.

SA:      Or are you not in a hurry?

UD:     We have two major issues that need to wait for decision: Jerusalem and security. Security we initiated today the first meeting with Gen. Hazem Atallah, chief of police, and Amos Gil’ad. There are connections with our issues.

SA:      So maybe we can meet together sometimes?

UD:     We can consider that.

SA:      And we’ll go back to our side and check as well.

NF:      On process, when is the next meeting? Monday?

DT:      I can’t do Monday.

UD:     Let’s say Sunday. We will talk and confirm.

END TIME:  15h50

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Zio-Nazi Pa Traitors Common Language (6)

Meeting Minutes: 1st Meeting on Territory

Summary

 

Minutes of the first meeting on territory, where Palestinian and Israeli parties discussed common language and understandings on territories and borders. The Israeli side refused to engage on the basis of the 1967 line or to accept the principle of a swap.  The parties were unable to agree on a starting point for negotiations. 

Full text

 

Minutes of First Meeting on Territory

Wednesday, 12 March 12 2008, 12:30 PM

KingDavid Hotel, West Jerusalem

Attendees:

Palestinian: Dr. Samih Al-Abed [SA], Khaled Elgindy [KE], Nizar Farsakh [NF]

Israeli: Udi Dekel [UD] and Dani Tirza [DT]

Overview:

  • The Israeli side refused to engage on the basis of the 1967 line or to accept the principle of a swap—and it was clear that they had no mandate to do so.  They also insisted that the border in Jerusalem be excluded from the work of the territory committee.  However, there was no discussion of the eastern border, including the fate of the Jordan Valley.
  • Parallel with this, they repeatedly noted their desire to “change the language” (Read: terms of reference) of the negotiations, which is consistent with the overall Israeli approach.
  • The Israeli standard is essentially two-fold: (1) realities on the ground and (2) what they referred to as the “West Bank outline map” (i.e., excluding the No Man’s Land and East Jerusalem).
  • Since no agreement could be reached on the starting point for negotiations, the Israeli side proposed that we either: (1) exchange maps of each side’s respective starting points, identify gaps and agree on a new baseline, or (2) send the issue back to the Abu Alaa/Livni track for them to decide.  The Palestinian side rejected the former and was non-committal on the latter.
  • Apart from these major points of contention however, the Israeli side was clearly following an interest-based approach, which provides at least potential opportunities for future progress.

 

Meeting Minutes (not verbatim):

UD:     We have to take every opportunity to find a solution, but it will be difficult.

SA:      Why is it difficult?  Is it because your desire to make an agreement is only your head and not in your heart as well?

UD:     First, there is history, which for some is more important than the future.  Each side has different interpretations of this or that event or symbol. The other problem is implementation, whereby after an agreement each side claims the
 

 

other is not acting in accordance with what was agreed.  Then we have the problem of terror groups who oppose any agreement and want to stop the process—not just here but all over the region, there are actors who do not want to see any progress.  But we have to go forward.  After our operation in Gaza, your side stopped negotiations. But after the terror attack in Jerusalem, we agreed to continue the process.

SA:      I agree, but you’re only telling half the story.  Also on your side there are people that want to get rid of us, and you did not mention the continuing settlement expansion…

DT:      These are not settlements…

SA:      … like the 750 new units approved in Giv’at Zeev, or other places; it makes people want to respond.  So we need the full story before we can go forward.

UD:     I’m not going to argue with you… but we have to be determined enough to reach an agreement.  Now, about today’s meeting, I don’t know what Abu Alaa and Livni agreed but, as I understand it, we need to agree on a common language when it comes to territory and borders.  From your side, I know there was discussion of percentages, or areas (in sq. km)… In the previous two meetings with Abu Alaa and Livni, we started to explain all the considerations of what we mean when we talk of territory and borders.

SA:      You are jumping directly into discussing areas.  We need to discuss parameters or guidelines.  You spoke of sq. km, but we already have a starting point, which is 1967.  We just need to have all the maps.  This is what we need for a breakthrough.  We must have a common language, agree on common maps and data, and then we can have a discussion about the issues.

UD:     As you know, our guiding principles are UNSC Res. 242, the need for boundaries that can provide security for Israel, and we’re talking about the situation on the ground, as per Pres. Bush’s letter.

SA:      Do you mean the situation as it was then, or now?

UD:     Reality now… But we’re not going to argue.  We can’t change reality on the ground.  We don’t see the 1967 border as a reference, first because we don’t even know exactly where the line is.

SA:      We have all the maps that were signed by you.

UD:     But that wasn’t exactly the line on the ground.

SA:      If not the 1967 line, then what is your reference?

UD:     We said already, the situation on the ground.

SA:      The wall?

UD:     The security fence is not a border.  Unfortunately, it is needed for security.  Every week we intercept 3 to 4 suicide bombers.  As we’ve said before, the fence is not a border and can be moved like we did with Lebanon.

NF:      What is your frame of reference?

UD:     We’re talking about blocs of settlements—not far in the West Bank, but close to the area we are talking about—are to be part of Israel. In Oslo we used the West Bank outline map.

DT:      It is the West Bank outline map, in which under our law Israeli military law is applied.

SA:      This is your law.  In our law, the line is 1967.

DT:      Based on which maps?  There is no…

SA:      This is the standard we’ve worked from, from Oslo to Taba… we are not going to discuss any other line.  If we’re going to waste time this is something else.

UD:     This is your opinion, but not our opinion.  It is very difficult to locate the exact line of the situation that existed on 4 June 1967.  It’s not the same line.  But for us, the baseline we use is the outline of the West Bank.  It may be close, but it’s not the same line.  You mentioned the NML—you can’t say this is “occupied”.

SA:      It doesn’t belong to you either.  The Jordan army was there at least in some places, but the Israeli army was not anywhere (in the NML).

UD:     This is our line. We have proof that the area was split and we consider it part of Israel

NF:      This was a gentlemen’s agreement that was not signed whereby the farmers from each side cultivate up to the middle of the NML, but then a dispute erupted in 1964 whereby this arrangement was dismissed.

UD:     We do not agree.

NF:      OK, then we agree to disagree.

KE:      There two practical problems with your approach.  How can we start from realities on the ground when the situation on the ground keeps changing, even as we speak. Second, how can we identify which areas in Israel would be swapped in exchange for what is being taken in the West Bank if we don’t have a reference line?

UD:     We are not speaking in the same dimension.  We are not speaking about “giving” and “taking”… we are taking about realities.  Our goal is to create a better situation for Palestinians, as well as for Israelis.

NF:      Can you explain to us how you see us moving forward from today’s meeting to an final agreed border?

UD:     Take reality on the ground…  We want the blocs to be included in Israel, and we want contiguity—just like you want contiguity.  And you have to take into consideration the need to protect our citizens, for strategic depth, and the ability of people to continue living normal lives—there is a list that we spoke of before—in addition to other concerns like holy places, water, etc.  If you’re going to talk about “rights” and what we “give back,” we can’t go forward.

SA:      This is not an encouraging way to start out.  All you’ve discussed is what you want to take.  We also have concerns about these issues—water, holy places, etc.  All these can be dealt with.  What is the adjacent area on your side?  We have that data and criteria for it as well.  If you want to just take, then we just keep what we have now.  What do you expect us to say to our people?  Everything you’re doing—the settlements, the wall—is illegal.  This is not a starting point.  If this is your intention, to argue about this, then how can we accept it?  This land that was taken was taken by force and it belongs to people. Who accepts that?

DT:      We’re talking about an agreement between two entities, not private property rights.  That will come later, at the end… because we also have Israelis who owned private property in the West Bank pre-1948. 

SA:      Fine.  We can deal with that too.

DT:      Al-Quds University is built on private property owned by Israelis.  But today we are talking about an agreement between states.

SA:      We have three issues: the 1967 line, exchanging maps and the swap.

UD:     The discussion between us is very important.  It will not help to talk about what is “illegal”.  Only my supreme court will tell me what is legal. We are the only country that has a supreme court that plays such a major role. We can fight over sentences…

SA:      We understand each other from all previous negotiations.

UD:     We didn’t take anything from you.  No Palestinian state existed before.  When you say 1967, it’s not something we can recognize. First, it’s not a border.  Second, we don’t know exactly where it is.  So we have to forget those things.  It doesn’t help to talk about what we “take” or “give”.  Also, percentages don’t help.  But if we agree on a border then we can move forward

NF:      We’re disagreeing over approach.  I still fail to see how this is so.  Yes, the exact 1967 line is hard to know but there are ways to deal with this. With Jordan you had that problem because of the vague definition of the boundary in Wadi Araba (where it said the middle of the wadi) and you split the difference between your interpretation and the Jordanian one.  We can deal with any discrepancies between your interpretation and ours.  But need some sort of starting point.

KE:      The entire international community does not accept Israeli sovereignty in any of the territory occupied in 1967. You are asking us to accept what the whole world is refusing to accept.  This is not logical.

UD:     The international community is not relevant here. We are not agreeing with them; we are agreeing with you on the border between us.  And there  wasn’t a border.  All the maps we agreed upon are based on that line [“WB outline”].

KE:      But even your line is based on the 1967 line.  If we compare your line to 1967 line we’ll find that it coincides everywhere except the Latrun NML and Jerusalem.  You mentioned UNSC Res. 242, which itself means the 1967 line.

UD:     You know the wording of 242 so… Maybe we can start by identifying differences between our West Bank outline and what you call 1967.

SA:      We have maps and you have maps, but if you want an international commission to judge where the line is, this is a waste of time.

UD:     We want to reach an agreement between us.  We don’t need the international community to tell us what to do.

SA:      We cannot take the line you created.

UD:     It’s not created, it is used in our agreements with you in Oslo.  It’s based on this line [“WB outline”]

NF:      The Interim Agreement has no line. It just shows Areas A and B.

