Archive | September 4th, 2015

Bibliography of Periodical Literature Compiled


by Norbert Scholz

This section lists articles and reviews of books relevant to Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Entries are classified under the following headings: Reference and General; History (through 1948) and Geography; Palestinian Politics and Society; Jerusalem; Israeli Politics, Society, and Zionism; Arab and Middle Eastern Politics; International Relations; Law; Military; Economy, Society, and Education; Literature, Arts, and Culture; and Book Reviews.


Mahdi, Inji. “The Role of Think Tanks in the United States” [in Arabic]. SD 51, no. 199 (Jan. 15): 36–50.

Rabinovich, Itamar. “Two Sons of the Levant: Fouad Ajami (1945–2014) and Patrick Seale (1930–2014).” Bustan 5, no. 2 (14): 207–9.


Abisaab, Malek. “Warmed or Burnt by Fire? The Lebanese Maronite Church Navigates French Colonial Policies, 1935.” ASQ 36, no. 4 (Fall 14): 292–312.

Abu-Manneh, Butros (interview). “Has the Ottoman Empire Unified the Levant?” [in Arabic]. MDF, no. 101 (Win. 15): 110–29.

Alroey, Gur. “Mesopotamia – ‘The Promised Land’: The Jewish Territorial Organization Project in the Bilad Al-Rafidayn and the Question of Palestine, 1899–1917.” MES 50, no. 6 (14): 911–35.

Anabseh, Ghaleb, and Nader Masarwah. “Palestinian Oral Traditions and the ‘Sanctity’ of Damascus: A Critical Analysis of a Palestinian Seventeenth-Century Manuscript.” HLS 13, no. 2 (Nov. 14): 213–21.

Beckerman-Boys, Carly. “Third Parties and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Poliheuristic Decision Theory and British Mandate Palestine Policy.” Foreign Policy Analysis 10, no. 3 (Jul. 14): 225–42.

Berridge, W.J. “Imperialist and Nationalist Voices in the Struggle for Egyptian Independence, 1919–22.” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 42, no. 3 (May 14): 420–39.

Corm, Georges. “La Première Guerre mondiale et la balkanisation du Moyen-Orient.” PÉ, no. 1 (Spr. 14): 187–98.

Fares, Awni. “The Palestinian Villagers in Haifa (1930–1948)” [in Arabic]. Hawliyat al-Quds, no. 17 (Spr.–Sum 14): 54–65.

Greenstein, Tony. “Zionist-Nazi Collaboration and the Holocaust—A Historical Aberration? Lenni Brenner Revisited.” HLS 13, no. 2 (Nov. 14): 187–212.

Hammoudeh, Sameeh. “New Light on Ramallah’s Origins in the Ottoman Period.” JQ, no. 59 (Sum. 14): 37–53.

———. “Hidden Documents on the Great Arab Revolt, 1936–1939 in Palestine” [in Arabic]. Hawliyat al-Quds, no. 17 (Spr.–Sum 14): 75–90.

Kelly, Matthew Kraig. “The Revolt of 1936: A Revision,” JPS 44, no. 2 (Win. 15): 28–42.

Khalidi, Issam. “Sports and Aspirations: Football in Palestine, 1900–1948.” JQ, no. 58 (Spr. 14): 74-88.

Nordbruch, Goetz. “Arab Students in Weimar Germany – Politics and Thought beyond Borders.” Journal of Contemporary History 49, no. 2 (Apr. 14): 275–95.

Orzeck, Reecia. “Normative Geographies and the 1940 Land Transfer Regulations in Palestine.” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 39, no. 3 (Jul. 14): 345–59.

Quiquivix, Linda. “Art of War, Art of Resistance: Palestinian Counter-Cartography on Google Earth.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 104, no. 3 (May 14): 444–59.

Ram, Haggai. “On Thrillers, Boundary Crossing and Crime in Mandatory Palestine” [in Hebrew]. Jama‘a 21 (14): 119–34.

Reibman, Max. “The Case of William Yale: Cairo’s Syrians and the Arab Origins of American Influence in the Post-Ottoman Middle East, 1917–19.” IJMES 46, no. 4 (Nov. 14): 681–702.

Shoka, Khalil. “Qais and Yemen Parties in 19th-Century Ottoman Palestine” [in Arabic]. Hawliyat al-Quds, no. 17 (Spr.–Sum 14): 66–74.

Thawaba, Salem A. “Integration of GIS and Perception Assessment in the Creation of Needs-Based Urban Parks in Ramallah, Palestine.” Journal of Urbanism 7, no. 2 (Apr. 14): 170–86.

Wagner, Steven. “Whispers from Below: Zionist Secret Diplomacy, Terrorism and British Security Inside and Out of Palestine, 1944–47.” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 42, no. 3 (May 14): 440–63.

Yazbak, Mahmoud. “In the Shadow of the Empire: Palestinian Positions against the Zionist Movement (1882–1914)” [in Arabic]. Hawliyat al-Quds, no. 17 (Spr.–Sum 14): 32–53.


Achilli, Luigi. “Disengagement from Politics: Nationalism, Political Identity, and the Everyday [ES2] in a Palestinian Refugee Camp in Jordan.” Critique of Anthropology 34, no. 2 (Jun. 14): 234–57.

Azoulay, Ariella. “Palestine as Symptom, Palestine as Hope: Revising Human Rights Discourse.” Critical Inquiry 40, no. 4 (Sum. 14): 332–64.

Bistolfi, Robert. “Démilitariser Gaza, sans plus: Un piège?“ CM, no. 90 (Sum. 14): 195–200.

Bubush, Mohammad. “The Significance of Recognizing the Palestinian State” [in Arabic]. SD 51, no. 199 (Jan. 15): 148–51.

Cohen, Hillel. “Introduction – Man’s Search for Meaning: Constantine Zurayk Tries to Understand the Nakba” [in Hebrew]. Jama‘a 21 (14): 89–96.

Fares, Awni. “Salafi Jihad in Palestine” [in Arabic]. MDF, no. 101 (Win. 15): 45–57.

