Categorized | USA

Insurance Scammers As Evil As Central Bankers; a History

NOVANEWS

The saga of Lloyds of London is most revealing.

by Tom Valentine

Most of the details are on the Internet as propaganda, but one must read between the lines:

“From its first beginnings in Edward Lloyd’s Coffee House in 1688, Lloyds has been a pioneer in insurance and reinsurance.Starting with its roots in marine insurance, Lloyds has grown over 300 years to become the worlds leading market for specialist insurance.”

Now we pause to insert what we have learned about “’the city of London” (the fascist ‘Crown’) into this company propaganda from the Internet.

“From 17th century shipping and Lord Nelson’s victory at the Battle of Trafalgar, through the devastation of the San Francisco earthquake in 1906, and on to the emergence of space satellite technology in the late 20th century, the story of Lloyds is both a long and an interesting one.”

The Internet propaganda is careful not to distinguish the ‘city” from metropolitan London at large: “Lloyd’s earliest home was Edward Lloyd’s coffee house, firmly established by the year 1688 at Tower Street in the City of London.
This small club of marine underwriters moved to Lombard Street, closer to the heart of the “City” in 1691.

The market began in Edward Lloyd’s coffee house around 1688. His establishment was a popular place for sailors, merchants, and ship owners, and Lloyd catered to them with reliable shipping news. The shipping industry community frequented the place to discuss insurance deals among themselves. Just after Christmas 1691, the coffee shop relocated to Lombard Street (a blue plaque commemorates this location) This arrangement carried on until 1774, long after Lloyd’s death in 1713, when the participating members of the insurance arrangement formed a committee and moved to the Royal Exchange on Cornhill as The Society of Lloyd’s.

Whenever we see the designation of “ Royal Society ” we must realize that this is historically and actually a cabalistic, Masonic organization for elite racists.

Due to the focus on marine business, during the formative years of Lloyd’s (between 1688 and 1807), one of the primary sources of Lloyd’s business was the insurance of ships engaged in slave trading; as Britain (read ”crown”) rapidly established itself as the chief slave trading power in the Atlantic.

(Crown) shipping carried more than 3.25 million people into slavery, meaning that by the end of the eighteenth century, slave trading had become one of the primary constituents of all (crown) trade. The dangers involved necessarily meant that insurance of slave-trade shipping was a major concern. Between 1689 and 1807, 1053 British vessels were lost whilst undertaking slave-trading activities.

“The Royal Exchange was destroyed by fire in 1838, and, although the building was rebuilt by 1844, many of Lloyd’s early records were lost.(convenient) In 1871, the first Lloyd’s Act was passed in Parliament (by puppets), which gave the business a sound legal footing (as if it were necessary) The Lloyd’s Act of 1911 set out the Society’s objectives, which include the promotion of its members’ interests and the collection and dissemination of information .
The membership of the Society, which had been largely made up of (money launderers) market participants, was realized to be too small in relation to the market’s capitalization and the risks that it was underwriting.

Note the dates given from this point on are modern history.

(Crown insiders always seek to cover risk with money from the sheepish taxpaying population). “Lloyd’s response was to commission a secret internal inquiry , known as the Cromer Report, which reported in 1968 . This report advocated the widening of membership to non-market participants, including non-British subjects and women, and to reduce the onerous capitalization requirements (which created a more minor investor known as a mini-Name). The Report also drew attention to the danger of conflicts of interest. (false flag in the report).

“During the 1970s, a number of issues arose which were to have significant influence on the course of the Society. The first was the tax structure in the UK: capital gains were taxed at 40 per cent, earned income was taxed in the top bracket at 83 per cent, and investment income in the top bracket at 98 per cent.

Lloyd’s income counted as earned income, even for Names who did not work at Lloyd’s, and this heavily influenced the direction of underwriting: in short, it was desirable for syndicates to make a (small) underwriting loss but a (larger) investment profit.

The losses were 98% funded by the taxpayer (the sheep dues) while the gains largely accrued to the Names; when Margaret Thatcher’s (puppet) government greatly reduced the top rate of income tax , (This clever tax code ploy worked beautifully—remember Ronnie Reagan?) the proportion of the losses paid by the Namesincreased astronomically. The investment profit was typically achieved by ‘bond washing’ or ‘gilt stripping’: buying the bond ‘cum dividend’ and selling it ‘ex dividend,’ creating an income profit and a capital loss. (clever gambit continued by today’s investment bankers).

Syndicate funds were also moved offshore (which later created problems through fraud and self-dealing; how could the rulers of all the seas move “offshore)?

“Because Lloyd’s had turned itself into a tax shelter (for super rich), the second issue affecting Lloyd’s was an increase in its external membership, such that, by the end of the decade, the number of passive investors dwarfed market investors. (a “city”gambit) Thirdly, during the decade a number of scandals had come to light, including the collapse of the Sasse syndicate and the disgrace of Christopher Moran, which had highlighted both the lack of regulation and the legal inability of the Council to manage the Society. (surprise, surprise).

“Arising simultaneously with these developments were wider issues: firstly, in the United States, an ever-widening interpretation by the Courts of insurance (admiralty)? Coverage in relation to workers’ compensation relating to asbestos-related losses, which had the effect of creating a huge, and initially unrecognized and then unacknowledged hole in Lloyd’s reserves.

Secondly, by the end of the decade, almost all of the market agreements, such as the Joint Hull Agreement,which were effectively cartels mandating minimum terms, (a touch of truth)? Had been abandoned under pressure of competition. Thirdly, new specialized policies had arisen which had the effect of concentrating risk: these included ‘run-off policies’, under which the liability of previous underwriting years would be transferred, and ‘time and distance’ policies, whereby reserves would be used to buy a guarantee of future income.

“In 1980, Sir Henry Fisher was commissioned by the Council of Lloyd’s to produce the foundation for a new Lloyd’s Act. The recommendations of his Report addressed the ‘democratic deficit’ and the lack of regulatory muscle. (oh ho-ho, another phony commission).

“The Lloyd’s Act of 1982 further redefined the structure of the business, and was designed to give the ‘external Names’, introduced in response to the Cromer Report, a say in the running of the business through a new governing Council. “(more double talk; we know how the “crown” operates).

Isn’t it time to eclipse these archaic masons? We the productive people do not pay attention.

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