UD:     But the percentage of the areas are calculated according to that line.

NF:      That still does not mean that we accept that line.  I can draw 100 different lines and still get the same areas; that is not a standard.

UD:     Let’s check the line you have and what we have.  If it’s 90% the same, we can work on the rest… 

SA:      but we used this line in Camp David and Taba, so why restart the discussion?

UD:     I’m trying to change the language between us, to create a soft language between us.  We don’t want to fight over symbols; we’d like to create a new approach.  If we use symbols, it will be very difficult for you, and for us.  We’d like to have a new approach—not looking at maps signed by Moshe Dayan and Jordanians in the 1950s.

SA:      We also want to be creative and have an open mind to make an agreement acceptable.  But you cannot impose on me facts on the ground that you created and say this is the starting point.  These facts on the ground caused lots of problems for us.  We want to be creative

[Break: 13h30 – 13h45]

SA:      There are some logistical and process issues we can discuss before going back to our previous discussion, such as how often we meet, how many, etc.

UD:     My recommendation is we should see each other once a week, and in each meeting decide the issues to be discussed in the next meeting.  For example, our idea to discuss our line and your line to see what we can agree on; you can bring your people and we’ll bring our people and we’ll discuss the gaps.

SA:      This will take a long time and will take us away from the fundamental issues.  We need a comprehensive agreement on the full border.

UD:     So we have to agree upon the line.  If it’s 80% agreed then we leave it aside as a baseline and focus on the remaining 20%

KE:      Just a point of clarification on what you’re proposing: are you saying the sections of the line that we agree on would be the border, or the baseline?

DT:      No, the baseline.

UD:     Once we agree where the baseline is we can go forward.  Then we can define the line on the ground…  There are no shortcuts.  We have to understand each side’s opinion.

SA:      If we are going to sit and discuss the baseline, which is known to everyone, then this sounds like a way to delay.  It’s an obstacle now.  We’ve discussed this with you since 2000; now you’re coming with something different.

UD:     You didn’t discuss it with us. You can’t tell me that if we don’t use your approach then we are putting obstacles. This is not the way to negotiate.  You have your concept; we have ours.  I would like to see if there really is a big difference in terms of the outcome.  If there is a big gap, then we can reevaluate our approach.  I would like to take reality on the ground.

SA:      We can’t accept that because it was imposed on us. 

UD:     You can’t say that the Armistice Line of 1949 is the reality that existed on 4 June 1967.

KE:      So why not just focus on identifying the 1967 line as it was then, which is a technical exercise?…  Just to clarify, because you seem to be saying two different things.  On the one hand you’re saying the starting point is your “West Bank outline”, which is an arbitrary line that you drew and is not recognized by anyone in the world.  And on the other you’re saying it’s facts on the ground, which you imposed on us and which is changing on a daily basis.  But the two are not same.  You have facts on the ground that go well beyond your “West Bank outline”.  In that sense, Area C is an equally valid starting point. 

UD:     Everything can be taken to extremes… that is not what I said.  I said we do not accept 1967 as a principle.  We want to start with the reality that existed in 1967 and take into consideration current realities on the ground. We’d like to keep the blocs, but this is not new.  We need to define a line.  You have your line and we have ours.

SA:      We oppose the idea of facts on the ground as the starting point.  We all know what the starting point is.

UD:     You cannot say ‘if you don’t accept my way we can’t move forward.’  This is no way to move forward.

DT:      If you want to move forward, let’s map the gaps (between our two lines).  The gaps are Jerusalem, which we are not talking about today (we have no mandate), and the NML, which we can discuss in another meeting.  This is a very minor thing.

SA:      This is not a minor thing.  We’re talking about Jerusalem, which is not a “concept” or “symbol”.  If this is what you want to start with, you are taking us backward.

UD:     There are now two options: either we do this exercise of comparing lines and identifying gaps, or we go back to Abu Alaa and Livni for them to decide in their next meeting.

KE:      Practically, what you’re proposing is to draw only a partial border.  Meaning we’d have a line everywhere except Jerusalem?

UD:     Your leaders speak of an open city for example… so until the upper level comes to agreement we can’t talk about Jerusalem.  After the discussion with the upper level, we will have a solution for Jerusalem, but we don’t have the ability to do that now.

SA:      What is the line that we would stop at in Jerusalem in your view?

UD:     They will have to decide what will be the solution for Jerusalem.

NF:      Physically, where is the stopping point?  Qatannah?  And then to what point?

DT:      Battir.

SA:      This is a state with provisional borders.  I do not have authority to discuss this.

UD:     Check with your leader and I will check with mine.  Abu Alaa and Livni will meet next week.  I will be part of that.  I don’t know, maybe you will come too. But I know they won’t agree and will tell us to try again to come to a solution.

DT:      Regarding common maps, what system are you working from?  UTM?

NF:      We use UTM, but it’s not a problem.  They’re convertible anyway.

UD:     So I understand, we’ve agreed to bring the issue to Abu Alaa and Livni?  Or do we meet to agree on a (new) line?

SA:      We can do both.  We’ll check with them and we can meet.

UD:     I will call you to arrange our next meeting.

DT:      Can you send me the shapefile of your line?

NF:      We’ll have to check.

UD:     Thank you for coming.  Even if we do not see eye to eye, we want to keep talking.

SA:      We agree, but you are taking us back…

END TIME:  14h15  

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Minutes of Zio-Nazi & PA Traitors (5)

Meeting Minutes: Saeb Erekat, Ahmed Qurei and Tzipi Livni

Summary

Minutes of meeting among Erekat, Qurei and Livni. The parties discuss establishing committees on state-to-state issues and have an intense debate regarding the use of 1967 borders as a springboard for ongoing discussions and negotiations.

Livni: Do not say that the terms of reference should be 1967 borders because I cannot accept this and I know your position towards 1967 borders.

Qurei:If we agree on the principle of borders it will be easier for us to reach an agreement. This is better than just talking about the existence of Israelis in Hebron, Jericho, Jerusalem and its outskirts.

Livni:I can understand your position with regard to 1967 borders but I cannot accept it.

Qurei: Then 1949 armistice line.

Livni: I asked someone about the difference between 1967 borders and 1949 armistice line and he told me there is no difference.

(Dismissing legitimate Palestinian concerns)

Dekel: …It is better to talk about the future and not the past.

(Threatening the Palestinians: rel. between occupier and occupied)

Livni:  As long as you talk about [1967] borders there will be no link between the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Qurei: “I want to propose that the basis is that 1967 borders are the borders. We agreed to modify them and we are committed to this. The area of land for swap and its location should be discussed.”

Livni: You mean 1967 borders, but some talk about 1967 borders plus. For instance, safe passage with the Gaza Strip is 1967 plus.

Erekat: The passage was agreed on in Oslo.

Becker: But there was no reference to 1967.

Erekat: There was enough reference to lead to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 & 338.

Livni: A viable state is an internal matter.

Qurei: I am not talking about economic viability but about a land in which I will establish my state.

Livni: Settlement blocs will not affect the viability of the state.

Qurei: A state whose parts are connected with tunnels and bridges is not a viable state.

Dekel: The solution is difficult and that is why we have to be creative.

Livni: God gave us bad cards to play with.

Qurei: We are ready to discuss your security needs without exaggeration and without dictates. Security is not an early alert station here or there, but it is the manner in which we cooperate together for the realization of security both for you and us.

Erekat: What God created is destiny, but what you created on the ground is not destiny and we do not have to live with it. Abu Ala’ suggested two points to start with: 1967 borders and the modifications on the borders. But your criteria will smother us, and you also forgot the psychological factor in these criteria.

Erekat: We are waiting for the implementation of what has been agreed upon in Annapolis.

Livni: We evacuated 7000 settlers from the Gaza Strip.

Qurei: You evacuated 4 million Palestinians.

Livni: We did not expel them all. […] Sincerely, the area of the West Bank is small. We can give you the West Bank without any link to Gaza.

Qurei: How will we reach Gaza? Are we going to fly there?

Livni: You are angels that have wings. Instead of using the term “settlement blocs” to call settlements we can use Clinton’s term “Israeli civil population centers.”

Full text

Meeting Minutes

 

Jerusalem/Sheraton Plaza

18 February 2008

12:00 – 14:00

 

Attendants

 

Palestinian side:

  •  Ahmad Qrei’ (Abu Ala’)
  •  Dr. Saeb Erekat
  •  Salah Ilayan

 

Israeli side:

  •  Tzipi Livni
  •  Udi Dekel
  •  Tal Beker

 

 

Livni: I introduce to you Udi Dekel who has been recently appointed head of the negotiations department. He came here today to help us.

 

Tomorrow Prime Minister Olmert will meet with President Abu Mazen, and the specialized teams will meet on Wednesday with the participation of one person for each of the issue we have agreed on, namely, water, environment, economic relations, infrastructure, state-to-state relations, legal and prisoners’ issues – civil society and culture of peace.

 

This will be a symbolic meeting to give them our support and guidelines, but in the end we are the ones who decide.

 

The same person will also represent us in the legal issues and prisoners’ committee.

 

Abu Ala’: We do not care if the same person represents you or not but for us we will have two people, one for the legal issues and another for the prisoners’ issue because the issue of the prisoners is so important for us.

 

At the beginning we will have one person from each side and perhaps later they will need more people to help them.

 

Livni: In spite of the threats of Shas Party to withdraw from the government coalition, I declared that we will continue negotiations with the Palestinians and that it was agreed in Annapolis conference to discuss all issues.

 

Saeb: Your declarations indicate courage, integrity and sincerity.

 

Livni: What about if we declare after our meeting today that we will continue with the negotiations, that we are satisfied with the progress that has been achieved, and that the evidence for all this is that the specialized teams will convene on Wednesday? This will be an answer to the voices that claim that no progress has been achieved in the negotiations.