Gren, Nina. “Gendering Al-Nakba: Elderly Palestinian Refugees’ Stories and Silences about Dying Children.” St. Antony’s International Review 10, no. 1 (May 14): 110–26.

Gvion, Liora. “Intertwining Tradition with Modernity: The Case of Palestinian Restaurants in Israel.” Journal of Intercultural Studies 35, no. 4 (Jul. 14): 366–84.

Hadawi, Sami. “Catastrophe Overtakes the Palestinians: Memoirs, Part II.” JQ, no. 59 (Sum. 14): 100–15.

Karp, Jacqueline. “When Are You Coming to Irtah?” [in Arabic]. MDF, no. 101 (Win. 15): 156–65.

Kertcher, Chen. “Grassroots Medical Peace Building: Training Palestinian Physicians in Israel.” Medicine, Conflict and Survival 30, no. 3 (Jul.–Sep. 14): 190–212.

Khalidi, Rashid. “1948 and After in Palestine: Universal Themes?” Critical Inquiry 40, no. 4 (Sum. 14): 314–31.

Khalil, Asem. “Palestinians to Citizens.” MLG 6, no. 3 (14): 204–24.

Milton-Edwards, Beverley. “Islamist versus Islamist: Rising Challenge in Gaza.” Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 2 (Apr.–Jun. 14): 259–76.

Moed, Kamal. “Educator in the Service of the Homeland: Khalil al-Sakakini’s Conflicted Identities.” JQ, no. 59 (Sum. 14): 68–85.

Mohsen, Anis. “The Chatila Camp: ‘Ali Abu Toq and the Regained Memory” [in Arabic]. MDF, no. 101 (Win. 15): 142–45.

Naser-Najjab, Nadia. “Between Myth and Reality: The Palestinian Political Elite and the Two-State Solution.” HLS 13, no. 2 (Nov. 14): 139–58.

Nawfal, Jihad. “Toward a New Political Alignment?” [in Arabic]. MDF, no. 101 (Win. 15): 79–87.

Penfold, Rose, and Mohammad Ali. “Building Medical Education and Research Capacity in Areas of Conflict and Instability: Experiences of the OxPal Medlink in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.” Medicine, Conflict and Survival 30, no. 3 (Jul.–Sep. 14): 166–74.

Ranta, Ronald, and Yonatan Mendel. “Consuming Palestine: Palestine and Palestinians in Israeli Food Culture.” Ethnicities 14, no. 3 (Jun. 14): 412–35.

Rijke, Alexandra, and Toine van Teeffelen. “To Exist Is To Resist: Sumud, Heroism, and the Everyday.” JQ, no. 59 (Sum. 14): 86–99.

Roiston, Bill. “Messages of Allegiance and Defiance: The Murals of Gaza.” Race and Class 55, no. 4 (Apr.–Jun. 14): 40–64.

Sacks, Jeffrey. “Palestine and Sovereign Violence.” CSSAME 34, no. 2 (14): 368–88.

Salama, Bilal A. “The Social Actor: A Critique in Light of the Challenges in Palestine” [in Arabic]. MA 37, no. 431 (Jan. 15): 54–69.

Salama, Khader. “The Sheikh Mohammad al-Khalili” [in Arabic]. Hawliyat al-Quds, no. 17 (Spr.–Sum 14): 6–31.

Sandford, Michael J. “Is Jesus Palestinian? Palestinian Christian Perspectives on Judaism, Ethnicity and the New Testament.” HLS 13, no. 2 (Nov. 14): 123–38.

Schubert, Manuel, and Johann G. Lambsdorff. “Negative Reciprocity in an Environment of Violent Conflict: Experimental Evidence from the Occupied Palestinian Territories.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 58, no. 4 (Jun. 14): 539–63.

Seikaly, Sherene. “Bodies and Needs: Lessons from Palestine.” IJMES 46, no. 4 (Nov. 14): 784–86.

Shaheen, Khalil. “Palestinian Territories on the Verge of Explosion” [in Arabic]. MDF, no. 101 (Win. 15): 188–93.

Sherwell, Tina. “Laylat al-Qadr.” JQ, no. 59 (Sum. 14): 12–15.

al-Tahir, Mu‘in. “The Shuqayf Castle Battle (1982): Two Narrations” [in Arabic]. MDF, no. 101 (Win. 15): 146–55.

Tamari, Salim. “Issa al Issa’s Unorthodox Orthodoxy: Banned in Jerusalem, Permitted in Jaffa.” JQ, no. 59 (Sum. 14): 16–36.

Wilson, Andrew M. “An Analysis of Makovsky’s Border Proposal in Light of Palestinian Needs.” DOMES 23, no. 2 (Fall 14): 215–34.

Wistrich, Robert S. “Gaza, Hamas, and the Return of Antisemitism.” IJFA 8, no. 3 (Sep. 14): 35–48.

Zurayk, Constantine K. “‘Ma‘na al-Nakba’ [The Meaning of the Disaster]” [in Hebrew]. Jama‘a 21 (14): 97–104.


Alkhalili, Noura, Muna Dajani, and Daniela De Leo. “Shifting Realities: Dislocating Palestinian Jerusalemites from the Capital to the Edge.” International Journal of Housing Policy 14, no. 3 (Jul. 14): 257–67.

Arna’ut, Abd al-Ra’uf. “Jerusalem: A Leaderless Popular Uprising” [in Arabic]. MDF, no. 101 (Win. 15): 130–41.

Bowman, Glenn. “Sharing and Exclusion: The Case of Rachel’s Tomb.” JQ, no. 58 (Spr. 14): 30–49.

Busbridge, Rachel. “Frontier Jerusalem: Blurred Separation and Uneasy Coexistence in a Divided City.” Thesis Eleven 121, no. 1 (Apr. 14): 76–100.

Darraj, Faisal. “Jerusalem in the Writings of Jabra Ibrahim Jabra” [in Arabic]. MA 37, no. 429 (Nov. 14): 152–56.

Dumper, Mick. “Running the Divide.” JQ, no. 58 (Spr. 14): 89–94.

Graff, Candace. “Pockets of Lawlessness in the ‘Oasis of Justice.’” JQ, no. 58 (Spr. 14): 13–29.

Harker, Christopher, Reema Shebeitah, and Dareen Sayyad. “Ghosts of Jerusalem: Ramallah’s Haunted Landscapes.” JQ, no. 58 (Spr. 14): 7–12.

Jawharieh, George. “Saint Barbara’s Nocturnal Visits: Jerusalem Memoirs.” JQ, no. 58 (Spr. 14): 67–73.

al-Ju‘ba, Nazmi. “The Colonization of Jerusalem: Executing Old Plans” [in Arabic]. MDF, no. 101 (Win. 15): 14–28.

Masry-Herzalla, Asmahan, and Eran Razin. “Israeli-Palestinian Migrants in Jerusalem: An Emerging Middleman Minority.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 40, no. 7 (Jul. 14): 1002–22.

Shalhoub-Kevorkian, Nadera, and Sarah Ihmoud. “Two Letters from Jerusalem: Haunted by Our Breathing.” JQ, no. 59 (Sum. 14): 7–11.

Tawil-Souri, Helga. “My Aunt’s Mamilla.” JQ, no. 58 (Spr. 14): 50–66.

Yacobi, Haim and Wendy Pullan. “The Geopolitics of Neighbourhood: Jerusalem’s Colonial Space Revisited.” Geopolitics 19, no. 3 (Jul. 14): 514–39.


Arian, Ofer. “What Do Facts Have to Do with the Summer 2011 Protests? Structuring Reality.” IsA 20, no. 4 (14): 613–31.

Baddad, Jamal M. “Jewish Communities in South Africa, Their History and Their Attitudes toward the Palestine Question” [in Arabic]. MA 37, no. 431 (Jan. 15): 59–74.

Birenbaum-Carmeli, Daphna. “Health Journalism in the Service of Power: ‘Moral Complacency’ and the Hebrew Media in the Gaza-Israel Conflict.” Sociology of Health and Illness 36, no. 4 (May 14): 613–28.

Bram, Chen. “Spirituality under the Shadow of the Conflict: Sufi Circles in Israel.” IsSR 29, no. 2 (Win. 14): 118–39.

Brom, Shlomo. “Israel and the Peace Process: Past and Present.” Bustan 5, no. 2 (14): 123–35.

Doron, Gideon, and Ofer Arian. “Introduction: The Many Faces of Israel’s Political Economy.” IsA 20, no. 4 (14): 445–51.

_____, and Fany Yuval. “Between the Quality of the Environment and the Quality of the Performances in Israeli Local Government.” IsA 20, no. 4 (14): 470–83.

Eisikovits, Rivka A. “Second Generation Identities: The Case of Transnational Young Females of Russian Descent in Israel.” Ethnicities 14, no. 3 (Jun. 14): 392–411.

Feraro, Shai. “Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: The Shaping of a Community-Building Discourse among Israeli Pagans.” IsSR 29, no. 2 (Win. 14): 57–77.

Gal, John, and Roni Holler. “The Development of Social Policy Research in Israel.” IsA 20, no. 4 (14): 452–69.

Gal-Ezer, Miri. “The Visible Hand: Economic Censorship in Israeli Media.” IsA 20, no. 4 (14): 577–612.

Gideon, Lior, and Ayala Sherman-Oren. “The Role of Social Distress, Political Affiliation, and Education in Measuring Punitive Attitudes: Israel as a Case Study.” International Criminal Justice Review 24, no. 2 (Jun. 14): 151–71.

Halabi, Rabah. “Invention of a Nation: The Druze in Israel.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 49, no. 3 (Jun. 14): 267–81.

Hashimshony-Yaffe, Nurit, and Assaf Meydani. “The Political Economy of Human Rights: The Struggle over the Establishment of a Human Rights Commission in Israel.” IsA 20, no. 4 (14): 484–502.

Hussein, Ahmad M. “Israel and the Nile Water: A Never-Ending Conflict” [in Arabic]. ShA, no. 160 (Win. 14): 202–20.

Inbar, Efraim, and Eitan Shamir. “‘Mowing the Grass’: Israel’s Strategy for Protracted Intractable Conflict.” Journal of Strategic Studies 37, no. 1 (14): 65–90.

Jamal, Amal. “The Proposed Basic Law: Israel a Jewish Nation State: Meanings and Objectives” [in Arabic]. MDF, no. 101 (Win. 15): 7–13.

Klin-Oron, Adam. “The End Begins in Me: New Forms of Political Action in Israeli Channeling.” IsSR 29, no. 2 (Win. 14): 39–56.

Lustick, Ian. “Making Sense of the Nakba: Ari Shavit, Baruch Marzel, and Zionist Claims to Territory.” Journal of Palestine Studies 44, no. 2 (Win. 15): 7–27.

Magen, Clila, and Eytan Gilboa. “Communicating from within the Shadows: The Israel Security Agency and the Media.” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 27, no. 3 (Sep. 14): 485–508.

Michael, Kobi. “The Weight of the Demographic Factor in Israel’s Strategic Considerations on the Palestinian Issue.” Strategic Assessment 17, no. 3 (Oct. 14): 29–40.

Morris, Benny. “Mandate Palestine in Perspective.” Bustan 5, no. 2 (14): 136–45.

Olesker, Ronnie. “National Identity and Securitization in Israel.” Ethnicities 14, no. 3 (Jun. 14): 371–91.

Persico, Tomer. “Hitbodedut for a New Age: Adaptation of Practices among the Followers of Rabbi Nachman of Bratslav.” IsSR 29, no. 2 (Aut. 14): 99–117.

Rosen, Shai. “‘Eviction & Compensation,’ the Village of al-Samara, 1948–1951: Israel and Baha’i Community Relations” [in Hebrew]. Jama‘a 21 (14): 31–58.

Sadeh, Tal. “Is an ‘Economic Peace’ Possible? Israel and Globalization since the 1970s.” IsA 20, no. 4 (14): 530–65.

Shalhut, Antun. “Netanyahu Looks Forward to a Fourth Term—His Reelection following the Proposed Basic Law: Israel, a Jewish Nation State” [in Arabic]. MDF, no. 101 (Win. 15): 195–202.