 

Abu Ala’: We can say that we are continuing the negotiations and that they are not easy because of the intricacy of the issues under discussion.

 

Livni: Will this raise the sensitivity of the members of the steering committee of the negotiations?

 

Abu Ala’: For us it will raise the sensitivity of the committee’s members.

 

Saeb: We declare that the negotiations continue without giving any details.

 

Dekel: The start of the work of specialized committees is a positive sign.

 

Livni: In order not to waste time, we say that in addition to the main issues, the specialized committees will start their meetings.

 

Saeb: Then you have to open the doors for unending questions from reporters. We just say that the peace process continues and that all issues are being negotiated.

 

Livni: I have no problem.

 

Saeb: But if Abu Ala’ said the water committee will convene, they will ask him about Jerusalem and he will have to answer. We are trying to protect the peace process. When we put our feet on the ground we can then talk about specialized committees.

 

Abu Ala’: We say we are negotiating all issues without naming them.

 

Saeb: At this stage the less that is said the better.

 

Livni: I thought of a way to work on the issue of borders. I want to share with you our needs and mention a number of criteria for negotiating the issue of borders.

 

Abu Ala’: Before the criteria there are terms of reference we have agreed on in all the negotiations we have conducted. The terms of reference are 1967 borders but the criteria are the modifications.

 

Tal: We did not say in any previous negotiations that we accept 1967 borders. What we have between us is 242 UN resolution.

 

Saeb: Did you accept roadmap plan or no?

 

Livni: We do not want a discussion that leads to frustration and confrontation. I do not wish to reach a deadlock before we start. I want you to review the maps and ask yourselves if they achieve what we agree on, your dream and our dream.

 

In the end we are talking about the creation of a Palestinian state not in Tel Aviv and not only in the Gaza Strip. We are talking rather about a state in the Gaza Strip and on most parts of the West Bank. Thus do not say that the terms of reference should be 1967 borders because I cannot accept this and I know your position toward 1967 borders.

 

Let us propose to you some criteria regarding borders as a springboard for discussion. I want you to understand our needs, not only to accept our criteria. Then we can return to the maps.

 

Abu Ala’: If we do not specify what we are talking about we will open the case for may possibilities. I will talk about Resolution 181 and you will ask angrily where we are heading. I will say to West Jerusalem and you will lose your temper.

 

We have to agree on the principle, and then we can talk about modifications. We have our own ideas and you have yours concerning modifications. We discuss them and agree on them.

 

To start with the maps is going to be difficult because maps determine the concept and therefore it is better to start otherwise.

 

Livni: Do you know why I cannot accept 1967 borders? Because I want a feasible agreement that can be implemented.

 

Abu Ala’: There are natural things on the ground and others artificial. We cannot say, for example, that due to the existence of an artificial Israeli demography in Jericho then Jericho must be annexed. If we agree on the principle of borders it will be easier for us to reach an agreement. This is better than just talking about the existence of Israelis in Hebron, Jericho, Jerusalem and its outskirts.

 

Livni: I can understand your position with regard to 1967 borders but I cannot accept it.

 

Abu Ala’: Then 1949 armistice line.

 

Livni: I asked someone about the difference between 1967 borders and 1949 armistice line and he told me there is no difference.

 

Dekel: There are differences that are difficult to specify. It is better to talk about the future and not the past.

 

Livni: This is what I wanted to say. In the end you need borders that you accept and live with.

 

Dekel: There are two guidelines for us in the criteria for borders: (1) recognition of secure borders, and (2) the situation and the reality on the ground. We want borders that can protect Israel and its inhabitants; borders that take into account the topographical reality.

 

Livni: We are not talking here about a specific place regarding the topographical reality.

 

Dekel: The largest number of settlers is under Israeli sovereignty and the least number of Palestinians are behind the borders on the Israeli side.

 

Abu Ala’: You mean the wall.

 

Dekel: I did not talk about the wall.

 

Livni: It seems that Abu Ala’ knows the criteria that the Higher Israeli Court has put regarding the route of the wall. Some parts of the route of the wall are not sacred.

 

We have to create a reality in which people can have a normal life, and here I mean both Palestinians and Israelis. We should minimize friction as much as possible.

 

Dekel: Water and the holy places: what will be their situation when we talk about the borders. We will demand sovereignty over them.

 

Saeb: This means that wherever there is a water basin the route of the wall takes into account the annexation of the land in which the water basin lies.

 

Livni: I recall what Abu Ala’ said in the first meeting: “We want 1967 borders, what is above them and what is underneath them.”

 

Abu Ala’: That was mere talk, and of course what is above and underneath the land.

 

Livni: The way I know you, it was not mere talk. There are issues for swap. For example, if you say you want the land where there is a water basin and I find that the opinion of water experts contradicts that then I will not object to it.

 

Tal: We should balance between criteria on issues that do not contradict each other.

 

Dekel: We have to discuss borders regime.

 

Livni: Another example for swap of issues is the issue of security in the Jordan Valley.

 

Dekel: Antiquities are one of the criteria.

 

Saeb: Borders regime to discuss free trade system or customs federation.

 

Livni: We can start negotiating the issue of crossings in a separate track. As for security, taking of land can be compensated if our security demands are met.

 

Saeb: What about connection with the Gaza Strip?

 

Livni: We started discussing the West Bank and as long as you talk about 1867 borders there will be no link between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. We understand the need for a safe passage but it will affect contiguity in Israel and Israeli sovereignty. Besides, the safe passage has to fulfill our security needs.

 

Abu Ala’: The passage has to be discussed.

 

Livni: I received a message just now about Joseph’s Tomb to put to you and I have no idea about its background.

 

Saeb: One civilian is building a three-storey building adjacent to Joseph’s Tomb and the Israeli side considers this a security threat.

 

Livni: I wish you will give attention to this issue.

 

Abu Ala’: I want to propose that the basis is that 1967 borders are the borders. We agreed to modify them and we are committed to this. The area of land for swap and its location should be discussed.

 

We want an independent state that is capable of absorbing most Palestinians here and in the Diaspora; a viable state for future generations with an adequate area to fulfill the needs of its citizens. This state must be independent out-and-out and must have full sovereignty over its land and natural resources. There are also other issues which we will talk about in future sessions. We want an independent sovereign state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital.

 

Livni: You mean 1967 borders, but some talk about 1967 borders plus. For instance, the safe passage with the Gaza Strip is 1967 plus.

 

Saeb: The passage was agreed on in Olso.

 

Tal: But there was no reference to 1967.

 

Saeb: There was enough reference to lead to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 & 338.

 

Livni: A viable state is an internal matter.

 

Abu Ala’: I am not talking about economic viability but about a land in which I will establish my state.

 

Livni: Settlement blocs will not affect the viability of the state.

 

Abu Ala’: But they will. Let us take the example of Ma’ale Adomim settlement. Its continued existence will affect the life of 100,000 Palestinian civilians living in the area where they cannot expand. The situation in Giv’at settlement is similar. A state whose parts are connected with tunnels and bridges is not a viable state.

 

Dekel: The solution is difficult and that is why we have to be creative.

 

Livni: God gave us bad cards to play with.

 

Abu Ala’: Ariel settlement goes inside the bowels of the West Bank. We are ready to discuss your security needs without exaggeration and without dictates. Security is not an early alert station here or there, but it is the manner in which we cooperate together for the realization of security both for you and us.

 

Livni: Egypt in all her greatness accepted a peace treaty with some restrictions.

 

Saeb: We know the realities on the ground, but there is something called negotiation cares, like the father who sacrifices his liver to save his son. We are not discussing the manner by which to preserve your interests, but the manner whereby we can reconcile between your and our interests.

 

You want to transfer water from our water basins to Israel, and you say that the wall and settlements are a reality on the ground; that is keeping what you created on the ground as it is and then you want us to see what is best for you. What God created is destiny but what you created on the ground is not destiny and we do not have to live with it.

 

Abu Ala’ suggested two points to start with: 1967 borders and modifications on the borders. But your criteria will smother us, and you also forgot the psychological factor in these criteria.

 

Abu Mazen and Abu Ala’ want to reach an agreement and thus I do not advise you to talk about these criteria in this flowery language of yours. I hope the whole concept would divert to suit our interests.

 

Livni: You are putting words in my mouth. I participated in reaching previous agreements, and what worried me was not the discussion of issues or reaching an agreement but the ability to implement agreements.

 

Saeb: Therefore we are waiting for the implementation of what has been agreed upon in Annapolis.

 

Livni: This is what we are doing. I do not want an agreement for the shelf without implementation. After what Dekel has said you are free; you can look at the empty part of the glass.

 

Abu Ala’: When we talk about borders we talk about the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem.

 

Livni: When we talk about settlement blocs we talk about the smaller part of the West Bank. You will say that they affect your life. I said that water could be either land or fair arrangements about it.

 

I said the route of the wall is not sacred. I asked you to understand our criteria and not to accept them.

 

Saeb talked about history and psychological association. I have passed that.

 

I understand Abu Ala’ when he talks about 1967 borders but I not am saying that accept them. In the end, I did not ask you to accept these criteria, but I want to sit with you and have a confidential agenda.

 

Saeb: We have to know how to reconcile our interests.

 

Livni: You can say that you hate settlements blocs and this is a crime against humanity and is opposed to international legitimacy. In the end it is up to you to make up your mind.

 

Let us talk about the implementation of the agreement. We evacuated 7000 settlers from the Gaza Strip.

 

Abu Ala’: You evacuated 4 million Palestinians.

 

Livni: We did not expel them all. The question is: Can Israel remove the settlements in the West Bank or no? You can say that this is not your business.

 

Abu Ala’: What will you do with the settlers in the Golan Heights? Why did you remove all the settlements when you reached a peace agreement with Egypt? And this is what will happen with Syria.

 

Livni: Sincerely, the area of the West Bank is small. We can give you the West Bank without any link with Gaza.

 

Abu Ala’: How will we reach Gaza? Are we going to fly there?

 

Livni: You are angels that have wings. Instead of using the term “settlement blocs” to call settlements we can use Clinton’s term “Israeli civil population centers.”

 

Abu Ala’: I suggest moving ahead in the issue of borders; two persons from each side. On our side we will have Dr. Jad Ishak and Dr. Samih al-Abed.

 

Livni: From our side we will have Udi Dekel and Dani Terza.

 

Abu Ala’: I suggest that the specialized committees meet at 12 noon on Sunday instead of Wednesday

Posted in Palestine AffairsComments Off on Minutes of Zio-Nazi & PA Traitors (5)

Traitors Preparation fot the Annapolis summit (1)

Meeting Minutes: 7th Negotiation Team Meeting

Summary

Minutes of the 7th Negotiation Team meeting in preparation for the Annapolis Summit. This is a continuation meeting for both sides to agree on a joint document for the Summit. The document aims to establish a joint proposal for implementing the Road Map. In this meeting, the parties debate language pertaining to the nature and purpose of two separate states.  The parties also touch on other Terms of Reference, implementation, refugees and Jerusalem.

 

Qurei: In a permanent agreement we can say whatever we want. Now we are preparing for Annapolis. Now we are talking about a two state solution. We can elaborate in a permanent agreement. If you want a one state solution, we can discuss that.

Livni: There is no two states if there is no (two states for) two people. 

Full text

 

 

Minutes from 7th Negotiation Team Meeting

(In Preparation for Annapolis)

Monday, 12th November 2007, 3h00pm

Crowne Plaza Hotel, West Jerusalem

 

Attendees:

Palestinian 

  •  Ahmed Querei (AA)

  •  Yaser Abd Rabbo (YAR)

  •  Akram Haniyeh (AH)

  •  Dr. Saadi Kronz (SK)

  •  Zeinah Salahi (ZS)

  •  Dr. Saeb Erekat (SE)

 

Israeli

  •  FM Tzipi Livni (TL)

  •  Yoram Turbovich (YT)

  •  Shalom Turjeman (ST)

  •  Gen Amos Gilad (AG)

  •  DG Abromovich (Abr)

  •  Tal Becker (TB) (Arrived late)

  •  Alon Bar (AB) (Head of Policy Staff of the Foreign Ministry)

 

Detailed minutes:

 

TL:

  •  [Notes that all parties need to leave early today. TL needs to leave to defend a vote of no confidence in the Knesset due to the negotiations process. AA had to leave to a meeting in Ramallah.  She noted that the next meeting should be longer than two hours. She suggests the next day as the best time for the next meeting.]

  •  Today we should focus on what the issues are and outline where agreement is, and not address what the disagreement is over.  We should leave that until the next meeting.  

  •  Tomorrow while we are sitting we can start to draft.

  •  [Discussion over timing of the meeting tomorrow. Five pm is agreed. Side discussion over possible locations for the meeting.]

 

AA:

  •  [Makes point that he was denied from entering Jerusalem yesterday, and that this greatly concerns the Palestinians.]  

  •  I am afraid soon that I will need a visa to enter Jerusalem!

 

TL:

  •  If we have some items that are agreed we can start drafting tomorrow.  Let’s not discuss what was not agreed today.

  •  On the preamble [TL then highlights the key points from the Israeli perspective of the preambular language that was read in earlier meetings.  She notes specifically:

    •  the Bush vision,

    •  the principle of two states for two peoples,

    •  language referring to the fact that a future agreement will address all outstanding issues,

    •  that the two states will be the homelands of their respective peoples and fulfill their national aspirations, Israel a state for the Jewish people, and Palestine for the Palestinians,

    •  the importance of implementation of the Roadmap [“RM”] by both sides.]

 

SE:

  •  So basically your preamble [as read at earlier meetings].

 

TL:

  •  Not the language.  I’m just trying to understand what is not agreed [in principle].

 

AA:

  •  There are many things that we don’t agree with.

 

SE:

  •  We agreed not to exchange drafts.

 

AA:

  •  We see three elements in the preamble:

  •  The Terms of Reference [“TOR”], which will include good words, address the future;

  •  The two state solution – I think we agreed on this;

  •  Implementation of the RM. We talked about the first phase – we have the five points.

 

TL:

  •  But we couldn’t reach and understanding on the TOR?  You want to put all the future points in the preamble?

 

AA:

  •  Second point, is the core issues;

  •  Third point is the day after Annapolis – negotiations, the process, timeline etc.  

 

TL:

  •  We added the role of the international community and the Arab world.

 

AA:

  •  We have no problem with these.

 

TL:

  •  But we have to outline what we agreed.  These are the basic parameters/outline of the future agreement.  On the TOR — you say yours, we say ours.  We can try to find the common ground.

  •  242, 338

  •  RM and previous agreements

  •  President Bush’s vision [clarifies that this is the vision – not the speech]

  •  3 quartet principles – is this agreed?

 

AH:

  •  We agreed to present these in another way.

 

SK:

  •  This is about the Hamas government!

 

AA:

  •  The RM

  •  The Arab Peace Initiative [“API”] [TL: this is not agreed]

  •  International Law

  •  International legitimacy [TL: what does this mean?] Resolutions 242, 338, 1397, 1515, 194

  •  President Bush’s vision

 

TL:

  •  President Bush’s vision is agreed.  

  •  Now we have the agreed and the not agreed.

  •  I don’t want to go into detail on each one today.  

  •  Now the TORs – agreed and not agreed.

  •  The two-state solution – this refers to two states for two peoples.  We suggested that we refer to it as a fundamental principle. The goal is two nation states, Israel and Palestine living side by side in peace and security [repeats homeland for its people language, that these states would fulfill the national aspirations of their people in their own territory, Palestine for Palestinians, Israel for Jews.]  This is what we want.  Now what is agreed and what is not?

 

AH:

  •  First of all I noticed that Olmert hinted in the Knesset that Palestinians approved, and that Abu Mazen approved [the Jewish state language]. It’s not true!

 

ST:

  •  I was with him. He didn’t say that!  

 

AH:

  •  That is what is reported in the press.

 

AA:

  •  This point is fundamental for you.  Not to have it is fundamental for us.  

 

TL:

  •  I read four lines – I want to know what is agreed and what is not.

 

AA:

  •  It’s not for the Iraqis or the Kuwaitis – we don’t need it. Two states with full sovereignty [and all the other attributes of statehood].

 

TL:

  •  Why establish a Palestinian state?  Because you want self determination which we respect.  The conflict is based on [achieving] your national aspirations for your people.  [The two] nation states are to give an answer to these aspirations.

 

YAR:

  •  Beyond the words we see the problems. First – we don’t want to interfere in the nature of the state.  We don’t want to join the Zionist movement.  We want to leave the Arab national movement!  

 

AA:

  •  [Suggesting language acknowledging the suffering of the people.]

 

TL:

  •  But it’s not about individual suffering.  Line by line [what are the problems] – I really don’t understand.  

 

YAR:

  •  We can’t interfere with the nature of the states. [Sovereign states are sovereign states and can do whatever they’d like with their states.] We are sovereign people and don’t want to interfere with yours even if you let us!  It’s your decision – we recognize your state however you want [to define it yourselves].

 

TL:

  •  You are referring to the last line as a Jewish state.

 

YAR:

  •  No – until we solve the issue of refugees we don’t want any sentence to complicate our life.  We don’t want our intellectuals to debate the true meaning of that sentence.  

 

TL:

  •  But you want something that says at the end of the road [our goal is] to create a Palestinian state?  [The creation of the state is connected to the principle of giving an answer to the national aspirations of the people.] When we talk about the core issues – it’s not like we’ll erase the refugees.  We’ll talk about it.  [TL again tries to walk through her language sentence by sentence.] So what is the meaning of a state?

 

AA:

  •  For Palestinians, to alleviate the suffering – achieve national rights — we are not here to describe for each state what to do.

 

TL:

  •  So what’s not agreed is the nature of the state?

 

AA:

  •  [Sovereignty over all of the territory and natural resources, viability, independence, etc.  this is the language with which we can describe states.]

 

TL:

  •  I understand we both know what we are talking about. I just want to list [i.e. what is agreed and what is not agreed] this meeting. You have problems agreeing to the nature of the state of Israel.

 

YAR:

  •  We are not against what Israel describes itself as.  We just don’t want to say it — we have citizens of Jordanian citizenship.  It will create problems.  [Continues to explain the problematic nature of defining the nature of a state.]

 

AA:

  •  We want a two state solution.  [Reiterates traditional language on this, side by side… etc.]

 

TL:

  •  Two states for two people.

 

AA:

  •  What if we import other people?

 

TL:

  •  We respect your right for a state of your own. You should respect mine.  Two states for two people. Two nation states. If you cannot say that a Palestinian state answers the national aspirations of the Palestinian people…

 

AA:

  •  In a permanent agreement we can say whatever we want.  Now we are preparing for Annapolis. Now we are talking about a two state solution. We can elaborate in a permanent agreement.  If you want a one state solution, we can discuss that.  

 

AH:

  •  [Raises engagement metaphor.]

 

SE:

  •  How can we describe a state without describing its borders!  

 

TL:

  •  We can say [this description will come to fruition] once we have borders.  

 

SE:

  •  We have six core issues to solve – Jerusalem, Refugees, Borders, Settlements, Water and of course Security.   We cannot solve the problems in a preamble.

 

TL:

  •  If we can’t say two states for two people then we have a problem.  This is not a core issue.  

 

AA:

  •  There is two states or one state [i.e. there are only two solutions to the conflict].

 

TL:

  •  There is also two states with one on the other side of the Jordan [River].

 

YAR:

  •  Or three states – Gaza.

 

AA:

  •  The two state solution is what we agreed. Since this means sovereignty – two states – we don’t want to describe the two states!  