Sharabi, Moshe. “Political Economy and Work Values: The Case of Jews and Arabs in Israel.” IsA 20, no. 4 (14): 503–16.

_____. “The Relative Centrality of Life Domains among Jews and Arabs in Israel: The Effect of Culture, Ethnicity, and Demographic Variables.” Community, Work & Family 17, no. 2 (14): 219–36.

Shenhar, Aliza. “The Evolution of Public Colleges in Israel.” IsA 20, no. 4 (14): 566–76.

Simchai, Dalit. “Ethno-National Identity and the New Age World View in Israel.” IsSR 29, no. 2 (Win. 14): 17–38.

Tamari, Assaf. “The Place of Politics: The Notion of Consciousness in Rabbi Yitzchak Ginsburgh’s Political Thought.” IsSR 29, no. 2 (Win. 14): 78–98.

Werczberger, Rachel, and Boaz Huss. “Guest Editors’ Introduction: New Age Culture in Israel.” IsSR 29, no. 2 (Win. 14): 1–16.

Zeitzoff, Thomas. “Anger, Exposure to Violence, and Intragroup Conflict: A ‘Lab in the Field’ Experiment in Southern Israel.” Political Psychology 35, no. 3 (Jun. 14): 309–35.

Zubida, Hani, and David Nachmias. “The Impact of Electoral Reforms on Voting Preferences: The Israeli 1996 and 1999 Cases.” IsA 20, no. 4 (14): 517–29.


‘Abd al-Fatah, Bashir. “The Iranian-Turkish Convergence toward Syria and Iraq” [in Arabic]. ShA, no. 160 (Win. 14): 40–53.

‘Abd al-Jawad, Jamal. “The Future of the Middle East” [in Arabic]. SD 51, no. 199 (Jan. 15): 66–70.

‘Abd al-Majid, Wahid. “The Arab Spring and Arab Wars: The Last Gasp?” [in Arabic]. SD 51, no. 199 (Jan. 15): 52–59.

Abis, Sébastien, and Karine Bennafla. “Afriqu’Orient: Des relations à explorer.” CM, no. 90 (Sum. 14): 9–21.

Abu Rumman, Muhammad. “Salafi Jihad: ISIS and al-Nusra Front: From Managing Brutality to Blood Jurisprudence” [in Arabic]. MDF, no. 101 (Win. 15): 58–68.

Ahmad, Ahmad Y. “The Influence of Terrorism on the Arab League and the Arab Blocs” [in Arabic]. SD 51, no. 199 (Jan. 15): 60–65.

Aras, Bulent, and Emirhan Yorulmazlar. “Turkey and Iran after the Arab Spring: Finding a Middle Ground.” MEP 21, no. 4 (Win. 14): 112–20.

Ardiç, Nurullah. “Civilizational Discourse, the ‘Alliance of Civilizations’ and Turkish Foreign Policy.” Insight Turkey 16, no. 3 (Sum. 14): 101–23.

‘Atwan, Khadir A. “The Arab Political System following the Arab Spring: A Critique of Internationalization” [in Arabic]. ShA, no. 160 (Win. 14): 170–86.

Bardhan, Soumia. “Egypt, Islamists, and the Internet: The Case of the Muslim Brotherhood and Its Rhetoric of Dialectics in Ikhwanweb.” DOMES 23, no. 2 (Fall 14): 235–61.

Bashur, Ma‘an. “Reviving Arab Nationalism: Necessities and Possibilities” [in Arabic]. MA 37, no. 430 (Dec. 14): 22–30.

Baudner, Joerg. “The Evolution of Turkey’s Foreign Policy under the AK Party Government.” Insight Turkey 16, no. 3 (Sum. 14): 79–101.

Beriker, Nimet. “Introducing the FPC-TR Dataset: Dimensions of AK Party Foreign Policy.” Insight Turkey 16, no. 3 (Sum. 14): 201–17.

Berti, Benedetta, and Yoel Guzansky. “Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy on Iran and the Proxy War in Syria: Toward a New Chapter?” IJFA 8, no. 3 (Sep. 14): 25–34.

Beška, Emanuel. “Political Opposition to Zionism in Palestine and Greater Syria: 1910–1911 as a Turning Point.” JQ, no. 59 (Sum. 14): 54–67.

Blanc, Pierre. “De l’Egypte à l’Ethiopie, quand la puissance se déplace en Afrique nilotique.” CM, no. 90 (Sum. 14): 123–39.

Bordenkircher, Eric. “Kings, Queens, Rooks and Pawns: Towards Deciphering the Lebanese Political Chessboard.” ROMES 47, no. 2 (Win. 13): 202–9.

Dahman, Ghazi. “The Arab Political System: Crisis and Prospects” [in Arabic]. ShA, no. 160 (Win. 14): 84–92.

Davis, Ryan G. “Israeli-Palestinian Healthcare Partnerships: Advancing Multitrack Peacework after the Arab Spring.” Peace and Change 39, no. 2 (Apr. 14): 190–211.

Diab, Ahmad. “Axes of Polarization and Alliances East of the Mediterranean” [in Arabic]. SD 51, no. 199 (Jan. 15): 144–47.

Fakhoury, Tamirace. “Do Power-Sharing Systems Behave Differently amid Regional Uprisings? Lebanon in the Arab Protest Wave.” MEJ 68, no. 4 (Aut. 14): 505–20.

Freeman, Chas W., Jr. “The Collapse of Order in the Middle East.” MEP 21, no. 4 (Win. 14): 61–68.

Furani, Khaled. “States of Exception, Ethics and New Beginnings in Middle East Politics.” Interventions 16, no. 3 (May 14): 346–64.

Gade, Tine. “Conflit en Syrie et dynamiques de guerre civil à Tripoli.” MM, no. 218 (14): 61–84.

Gonzales-Quijano, Yves. “La crise syrienne: Un traitement de choc des medias libanais.” MM, no. 218 (14): 125–34.