 

TL:

  •  There is no two states if there is no [two states for] two people.

 

SE:

  •  If we want a confederation with Jordan – how is that your business?

 

TL:

  •  The historic reconciliation is based on two states for two people.  Once we do that you can do whatever you want!

 

AA:

  •  In an agreement we don’t need it.  

  •  [Notes that he received a visitor today that asked him what a Jewish sate means – did it mean that 1.5million Palestinians would be deported from Israel?] Also – we need to decide refugees.  

 

TL:

  •  This is not about the refugees.  20% [of the state] is Palestinian so [if you ask me] it doesn’t affect refugees if it can be 20 or 21.  Refugees [will be dealt with as one of] the core issues. Refugees is one of the core issues.  Also there are those that say that you don’t represent the Israeli Palestinians!  

 

 AH:

  •  Aren’t you asking for an end of claims in a permanent agreement?

 

TL:

  •  But if a Palestinian state will not answer the questions… we are not talking about end of claims [with this issue].  

 

AA:

  •  If you insist on this it forces Palestinians back to the one state [solution].  

 

[TL receives a phone call from her son who has recently gotten his first call to the army.  She reiterates the importance of making peace for precisely that reason, although it may be too late for her son already.]

 

AA:

  •  Our aspirations we will speak about it to our peoples.  It is not necessary to speak about it [in the document].

 

TL:

  •  This was not agreed at all.

  •  What you are doing now [is a huge mistake] it’s like rejecting the partition plan!

 

AA:

  •  181?  If you want we’ll put it on the table.

 

TL:

  •  But without this sentence – you have your problems we have ours.  [Makes point that she can explain away some of the problems by saying that negotiations on the core issues come after Annapolis, etc. implying that this issue cannot be so easily explained away.]

 

AH:

  •  [In] the peace treaty there will be a recognition of each state…

 

TL:

  •  But this is like agreeing to talk with no idea what the vision is!

 

YAR:

  •  Postpone it…

 

TL:

  •  Ok, the RM.  Three principles. We have a problem which is the committee.

 

AA:

  •  When will the committee meet? [Joking.]

 

TL:

  •  We agreed to the Americans the principles that implementation of both sides starting now, that the Americans will be the judge, and that any future agreements are subject to the RM.  You asked for the trilateral committee, and we did not agree.  

 

AA:

  •  Why didn’t you agree parallel?

 

TL:

  •  Some things in the RM [are not parallel.] [TL repeats arguments over the sequentiality of some of the obligations in the RM. She also notes again that the Israeli side did not agree immediate and parallel.] To be fair, I did say that since the Americans are the judge they can invite anyone they want to any meeting; if we are invited we will come.  But we disagree to the trilateral committee.  [Continues to recap the three principles again.]

 

[Discussion on the language in the RM and the utility and logic of using it as an absolute TOR continues – for example, SE raises the question where does the principle of “subject to” appear in the RM.]

 

AA:

  •  When will the Israeli government take a decision to freeze all settlement activity and reopen Jerusalem institutions?  It doesn’t need a bulldozer or anything! [Continues to press Israelis on a concrete and immediate commitment to implement their RM obligations.]

 

TL:

  •  In the document we will [sign to our intention] to implement fully and completely the RM.

 

AA:

  •  This is just words – we need deeds!  

 

TL:

  •  Before Annapolis we’ll discuss what we can do.  [We’ll discuss] other CBMs…

 

AH:

  •  So not before Annapolis?

 

TL:

  •  We will discuss. We are discussing now. This will be signed right before Annapolis.  [You can decide not to sign it if it doesn’t meet your needs.] After it’s signed you can ask me when we will start.  We are willing to sign that we are ready to fully and completely implement the RM. Once we sign this you can ask me when [and we can fight about the timing of each other’s obligations. You don’t see us asking when you will complete each security obligation? Then we can ask you about] your security obligations.    [TL continues along these lines.]

 

[SE hands out a paper listing some of the tenders that have happened since 2004 to refute TL’s assertion in the last meeting that there had been no tenders or money towards settlements except Maale Addumim since a government decision in 2004.]

 

TL:

  •  The day after, the international community, the Arab world, and the core issues.  How do you see the reference to the core issue – since Annapolis will launch negotiations…

 

AA:

  •  I told you – for example on borders. The 1967 border. We can discuss [the possibility of] minor modifications, the percentage, that [any swaps] will not prejudice territorial contiguity or national resources….

 

TL:

  •  Since we are talking about the day after – should we try to reference these issues the day before? Or leave all of them to the day after?  To try to find an understanding on each of the core issues [now] will be a mistake.

 

AA:

  •  [Notes that the importance of addressing the core issues now is to understand the direction that the negotiations will go in post Annapolis and what kind of an agreement we are working towards.]

 

SE:

  •  In our meeting with Olmert he said he needed indicators on each of the core issues. What does this mean?

 

ST:

  •  He said that there will be a list of issues that will be dealt with.  The substantive discussion on each of the core issues [will be] post-Annapolis.

 

SE:

  •  [Asks for further clarification.]

 

ST:

  •  He also said that there would be no solution in the Annapolis statement.

 

TL:

  •  We need to be pragmatic. In the past there was an understanding on the need to agree the core issues, to meet in Annapolis, and then implement the RM.  

  •  Then there was a change in the process.  Then Israel agreed to do something that they did not agree before – to launch [negotiations on the] core issues post-Annapolis.   [So if we address the core issues in the Annapolis statement,] there will be no post- Annapolis.

 

AA:

  •  First we agree the four main issues in the document: first the preamble, second the core issues, third the day after Annapolis, fourth the timetable, fifth (you added this) the international community.  Let’s go through our position again, so there is no misunderstanding.  [Notes again the Palestinian position on the two state solution, the five US points on the RM, the timetable of 7-8 months to be concluded within the Bush term (and the process to include a committee to follow the negotiations).] On the core issues – do you want to hear our position now? Or later?

 

TL:  

  •  Tomorrow.  But it’s about being pragmatic about time.  [Recaps all of the Israeli positions on the above again.] On the core issues – each and every party should ask and answer itself – whether it’s feasible and whether you want [to include them in the document now] because [addressing core issues] means hard compromises on both sides.  We have two options – in two weeks we launch real permanent status negotiations, or we fight over it now. [TL makes the point that whatever is agreed now will be attacked by the public on both sides.]

 

[TL leaves to attend the no-confidence vote in the Knesset.]

 

[It was agreed that the next meeting of the teams would be held on Tuesday at five pm, location to be determined.]

 

 

About this Document

Date

November 12, 2007

Location

Jerusalem, Crowne Plaza Hotel

Committee

n/a

Representative Parties

Attendees or Authors

About the Transparency Unit

The Al Jazeera Transparency Unit (AJTU) was formed to mobilize its audience – both in the Arab world and further afield – to submit all forms of content (documents, emails, photos, audio & video clips, as well as “story tips”) for editorial review.

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Posted in Palestine AffairsComments Off on Traitors Preparation fot the Annapolis summit (1)

Meeting with Tratitors (2)

Meeting Minutes: Saeb Erekat and Karel de Gucht (Belgian FM)

Summary

Minutes of meeting among Saeb Erekat, Karel De Gucht and other Belgian officials, at NAD, dated March 23, 2007. They discuss the lack of progress with Fatah reform; Erekat says he needs money to do so, money they are yet to receive. They discuss Abbas’ weaknesses and progress on the release of Shalit to Egypt (Olmert accepted the idea). Erekat mentions Israel offered him 136 settlements.

Full text

 

 

MEETING MINUTES

 

 

Attendees:   Karel De Gucht, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs (KDG)

 10 or so other Belgian officials

 Dr. Saeb Erekat (SE)

 Hala Rashed

 

Subject: Belgian Foreign Minister’s visit

 

Date:   23 March 2007 11am

 

Location:  NAD

 

 

SE:

  •  Siege is composed of (1) bank restrictions and (2) tax revenues.
  •  “Bear-hugging”: International community pays lip service to AM.
  •  Saudis promised $80M for Pals, but we never saw it.
  •  [Saeb gave him the Israeli cabinet decision regarding the NUG].
  •  AM needs to do three things: (1) one gun, (2) Fatah reform, (3) political horizon.
  •  We won’t allow what happened to Arafat to happen to AM.
  •  We can reverse the course.  All we need is 3-4 months to conclude an agreement.
  •  We will not give up refugees before PSN.
  •  Israel has three options: (1) two-state solution, (2) control from Med to the Jordan River, but give us our rights, (3) status quo.
  •  I don’t want Al-Qaeda’s evil to use my just cause.
  •  Anyone who says that Pals are not ready for democracy is a racist.
  •  I can’t stand Hamas or their social program.

 

KDG:  Why haven’t you reformed Fatah?  You’ve had 14 months.

SE:  No good reason.  AM wants reform to happen, but he’s being blocked.  Reform needs money, and you need to help Fatah more.  

KDG:  For PSN, you need a strong Israeli government, need Fatah reform.  You need to be more than just president in title.

SE:  We’ll take the agreement to referendum.  We’re experimenting with the third party role now:  EU BAM, Japanese, TIPH.

KDG:  What about the diaspora?

SE:  I never said the diaspora will vote.  It’s not going to happen.  The referendum will be for Pals in Gaza, the WB and EJ.  Can’t do it in Lebanon.  Can’t do it in Jordan.

KDG:  I don’t think it will go to referendum.  I think the only way you can do it is to pass it through Parliament.

SE:  I told Sharon before disengagement to do it bilaterally.  He said no.  I said Hamas will claim victory, like they did in Lebanon.  And that’s exactly what’s happened.  

SE:  AM is not a politician.  He’s the most decent man.  He’ll never call early PLC elections without also calling presidential elections.

KDG:  That may be his weakness.

SE:  He’s also tough and smart.

KDG:  Will Shalit be released?

SE:  I met with 5 parties in Gaza who acted like 5 governments.  I said give Shalit to Egypt.  Stop firing Qassams.  Merge your security forces with ours.  I’m not sure they’ll do it.  Olmert accepted the idea that Shalit be handed to Egypt.  When I saw Suleiman, he said that they’d made progress.  I asked what criteria they were discussing.  He said that they hadn’t discussed any criteria, so I shut up.  It’s not the number that’s important, it’s the criteria.

KDG:  Will settlements be evacuated?

SE:  Israel offered me 136 settlements.  In the end, I want xxxx square kilometres [referring to size of OPT].  We are close to an agreement.

 

Posted in Palestine AffairsComments Off on Meeting with Tratitors (2)

Negotiating with Palestinan Collaborators (3)

Meeting Minutes: 8th Negotiating Team Meeting

Summary

Minutes of the 8th meeting in a series of meetings about the proposed joint agreement for the Annapolis Summit.  The parties discuss finishing changes to the preamble, and debate the inclusion of principles from: President Bush’s vision, the Road Map, the Arab Peace Initiative, UN resolutions and International law.

Full text

 

 

Minutes from 8th Negotiation Team Meeting

(In Preparation for Annapolis)

Tuesday, 13th November 2007, 5h00pm

Mount Zion Hotel, West Jerusalem

 

Attendees:

Palestinian 

  •  Ahmed Querei (AA)
  •  Yaser Abd Rabbo (YAR)
  •  Akram Haniyeh (AH)
  •  Dr. Saadi Kronz (SK)
  •  Zeinah Salahi (ZS)
  •  Dr. Saeb Erekat (SE)

 

Israeli

  •  FM Tzipi Livni (TL)
  •  Yoram Turbovich (YT)
  •  Shalom Turjeman (ST)
  •  Gen Amos Gilad (AG)
  •  DG Abromovich (Abr)
  •  Tal Becker (TB)

 

Detailed minutes:

 

TL:

  •  I would like to suggest that we will continue according to what I tried to at the beginning of the session yesterday, but unfortunately while doing so we ended up in some sort of a discussion.  At the end of today’s meeting the minimum that is required is some sense of the six or seven points that you stated that need to be in the document.  Just [a] list [of] what is agreed or not agreed.  Put aside the core issues for now, just have a list of agreed and not agreed, in points.  If we have this agreement… let’s not include the areas of disagreement now.

 

AA:

  •  [Suggests an I and P paper]

 

TL:

  •  Ok I think that this is a very good idea about all of the issues. I think that when this comes to the core issues [however] this is problematic. Let’s start with all the other issues then go from there. Because when we get to the core issues you will start with yours I will start with ours [i.e. positions].  This is our duty to do, so but it will not help us to do so now.

 

[Discussion continues on this a bit more.]

 

TL:

  •  I think that [putting down all of this for the non-core issues] is important because this part is more about process. When it comes to the core issues, putting the basic positions of the Israelis and the Palestinians will not help. Therefore let’s start with the others.

 

 

AA:

  •  We can finish tonight the subjects – the preamble. What are the components. Not the language or the nice words etc.  We should focus on three things in the preamble. One is the terms of reference [“TOR”].  The three core elements in addition to the [nice] language.  One is the TOR. Second is the 2 state solution. Third is the Roadmap [“RM”].  Is there anything to be added to the preamble?

 

TL:

  •  No – it’s ok.  And what we called before some good words. The basic idea of where we are going. End of conflict, [the goal is] to find a way to do so… something like this.
  •  So if you want to summarize the positions, this is something we did in our former conversation. When it comes to the TOR we want reference to 242, 338, the RM and other agreements agreed between the two sides. You added, and this is the problem, the API, international law, 1515, 1397, and 194. And we wanted the three principles of the Quartet.  

 

SE:

  •  Do you have differences on 1515 and 1397?

 

TL:

  •  Yes.

 

AA:

  •  Basically you want 242 and 338?

 

TL:

  •  Yes… basically we can refer to the RM as it is.  The RM and previous agreements as adopted by both sides.  President Bush’s vision — I forgot it before. The 3 principles of the Quartet.  [AA asking clarification questions throughout.]
  •  Do you agree these?

 

AH:

  •  The three principles… we cannot include it as it is.   

 

[It was agreed by both sides that we can find another place/way to include the three Quartet principles. TL suggested the same for the API. She reiterated the point that including the API is like including the Israeli declaration of independence – both are similarly one sided in their view of a resolution to the conflict.]

 

TL:

  •  Ok. I would suggest we find a place for the API, not as part of the TOR but in another place.  

 

AA:

  •  I think that this is a mistake for Israel. It is the only real compromise from the Arab world.

 

TL:

  •  We can find another place for it…  it is not part of the TOR.

 

AA:

  •  This is a main principle.  Part of the TOR. This is what will make the Arab states come.  

 

[Recap the points.]

 

AA:

  •  International law?

 

TL:

  •  NO. I was the Minister of Justice. I am a lawyer…But I am against law — international law in particular.  Law in general.
  •  If we want to make the agreement smaller, can we just drop some of these issues?  Like international law, this will make the agreements easier.

 

[TL made the point that Palestinians don’t really need international law. Palestinians protest this assertion.  AA raises examples of where it is important, such as water, and that it is key for the parties to agree what the permanent status agreements will be based on.  Abr says that the agreement will be whatever is agreed at the table.  At one point during this discussion, SE raises a problem with the “as adopted” language with respect to the Roadmap and previous agreements, noting that this would encompass the Israeli reservations which is not acceptable to the Palestinian side.]

 

AA:

  •  Second is about the two state solution.

 

TL:

  •  Two states is the ultimate goal of the process. But also part of the TOR.
  •  Each state is the answer to the natural aspirations of its people.

 

SE:

  •  [Raises RM language regarding unequivocal duty to accept each state as is. Reads from the RM.]

 

TL:

  •  To say the idea that two nation states contradicts the RM…

 

SE:

  •  [But we’ve never denied Israel’s right to define itself.]
  •  If you want to call your state the Jewish State of Israel you can call it what you want.  [Notes examples of Iran and Saudi Arabia.]

 

TL:

  •  I said basically that our position is a reference to the fact that each state is an answer to the national aspirations of their people.

 

AH:

  •  There was an article in Haaretz saying that Palestinians would be stupid if they accept this [i.e. the Jewish state].

 

TL:

  •  Someone wrote the Palestinians?

 

AA:

  •  I want to say two state solution living side by side in peace security stability and prosperity, Palestinian democratic state independent with sovereignty, viable with East Jerusalem as its capital.

 

TB:

  •  That’s all? [Sarcastically.]

 

AA:

  •  Yes that’s our position.
  •  Two state solution living side by side in peace security stability and prosperity, Palestinian democratic state independent with sovereignty, viable with East Jerusalem as its capital.
  •  This is what we want to have.  This small sentence.

 

TL:

  •  Since we are talking about two states, and since we agree that we shouldn’t refer to internal things for each and every state…
  •  I just want to say something. [Responding to a sarcastic question about whether the problem with the Palestinian suggested formulation is because Israel does not want a democratic state.] Not that there is a reference to being a democracy. [AA: if you don’t like it…] No, there are those that would like it a lot. Our idea is to refer to two states for two peoples.  Or two nation states, Palestine and Israel living side by side in peace and security with each state constituting the homeland for its people and the fulfillment of their national aspirations and self determination…

 

AH:  

  •  This refers to the Israeli people?

 

TL:

  •  [Visibly angered.]  I think that we can use another session – about what it means to be a Jew and that it is more than just a religion. But if you want to take us back to 1947 — it won’t help.  Each state constituting the homeland for its people and the fulfillment of their national aspirations and self determination in their own territory. Israel the state of the Jewish people — and I would like to emphasize the meaning of “its people” is the Jewish people —  with Jerusalem the united and undivided capital of Israel and of the Jewish people for 3007 years… [The Palestinian team protests.] You asked for it.  [AA: We said East Jerusalem!] …and Palestine for the Palestinian people. We did not want to say that there is a “Palestinian people” but we’ve accepted your right to self determination. Now I have to say, before we continue, in order to continue we have to put out Jerusalem from your statement and from our place. We have enough differences, without putting another one out there.

 

AA:

  •  Why is it different?

 

TL:

  •  The whole idea of the document is to launch negotiations on final status issues, one of them is Jerusalem. I know what is the Palestinian demand. You know the Israeli position.  If we want a joint statement we should find common ground. And Jerusalem is one of the most sensitive issues.  Jerusalem is one of the core of the core of the core issues.  
  •  In the preamble anyway adding the issue of Jerusalem cannot lead to something [that we will agree]. If this is trying to do a tradeoff between Jerusalem and the national aspirations it is not the same at all.
  •   I didn’t ask for something that relates to my own self. I didn’t ask for recognizing something that is the internal decision of Israel.  Israel can do so, it is a sovereign state. [We want you to recognize it.] The whole idea of the conflict is … the entire point is the establishment of the Jewish state. And yet we still have a conflict between us.  We used to think it is because the Jews and the Arabs…  but now the Palestinians… we used to say that we have no right to define the Palestinian people as a people. They can define it themselves.  In 1947 it was between Jews and Arabs, and then [at that point the purpose] from the Israeli side to [was] say that the Palestinians are Arabs and not [Palestinians – it was an excuse not to create a Palestinian state.  We’ve passed that point in time and I’m not going to raise it. The whole conflict between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea is not the idea of creating a democratic state that is viable etc. It is to divide it into two.]  For each state to create its own problem. Then we can ask ourselves is it viable, what is the nature of the two states. In order to end the conflict we have to say that this is the basis.  I know that your problem is saying this is problematic because of the refugees.  During the final status negotiations we will have an answer to the refugees. You know my position. Even having a Jewish state — it doesn’t say anything about your demands. …. Without it, why should we create a Palestinian state?