Haseeb, Khair El-Din (interview). “The Arabs . . . Where to Now?” CAA 7, no. 4 (14): 576–94.

Hashim, Ahmed S. “The Islamic State: From al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate.” MEP 21, no. 4 (Win. 14): 69–83.

Jaulin, Thibaut. “Citizenship, Migration, and Confessional Democracy in Lebanon.” MLG 6, no. 3 (14): 250–71.

Jenkins, J. Craig, Thomas V. Maher, and Chuck Fahrer. “Seedbeds of Insurgency: Structure and Dynamics in the Egyptian Islamist Insurgency, 1986–99.” Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 4 (Jul. 14): 470–86.

Kayyali, Majid. “Reflections on the Political and Intellectual Consequences of the Arab Spring” [in Arabic]. ShA, no. 160 (Win. 14): 112–22.

Klasta, Martin. “Le Hezbollah en Syrie: La Résistance redéfinie?” MM, no. 218 (14): 85–98.

Knudsen, Are J. “Violence et déplacement: La crise des réfugiés syriens au Liban.” MM, no. 218 (14): 29–40.

Legrenzi, Matteo, and Fred H. Lawson. “Iran and Its Neighbors since 2003: New Dilemmas.” MEP 21, no. 4 (Win. 14): 105–11.

Lippman, Thomas W. “Islam in Egypt: The U.S. View, 1982.” MEP 21, no. 4 (Win. 14): 133–50.

Mäkelä, Juha P. “The Arab Spring’s Impact on Egypt’s Securitocracy.” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 27, no. 2 (Jun. 14): 217–39.

Mamadouh, Virginie. “Making Sense of Ongoing Revolutions: Geopolitical and Other Analyses of the Wave of Arab Uprisings since December 2010.” Geopolitics 18, no. 3 (Jul. 13): 742–50.

Meier, Daniel. “Réfugiés de Syrie et tensions sunnito-chiites. Le Liban entre défis et périls.” MM, no. 218 (14): 41–60.

Moghadam, Valentine M. “What is Democracy? Promises and Perils of the Arab Spring.” Current Sociology 61, no. 4 (Jul. 14): 393–408.

Muhammad, Ala ‘Abd al-Hafiz. “The Future of the Arab State in Light of the Problematic Relation between the ‘Inside’ and ‘Outside’” [in Arabic]. MA 37, no. 429 (Nov. 14): 7–19.

Mufti, Malik. “Arab Reactions to Turkey’s Regional Reengagement.” Insight Turkey 16, no. 3 (Sum. 14): 15–25.

Myard, Jacques. “Révolutions arabes: L’histoire continue.” Géoéconomie, no. 69 (Mar.–Apr. 14): 67–81.

Nalbantian, Tsolin. “Lebanese Power Struggles and Fashioning ‘Armenian’ Space, 1957–1958.” ROMES 47, no. 2 (Win. 13): 218–27.

Otayek, René. “Une production islamique de la mondialisation: Les relations Afrique-monde arabe à l’ère du transnationalisme contemporain.” CM, no. 90 (Sum. 14): 23–37.

Podeh, Elie. “Israel and the Arab Peace Initiative, 2002–2014: A Plausible Missed Opportunity.” MEJ 68, no. 4 (Aut. 14): 584–603.

Rashid, Samih. “The Factors behind the Arab-Iranian Realignment?” [in Arabic]. ShA, no. 160 (Win. 14): 28–39.

Ruck, Isabelle. “Les Chrétiens libanais face à la crise syrienne: Entre dhimmitude et citoyenneté responsable.” MM, no. 218 (14): 99–124.

al-Samak, Muhammad (interview). “The Separation of Religion and State, and the Rejection of Extremism” [in Arabic]. MA 37, no. 430 (Dec. 14): 138–54.

Shukr, ‘Abd al-Ghaffar. “Al-Tali’a al-‘Arabiya: The Secret Nationalistic Organization of Jamal ‘Abd al Nasser” [in Arabic]. MA 37, no. 430 (Dec. 14): 31–50.

Siklawi, Rami. “The Social and Political Identities of the Shi‘i Community in Lebanon.” ASQ 36, no. 4 (Fall 14): 278–91.

Spears, Ian S. “Evaluating ‘Two-State Condominialism:’ A New Approach to Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict?” Global Change, Peace & Security 26, no. 2 (May 14): 195–210.

Stevenson, Jonathan. “The Syrian Tragedy and Precedent.” Survival 56, no. 3 (Jun.–Jul. 14): 121–40.

Stratfor Global Intelligence Firm. “Stratfor’s Fourth Quarter Forecast 2014” [in Arabic]. MA 37, no. 429 (Nov. 14): 54–75.

Tanchum, Micha’el. “Between Ankara and Tehran: How the Scramble for Kurdistan Can Reshape Regional Relations.” Strategic Assessment 17, no. 3 (Oct. 14): 67–80.

Tejel, Jordi. “Les paradoxes du printemps kurde en Syrie.” PÉ, no. 2 (Sum. 14): 51–61.

Uzuner, Zuhal M. “The Rise of Radical Liberal Discourse in Turkish Foreign Policy.” Insight Turkey 16, no. 3 (Sum. 14): 123–49.

Yesiltas, Murat. “The New Era in Turkish Foreign Policy: Critiques and Challenges.” Insight Turkey 16, no. 3 (Sum. 14): 25–37.

Yilmaz, Özcan. “Syrie: Ankara contre Téhéran?” PÉ, no. 3 (Fall 14): 121–31.

Zidam, Yusuf. “The Political Culture in the Arab World: A Study of the Non-Political Factors” [in Arabic]. MA 37, no. 429 (Nov. 14): 20–34.

Zisser, Eyal. “The End of the Syrian Revolution: Between Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s Islamic Caliphate and Bashar al-Assad’s Baath Regime.” Strategic Assessment 17, no. 3 (Oct. 14): 55–65.


‘Abdullah, Hicham. “A Report of the Conference: ‘The Geostrategic and Political Status of the Gaza Strip’ (Symposium)” [in Arabic]. MDF, no. 101 (Win. 15): 166–72.