 

AA:

  •  Can I have a minute to talk about the conflict?

 

TL:

  •  There is something that is shorter. I can read something with different wording.
  •  That the ultimate goal is constituting the homeland for the Jewish people and the Palestinian people respectively, and the fulfillment of their national aspirations and self determination in their own territory.  
  •  And we take Jerusalem off the preamble.  

 

SE:

  •  I noted that. We took it out. That is your position we take honestly what you said.

 

AA:

  •  That is your position… in 1947 the UN issued its famous resolution to create two states for the Arabs and the Jews. In 1948, 194 came.  [That whole time people were pushing for a one state solution – one secular state.] This was in 1968. From that date until 1988 this was the Palestinian position. In 1988 – the PNC of the PLO agreed the two state solution.  

 

TL:

  •  What did you say in 1988? What is written in your decisions 1988?  

 

AA:

  •  The acceptance of 242 and 338.  
  •  And then we came to the negotiations – Jerusalem is part of the occupied territories since 1967.  When we speak about East Jerusalem, when we talk about the core issues we will speak about the core issues in such a way that will keep all of the issues on Jerusalem [for later] when you say that East Jerusalem will be the capital of Palestine [we are addressing just the territorial element. Jerusalem can be divided into two elements – territory and arrangements. On arrangements there are many other aspects — more than ten or eleven to discuss later.]

 

TL:

  •  I would like to ask something.  There are two things you referred to. One is Jerusalem and the other is two states for two people. For Jerusalem, I want to state the obvious. [Talking about any core issue in the preamble cannot happen because we won’t reach an agreement on the preamble, on any core issue.  We know your opinion.]

 

AA:

  •  [Refers to 181.]

 

TL:

  •  181 is a matter of borders.
  •  If you say that two states for two people – [and that] the problem is that the borders are not defined yet [we can define it to come into effect once the borders are defined].
  •  This closes the circle.  Two states for two people – then [include a] reference to the future Palestinian state. Without the borders agreed upon it constitutes nothing. By saying that the borders will be agreed [you protect yourself]. The vision is to end the conflict.

 

AA:

  •  Ok – let’s [move on].

 

[Discussion on technical procedure for drafting the joint document.]

 

TL:

  •  [Reads from 1988 Palestinian Declaration of Independence.]  “Palestine is a state for Palestinians wherever they may be.”

 

AA:

  •  [You have your position, we have ours.] Let’s come to the RM.  We have the 5 points.

 

TL:

  •  You know our position.  At least delete immediate and parallel. And we want to change the trilateral committee to something that will refer to the American judge and say that the American judge can invite whomever they want to.  

 

[Reference to Yediot article on trilateral committee.]

 

AA:

  •  You want the trilateral committee to be a bilateral committee?

 

TL:

  •  No – we accept the Americans as the judge.  And the judge can invite whomever they like. We can have trilateral meetings, but not a trilateral committee. … I think that the Americans can live with it.

 

AA:

  •  [Recaps Israeli position. Short side discussion on it.]

 

AG:

  •  I took part in all the meetings of the trilateral committee.  Dayton, Moscovitz, CIA, Wolfe, State Department… Except the White House I think all the [departments] of the US shared this comment.  After the good morning, it was like court – the verdict was written before.  Everyone spoke to the history, the record, and not the security.  With Dayton, instead of dealing with security we dealt with prestige.  We dealt with a power point war.  By the way I think you won the power point war but we lost everything. We want to deal with security.  In all the committees the idea was to impress the Americans and not to deal with security. The first committee is deteriorating. What we need here is some flexible mechanism that will deal with security if we are serious about security.  

 

YAR:

  •  What is the mechanism you will suggest?

 

AH:

  •  We are not dealing with security only.

 

AA:

  •  We have many mechanisms that we want to activate that deal with more than just security. We are committed to all the bilateral mechanisms [between us that deal with economics, security, etc.] we are talking about the first phase of the RM.  [We all have problems with it.] We want a trilateral committee to follow up on the commitments of both sides.  This is why we need it to be parallel and immediate.  This is why we need Israel to say tomorrow that we will freeze all settlement activity. [AH: This has nothing to do with security] Also we need to reopen the Jerusalem institutions which have been closed since 2004? [Side discussion on date of the closure] 2001.  Also what is the problem to say that we will start to dismantle the outposts? That the decision [is] taken.  To start.  [Emphasizes seriousness of Palestinian efforts on security reform. If we succeed in Nablus we will move to Jenin. Also stresses Palestinian commitment and understanding to Israeli security and Palestinian security. We need it. You need it. We need the trilateral committee for this.]

 

ST:

  •  How is it different from what is in the RM, which includes a monitoring mechanism, and which we accept?

 

AA:

  •  We want something to follow up on [the obligations of both sides].

 

AG:

  •  [You are dealing with many issues. None of this deals with security as we define it.  None of them are dealing with Hamas. Other major security issues.  You are far away from dealing seriously with security. There is no intelligence cooperation about terror. And that is what happened in Gaza. And instead of dealing with terror – you showed us power point presentations that showed us how you behaved beautifully and did nothing about security. And we paid for this failure with hundreds of deaths.  We don’t want the trilateral meetings to focus on issues like settlements, etc.  We need something to deal with real security issues.]

 

SE:

  •  [This is the logic of having the US as the judge. To tell Palestinians if they are not serious, and to guide them along.]

 

AG:

  •  [But you saw what happened with Dayton!]

 

TL:

  •  We understand your concern [that we will use the RM as an excuse and with the difference of opinion over internal sequencing in the phasing. To deal with your concerns we agreed to the American judge. Another thing – the judge will refer to the implementation of the obligations of both sides, not just the Palestinian obligations.] Because of the [past experience of our MOD, our experience has been] that it doesn’t help. And since the 3rd party can invite to the meetings anyone he wants… And therefore [knowing the Americans if you ask them to call a meeting with all the three sides, they will do so. Therefore this should be sufficient to answer your concerns and it is easier to accept for us.] Anyway when it comes to the Israeli implementation of the RM, to find out whether we froze the settlements or not — it is a decision – we don’t need a trilateral committee or meetings on this. [The Americans can call us in on this in one day.] Anyway the trilateral committee doesn’t help on these things.    [TL raises the issue of CBMs again, and asks to defer all of this until the creation of a list of CBMs that sends the right message to the Palestinians.]

 

AA:

  •  If you allow me to [explain] and to ask for an explanation. You know that all of our problems come from two things. One is territory, the other is the freedom of the people.  [These have not been achieved.  I respect AG when he says that [total security reform] has not happened…]

 

TL:

  •  At the end of the day it is our decision and not [inaudible].

 

AA:

  •  Exactly.  And since 2003 – do you need to expand [the settlements]? [TL: No.] But it has continued.  I can give you maps, etc.  We need freedom of the people and the territory.  Because of these concerns – this is the real concern. I recognize that your concern is security.  [Continues along same lines and the seriousness of Palestinians with respect to security.]

 

SE:

  •  Can I add to what AA said?  I will take the points that AG said, not to satisfy you but to satisfy the [Palestinian] people.  The RM states that Palestinians and Israelis will resume security cooperation based on the Tenet plan. [Describes the Tenet work plan, which includes a trilateral committee.]  AA is basing his argument that everything that we are doing on security is in line with this.

 

ST:

  •  So if it is there why do you need to say it?

 

SE:

  •  [Because it is not functioning and I need it give it a fresh start.]

 

TL:

  •  Basically the RM refers to the cooperation between the two sides and doesn’t say anything about the trilateral committee [SE protests]. I don’t want to reinvent the wheel.  [We accept the RM as it is. There will be bilateral and trilateral meetings. I don’t know why it is so problematic to accept but this is our position.]

 

[Discussion continues on the importance of the trilateral committee and the seriousness of the Palestinians on security. AH notes that it is insulting that Israel is not acknowledging the seriousness of Palestinians with respect to security.  Look at what Palestinians are doing with Hamas!]

 

TL:

  •  I’d like to say something to AA about the settlements. Just like you said you understand our security needs. I understand the sentiments of the Palestinians when they see the settlements being built. The meaning from the Palestinian perspective is that Israel takes more land, that the Palestinian state will be impossible, the Israel policy is to take more and more land day after day and that at the end of the day we’ll say that it is impossible we already have the land and cannot create the state. [It was the policy of the government for a really long time. Now it is still the policy of some of the parties, but not the government.  On the borders – we have a distinctions between blocs of settlements and individual settlements. Some are not even in our interest to expand. This is why we haven’t built new settlements. This is why it is important — the dismantling of outposts is important for us as a government but this creates some difficulties as well. If it interests you the way Israelis see the situation… In the past there are those that felt that each day that passes while we are holding part of the land is another victory because we are holding the land. We made our choice – the most important thing is not more Jews living in all of the land, but the most important thing is the existence of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. And for this we decided that we needed to divide the land and to live in a smaller, Jewish and democratic state.  And by doing so to give the Palestinians the [right to self determination]. [Since 2004 we stopped subsidies to settlements. As Minister of Housing we refused to be in Kiryat Arba and other sensitive places because it is against the internal structure in Israel. It is not in our interest to keep taking on one hand and to talk peace on the other.  But you have not seen expansion beyond the existing settlements.]

 

ST:

  •  What is happening is through private sector.

 

TL:

  •  There has not been the confiscation of land. [Palestinian side protests at this comment, and notes the confiscations that happened one the same days as the first negotiation sessions.] Well there is the matter of the Wall.
  •  So let’s continue. Would you like to continue to other issues?

 

YAR:

  •  Well did we close the issue of security, settlements, etc…?
  •  [Israeli side says  no.]
  •  But I really wanted to ask just for the sake of clarity. The conclusion I get is that you want to make security on your own without our cooperation or anything.