Abu ‘Amud, Mohammad S. “Difficult Choices: The Future of U.S. Policy in the Middle East” [in Arabic]. SD 51, no. 199 (Jan. 15): 72–77.

Altwaiji, Mubarak. “Neo-Orientalism and the Neo-Imperialism Thesis: Post-9/11 US and Arab World Relationship.” ASQ 36, no. 4 (Fall 14): 313–23.

Bakr, Ali. “The Islamic Currents and the International Coalition: Positions and Implications” [in Arabic]. SD 51, no. 199 (Jan. 15): 118–24.

Bibars, Samia. “The Role of the Arab-Islamic Civilization in Building Bridges between the Arabs and South America” [in Arabic]. ShA, no. 160 (Win. 14): 221–34.

Butime, Herman. “Shifts in Israel-Africa Relations.” Strategic Assessment 17, no. 3 (Oct. 14): 81–91.

Del Sarto, Raffaella A. “Defining Borders and People in the Borderlands: EU Policies, Israeli Prerogatives and the Palestinians.” Journal of Common Market Studies 52, no. 2 (Mar. 14): 200–216.

Hoesterey, James B. “Is Indonesia a Model for the Arab Spring?” ROMES 47, no. 2 (Win. 13): 157–65.

Jensehaugen, Jørgen. “Blueprint for Arab–Israeli Peace? President Carter and the Brookings Report.” Diplomacy and Statecraft 25, no. 3 (Jul. 14): 492–508.

Kurtzer, Daniel C., Matthew Duss, Natan B. Sachs, and Yousef Munayyer. “Symposium: The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Has the U.S. Failed?” MEP 21, no. 4 (Win. 14): 1–31.

Maurer, Peter. “Challenges to Humanitarian Action in Contemporary Conflicts: Israel, the Middle East and Beyond.” IsLR 47, no. 2 (Jul. 14): 175–80.

Miller, Rory. “The Euro-Arab Dialogue and the Limits of European External Intervention in the Middle East, 1974–77.” MES 50, no. 6 (14): 936–59.

Oresharski, Plamen. “The Strategic Dimension of the Bulgarian-Israeli Partnership.” IJFA 8, no. 3 (Sep. 14): 87–90.

Parsi, Trita. “Why Did Iran Diplomacy Work this Time Around?” Insight Turkey 16, no. 3 (Sum. 14): 47–55.

Sanati, Reza. “Beyond the Domestic Picture: The Geopolitical Factors That Have Formed Contemporary Iran-US Relations.” Global Change, Peace & Security 26, no. 2 (May 14): 125–40.

Yarchi, Moran. “The Effect of Female Suicide Attacks on Foreign Media Framing of Conflicts: The Case of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict.” SCT 37, no. 8 (Aug. 14): 674–88.


‘Abidin, Issam. “The International Criminal Court Temporal Jurisdiction in the Case of Palestine” [in Arabic]. MDF, no. 101 (Win. 15): 69–78.

Aharoni, Sarai B. “Internal Variation in Norm Localization: Implementing Security Council Resolution 1325 in Israel.” Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society 21, no. 1 (Spr. 14): 1–25.

Azarov, Valentina. “An International Legal Demarche for Human Rights? Perils and Prospects of the Palestinian UN Bid.” International Journal of Human Rights 18, nos. 4–5 (Jul. 14): 527–44.

Barak, Aharon. “International Humanitarian Law and the Israeli Supreme Court.” IsLR 47, no. 2 (Jul. 14): 181–89.

Ben-Nun, Gilad. “The Israeli Roots of Article 3 and Article 6 of the 1951 Refugee Convention.” Journal of Refugee Studies 27, no. 1 (Mar. 14): 101–25.

Dupont, Pierre-Emmanuel. “Compliance with Treaties in the Context of Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Assessing Claims in the Case of Iran.” Journal of Conflict and Security Law 19, no. 2 (Sum. 14): 161–210.

Harpaz, Guy. “Being Unfaithful to One’s Own Principles: The Israeli Supreme Court and House Demolitions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.” IsLR 47, no. 3 (Nov. 14): 401–31.

Kontorovich, Eugene. “When Gravity Fails: Israeli Settlements and Admissibility at the ICC.” IsLR 47, no. 3 (Nov. 14): 379–99.

Mikdashi, Maya. “Sex and Sectarianism: The Legal Architecture of Lebanese Citizenship.” CSSAME 34, no. 2 (14): 279–93.

Ronen, Yaël. “Israel, Palestine and the ICC—Territory Uncharted but not Unknown.” Journal of International Criminal Justice 12, no. 1 (Mar. 14): 7–25.

Valter, Stéphane. “La justice chariatique en Syrie ‘libérée’: Un modèle juridique consensuel?” CM, no. 90 (Sum. 14): 155–74.


‘Alawi, Mustafa. “The War on ISIS: Regional and International Interactions” [in Arabic]. SD 51, no. 199 (Jan. 15): 92–97.

‘Alou, Imad. “The Military Strategy of ISIS” [in Arabic]. SD 51, no. 199 (Jan. 15): 12–21.

Altshuler, Alex, and Meir Elran. “Inter-Organizational Training for the Emergency Management System.” MSA 6, no. 2 (Aug. 14): 37–47.

Anteb, Liran. “Changing Trends in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: New Challenges for States, Armies and Security Industries.” MSA 6, no. 2 (Aug. 14): 21–36.

Arab Crisis Group. “The 2014 Israeli War on Gaza: The Palestinian Options in Managing the War and Its Outcomes” [in Arabic]. MA 37, no. 431 (Jan. 15): 114–31.

Badrakhan, Abdul Wahab. “The Coalition against ISIS: A War of Total Elimination or a Battle with Limited Political Prospects?” [in Arabic]. ShA, no. 160 (Win. 14): 18–27.

Bakir, Ali H. “Turkey’s Policy toward the International Coalition against ISIS” [in Arabic]. SD 51, no. 199 (Jan. 15): 112–17.

Barany, Zoltan. “Building National Armies after Civil War: Lessons from Bosnia, El Salvador, and Lebanon.” Political Science Quarterly 129, no. 2 (Sum. 14): 211–38.

Battera, Federico. “Perspectives for Change in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria: The Military Factor and Implications of Previous Authoritarian Regimes.” CAA 7, no. 4 (14): 544–64.

Beker, Avi. “UN Peacekeeping Forces: Preventive Diplomacy and Its Limitations.” MSA 6, no. 2 (Aug. 14): 3–19.

Beres, Louis R. “Changing Direction? Updating Israel’s Nuclear Doctrine.” Strategic Assessment 17, no. 3 (Oct. 14): 93–106.

Berti, Benedetta and Yoram Schweitzer. “Hizbollah and the Next War with Israel: Experience from Syria and Gaza.” Strategic Assessment 17, no. 3 (Oct. 14): 19–28.

Blanga, Yehuda. “Turmoil in Egypt—1968–2011: The Status of the Armed Forces in Citizen Uprisings in Egypt.” Contemporary Politics 20, no. 3 (Jul. 14): 365–83.

Chorev, Harel. “The Road to Operation Protective Edge: Gaps in Strategic Perception.” IJFA 8, no. 3 (Sep. 14): 9–24.

al-Dasuki, Abu Bakr. “A Strained Alliance and the Opportunities of Victory” [in Arabic]. SD 51, no. 199 (Jan. 15): 80–81.

Geukjian, Ohannes. “Political Instability and Conflict after the Syrian Withdrawal from Lebanon.” MEJ 68, no. 4 (Aut. 14): 521–45.

Habib, Kamal. “The Limits of the Effectiveness of the International Coalition against Terrorism” [in Arabic]. SD 51, no. 199 (Jan. 15): 98–101.

Hamblin, Jacob D. “The Nuclearization of Iran in the Seventies.” Diplomatic History 38, no. 5 (Nov. 14): 1114–35.

Kam, Ephraim. “The Rise of the Islamic State Organization.” Strategic Assessment 17, no. 3 (Oct. 14): 41–53.

al-Mashat, Abid al-Mun’im. “The International Coalition: Aims and Contradictions” [in Arabic]. SD 51, no. 199 (Jan. 15): 82–85.

Naf’a, Hassan. “The U.S. War Dilemma: Between Necessity and Choice” [in Arabic]. SD 51, no. 199 (Jan. 15): 86–91.

Parchami, Ali. “American Culpability: The Bush Administration and the Iranian Nuclear Impasse.” Contemporary Politics 20, no. 3 (Jul. 14): 315–30.

Pascovich, Eyal. “Military Intelligence and Controversial Political Issues: The Unique Case of the Israeli Military Intelligence.” Intelligence and National Security 29, no. 2 (Mar. 14): 227–61.

Perkovich, George. “Iran, Nuclear Talks Extended, Again” [in Arabic]. MA 37, no. 431 (Jan. 15): 86–91.

Rif’at, Said. “The War on ISIS” [in Arabic]. ShA, no. 160 (Win. 14): 5–16.

Salem, Mohammad A. “Arab States Facing ISIS Threat” [in Arabic]. SD 51, no. 199 (Jan. 15): 102–7.

Saunder, Emily C., and Bryan L. Fearey. “The Least Bad Option? Extending the Nuclear Umbrella to the Middle East.” Comparative Strategy 33, no. 2 (14): 122–30.

Shalom, Zaki. “The ‘Special Relationship’ in the Test of Time: US Policy during Operation Protective Edge.” Strategic Assessment 17, no. 3 (Oct. 14): 7–18.

Siboni, Gabi, and Sami Kronenfeld. “Developments in Iranian Cyber Warfare 2013–2014.” MSA 6, no. 2 (Aug. 14): 83–104.

Wahban, Ahmad M. “Trends in Analyzing Terrorism: A Conceptual and Historical Background” [in Arabic]. SD 51, no. 199 (Jan. 15): 22–35.

Wege, Carl A. “Hezbollah’s Communication System: A Most Important Weapon.” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 27, no. 2 (Jun. 14): 240–52.

Zahran, Munir. “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Where To?” [in Arabic]. SD 51, no. 199 (Jan. 15): 128–31.


Abdallah, Charles. “Les mutations de l’économie libanaise sous l’impact de la crise syrienne.” MM, no. 218 (14): 9–28.

Abdul-Jabar, Faleh. “Reflections on Arabs and Sociology: Insights into Sociological Schools of Thought in the Arab World – Challenges and Issues.” CAA 7, no. 4 (14): 499–509.

al-‘Afandi, Nazira. “Political Motives: The Tool of Economic Sanctions” [in Arabic]. SD 51, no. 199 (Jan. 15): 140–43.

Akmir, ‘Abd al-Wahhab. “Arabs and Europeans: Identity, Education, Citizenship” [in Arabic]. MA 37, no. 429 (Nov. 14): 76–94.

Anderson, Charles W. “Youth, the ‘Arab Spring,’ and Social Movements.” ROMES 47, no. 2 (Win. 13): 150–57.

Benedikter, Roland, and Davide Ziveri. “The Global Imaginary, New Media and Sociopolitical Innovation in the Periphery: The Practical Case of an Internet-Based Empowerment Project in Palestine and Israel.” Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies 28, no. 4 (Jul. 14): 439–53.

Bracy, Michael, and Najwa Raouda. “One Ideology, Two Paths: Gender, Education, and Emigration among the Lebanese Shi‘a of Jabal ‘Amil and the Biqa‘.” ROMES 47, no. 2 (Win. 13): 210–17.

Dohrmann, Mark, and Robert Hatem. “The Impact of Hydro-Politics on the Relations of Turkey, Iraq, and Syria.” MEJ 68, no. 4 (Aut. 14): 567–83.

Farsakh, Laila. “The Essence of Palestinian Economic Development” [in Arabic]. MDF, no. 101 (Win. 15): 88–109.

al-Hamash, Munir. “Arab Human Development in the Twenty-First Century (Symposium)” [in Arabic]. MA 37, no. 430 (Dec. 14): 90–119.