 

YT:

  •  I will phrase what AG said.  At the moment Gaza is a country of terror. You regret it and we regret it.    In the WB there is a very good cooperation between you and us, headed by Salam Fayyad who we tremendously respect, [that has started but this takes time.  AG said it was too early to judge the results or whether this reform has taken root. It is a good beginning. It is not that we don’t want cooperation – we do. We agreed the American judge.  The only difference we have is over the procedure.]  

 

YAR:

  •  We are not talking about all issues. There will be bilateral daily issues between us.  We are talking about the first phase of the RM.  [Continues to explain.] There are two levels.  [The trilateral and the bilateral do not contradict each other.]

 

TL:

  •  [Asks why the Pals think that the formulation she suggested is less good than the trilateral committee.]

 

YAR:

  •  Because we want a serious mechanism.  Because you connected this to the implementation of the entire peace treaty in the future. Therefore we want a different mechanism where you and the US will not just come occasionally to check in.

 

YT:

  •  You are preaching to the converted.  [We agree – the difference here is just procedural. The objective person is a serious achievement for you.]

 

[Discussion continues on this.]

 

AA:

  •  I just want to say one thing – back to the settlements – we don’t want the territory and the people to be kidnapped. The settlements there are real and [there is] too much expansion.  Second we are talking about settlement expansion – we are not talking just about the government expansion, but also the private sector.

 

TL:

  •  But you need to understand something about the process itself. When the government has [issued] the tender in the past it means that the private sector won the tender and then it has the rights on the land. They are entitled to work on the land that they purchased.  Even in talking in terms of freezing the settlements – I’d like you to put some parameters a list on what is the most problematic from your perspective. New settlements is the most. Expanding the settlements is the second.   

 

AA:

  •  In 1995 [raises the issue of the construction lines].

 

SE:

  •  What defines a settlement freeze, including natural growth.  [Makes point that it doesn’t matter whether it is private or public, etc.  The RM is clearly a freeze –period — without distinction. ] We all have our internal difficulties.

 

ST:

  •  Natural growth – what does it mean? If a family has a baby can it live in the settlement?

 

[SE begins to answer. TL interrupts to say: I respect your right to SD, respect my right to a Jewish state. ]

 

SE:

  •  If a child is born he has many alternatives.  [AA’s son, on the other hand, living in Abu Dis cannot even build a bathroom.]

 

TL:

  •  You refer to the RM and the obligations on both sides. Your obligations on security will take some time.  There are certain things that are crucial because there are things that make the settlements bigger, because it takes some of the land. I would like to share with you some of our problems – it’s not an excuse.
  •  The private sector– they have some rights in some places
  •  There are other places where they started. The child is born and the tractors are there on the ground.  It takes some time, but they are there on the ground.
  •  It is not internal political issues – I think that we need also to understand – because the last thing that we want is to say something and you will say that you are even in violation with your own statement.
  •  You understand our position – we are not trying to expand to give you less in the end. Now we have to deal with what is on the ground. [We want to know what exactly it means if Israel takes this decision — what exactly this will mean.]

 

[AA raises construction lines concept again.  Discussion continues. TL again asks for help in defining a freeze.]

 

AA:

  •  Can we speak about the timetable?  What we propose is that the peace treaty will be in President Bush’s term.  We put a date that is seven or eight months.

 

TL:

  •  When is Bush’s term?

 

AH:

  •  January 2009 [elaborates].

 

TL:

  •  [Why do you say less than the full term?]

 

[Palestinians respond that you need a buffer zone of time and a target date. Discussion continues repeating the logic of the timetable from earlier meetings and whether or not a timeline was agreed. SE clarifies that timetable is to ensure commitment to achieve an agreement and not just to exert best efforts.]

 

AA:

  •  I want to talk about the day-after Annapolis. Let’s say that the day after Annapolis there will be negotiations, and we will start immediately with teams to deal with all issues of the PS negotiations – not just the six issues – to form a steering committee on all the committees, etc.  there will be a committee, each to meet with the delegations, the parties, each three months to evaluate [progress].

 

ST:

  •  The Arab League? [joking]

 

AA:

  •  Amr Musa. [joking]  To evaluate — to see progress. After six months, we propose an international conference according to the RM.  

 

TL:

  •  What do you mean according to the RM?

 

AA:

  •  The RM calls for two.  

 

TL:

  •  You can refer to meetings – please don’t refer to the RM [with respect to the international conference].

 

[Joking about possible locations of international conference.]

 

AA:

  •  Fourth is the timetable. If you have anything else – maybe we can talk about the agenda of the negotiations.

 

[Palestinian side suggests one day after the meeting be dedicated to the first day of negotiations. TL thinks it is a good idea but has to check.]

 

TL:

  •  The statement will be adopted by the executive committee before or after Annapolis?

 

[Palestinian side responds before.]

 

[Discussion returns to the day after. YT and ST leave.]

 

TL:

  •  Now I am talking about what you suggested on the timetable. It was understood by Olmert that Abu Mazen agreed [to no timetable]. Since Olmert referred to the timetable in his speech, we can quote what was in his speech.

 

SE:

  •  [Notes again for the record that Abu Mazen did not agree this. Discussion on this continues. Abr also leaves.]
  •  Are we meeting tomorrow?

 

TL:

  •  My teams have left for two days, but we can meet the two of us or the four of us… [Referring to herself, TB, AA and SE]

 

TL:

  •  [Reads from Olmert speech.] “There is a chance that we can reach real accomplishments, perhaps even before the end of President Bush’s term in office.”
  •  Now referring to the day after, there are a lot of words that can represent seriousness [that should be included – I said that we need to ask about the first meeting, it sounds like a good idea.] We are not in favor of these follow up committees [especially if we don’t know who they are].
  •  I’d like to refer now to an easy thing – the role of the international community and the Arab world.
  •  We would also like to refer to [fact that] the process is a bilateral one. That there is no substitute for the bilateral process. We recognize that the international community in general and the regional and Arab and Muslim states in particular have a critical role to play in supporting the bilateral process as well as any agreement negotiated between the parties.  
  •  And now we have some ideas about the support of the international community.
  •  International support to the legitimate PA – maybe this is the point where we can refer to the 3 Quartet conditions.
  •  I think that there should be a reference to the capacity building, economic development, a reference to Tony Blair’s mission or something.
  •  I would like to see something about the determined efforts to confront extremism, incitement, intolerance, weapons smuggling, cutting public and private funding to terror. All these things that we need especially from the Arab world to do so. I don’t know if the Arab world will have a problem with this.

 

YAR:

  •  We don’t want anyone to think it is directed against them.

 

AA:

  •  I think that there are international resolutions on this.

 

TL:

  •  [This is a way for the Arabs to be involved.  Now this is where we can refer to the API] and to say something about the need to improve the regional ties and to promote regional cooperation [and to launch the multilateral committees] and until we have the real CBMs – I know it is a vague idea – I would like the Arab world to take steps — as we take steps towards the Palestinians they take steps towards Israel [to help Israel help the Palestinians]. I know if the CBMs will not be serious – they will not do so.

 

TB:

  •  The three core parts are:
  •  [Support for the bilateral process, fighting extremism and the API as part of regional cooperation.]

 

TL:

  •  [Notes that from their perspective the good parts of the API refer to peace and normalization with Israel at the end of the Road.  She repeats that the goal of peace with the Palestinians is for its own sake, not for normalization.  But the API includes parameters for the resolution of the core issues which is problematic for Israelis and cannot be part of the bilateral process between Pals and Israelis.] There are relevant references in the RM as it is. [Notes if you want a more concrete reference beyond what is in the RM to the API, this is the place to include it. Including the rest of the API is like including the Israeli declaration of independence, which is also a one sided perspective on what peace should be.] I would like to add one last thing.  [Refers to her trip to Lisbon and a discussion with Amr Musa.] He said about the need to promote a process and a bilateral track which is important.  Then he said that we have our own proposal and this is the API. So this is a proposal and not part of the bilateral…

 

AA:

  •  [Refers to 242] and that no party has the right to acquire territory by force.  Egypt – you’ve withdrawn from every meter. Syria – they are ready and have [basically agreed the borders]. Why are you trying to make the Palestinians pay the price for all of this? Putting the API in this context does that.  

 

TL:

  •  Of course we will have our future discussions on all these points.

 

AA:

  •  So if Israel is ready to withdraw completely from the Golan Heights…

 

[Refers to previous discussions on the Syrian track. AA notes that the API deals with regional peace and not just the Palestinian track; normalization with the Arab world is not cheap. TL responds that she respects the peace with the Palestinians very much and that including it in the TOR is basically like including its parameters as the parameters on the core issues themselves.]

 

SE:

  •  [Reads from six references to the Arab states in the RM.  Reads again the language on the API and regional peace, no funding, restore pre-intifada links, viable multilateral engagement… etc.] But this all comes in the context of a comprehensive peace with the Arabs.  [In 2003 the Arab and Islamic countries all met in Tehran and adopted the API. We cannot go to them now and try to get them to take these steps piecemeal or fragmented steps outside the concept of the comprehensive peace.  The Arab states have all accepted the RM.]

 

TL:

  •  I understand the sensitivity – that many want Annapolis to be part of the regional peace initiative [Syria etc.].  

 

YAR:

  •  If the Syrians don’t behave themselves in Lebanon for one week no one will care about them in the regional track.

 

TL:

  •  My understanding from discussions [with Jordanians etc.] is that the Arab league is very sensitive.  If the problem is to put the discussions in the regional peace context – [I need to think of what the best way to do this is]. [Reiterates that the problem is that the API tries to resolve all the open issues on both sides.]

 

 

[It was agreed that the next meeting would be held between AA and TL, Wednesday at 12h30pm, at the King David. AA notes he will be traveling to Jordan the next day.]

Posted in Palestine AffairsComments Off on Negotiating with Palestinan Collaborators (3)

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