Hassan, Ammar A. “Egypt’s Local Development and Regional Obligations: Incompatibility or Harmony?” [in Arabic]. ShA, no. 160 (Win. 14): 104–11.

Herzallah, Ahmad M., Leopoldo Gutiérrez-Gutiérrez, and Juan F. Munoz Rosas. “Total Quality Management Practices, Competitive Strategies and Financial Performance: The Case of the Palestinian Industrial SMEs.” Total Quality Management & Business Excellence 25, nos. 5–6 (Apr. 14): 635–49.

Joy, Jack. “Islamic Social Welfare and Redistributive Justice in the Middle East.” St. Antony’s International Review 10, no. 1 (May 14): 22–42.

Kandeel, Amal A. “Food Insecurity: The Basic Threat in an Overburdened Region.” MEP 21, no. 4 (Win. 14): 84–91.

Karagiannis, Emmanuel. “Comparative Islamist Perspectives on the Politics of Energy in the Middle East and Beyond.” SCT 37, no. 8 (Aug. 14): 619–37.

al-Kawakbi, Salam. “The Question of Development in the Arab World and Its Relation to Stability and Democracy” [in Arabic]. ShA, no. 160 (Win. 14): 123–31.

Khadduri, Imad. “The Future of Nuclear Energy in the Arab World” [in Arabic]. MA 37, no. 430 (Dec. 14): 51–58.

El-Khoury, Gabi. “Manifestations of Exclusion in Arab Countries: Selected Indicators.” CAA 7, no. 4 (14): 635–44.

Lodolini, E.M., S. Ali, M. Mutawea, M. Qutub, T. Arabasi, F. Pierini, D. Neri. “Complementary Irrigation for Sustainable Production in Olive Groves in Palestine.” Agricultural Water Management, no. 134 (Mar. 14): 104–9.

Mattes, Hanspeter. “Gewerkschaften in Nordafrika und Nahost: Unterschiedliche Ziele seit dem Jahr 2011.” GIGA Focus Nahost, no. 7 (Jul. 14): 1–8.

Meneley, Anne. “Discourses of Distinction in Contemporary Palestinian Extra-Virgin Olive Oil Production.” Food and Foodways 22, nos. 1–2 (Apr. 14): 48–64.

Mezouaghi, Mihoub. “L’Afrique subsaharienne et le monde arabe: Des espaces agricoles déconnectés.” CM, no. 90 (Sum. 14): 39–59.

Mthuli Ncube, John C. Anyanwu, and Kjell Hausken. “Inequality, Economic Growth and Poverty in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).” African Development Review 26, no. 3 (Sep. 14): 435–53.

Noori, Neema. “Does Academic Freedom Globalize? The Diffusion of the American Model of Education to the Middle East and Academic Freedom.” PS: Political Science and Politics 47, no. 3 (Jul. 14): 608–11.

al-Qattan, Najwa. “When Mothers Ate Their Children: Wartime Memory and the Language of Food in Syria and Lebanon.” IJMES 46, no. 4 (Nov. 14): 719–36.

Rettig, Elai. “Protecting Foreign Manpower in the Israeli Gas Industry: Lessons from Nigeria.” MSA 6, no. 2 (Aug. 14): 49–64.

Salem, Salah. “On the Cultural Roots of Arab Division” [in Arabic]. ShA, no. 160 (Win. 14): 134–45.

Sidani, Yusuf M., and Tony Feghali. “Female Labour Participation and Pay Equity in Arab Countries: Commonalities and Differences.” CAA 7, no. 4 (14): 526–43.

Tanielian, Melanie S. “Feeding the City: The Beirut Municipality and the Politics of Food during World War I.” IJMES 46, no. 4 (Nov. 14): 737–58.

Wiseman, Alexander W. “Representations of Islam and Arab Societies in Western Secondary Textbooks.” DOMES 23, no. 2 (Fall 14): 312–44.

Yemini, Miri. “Internationalization of Secondary Education? Lessons from Israeli Palestinian-Arab Schools in Tel Aviv-Jaffa.” Urban Education 49, no. 5 (Jul. 14): 471–98.

Zahlan, A.B. “Industrializing the Arab World: A Speculative Case Study.” CAA 7, no. 4 (14): 565–75.

Zelkovitz, Ido. “Education, Revolution and Evolution: The Palestinian Universities as Initiators of National Struggle 1972–1995.” History of Education 43, no. 3 (May 14): 387–407.


Ben ‘Abd Allah, Chahira. “War in the Media” [in Arabic]. MA 37, no. 429 (Nov. 14): 95–108.

Cohen, Kfir. “Mizrahi Subalternity and the State of Israel: Towards a New Understanding of Mizrahi Literature.” Interventions 16, no. 3 (May 14): 380–404.

Hamzah, Hussain. “Resistance, Martyrdom and Death in Mahmoud Darwish’s Poetry.” HLS 13, no. 2 (Nov. 14): 159–86.

Kassis, Shawqi. “Samih al-Qasim: Equal Parts Poetry and Resistance.” Journal of Palestine Studies 44, no. 2 (Win. 15): 43–51.

al-Manassra, Izz al-Din (interview). “The Palestinian Poet and Critic Izz al-Din al-Manassra in His Book The Palestinian Revolution in Lebanon” [in Arabic]. MA 37, no. 429 (Nov. 14): 141–51.

Shammas, Anton. “Seven Thoughts and a Footnote: On Languages and Books” [in Arabic]. MDF, no. 101 (Win. 15): 29–44.

Shitrit-Sason, Sharon. “Who is Afraid of Autobiographies? On Women’s Autobiographies in the Arab World—Fadwa Tukan and Haifa Bitar” [in Hebrew]. Jama‘a 21 (14): 7–30.


Reference and General

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History (through 1948) and Geography

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Palestinian Politics and Society

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Israeli Politics, Society, and Zionism

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Gordis, Daniel. Menachem Begin: The Battle for Israel’s Soul in IJFA 8, no. 3 (Sep. 14): 139–44 (Y. Weitz).

Masalha, Nur. The Zionist Bible: Biblical Precedent, Colonialism and the Erasure of Memory in JPS 44, no. 2 (Win. 15): 76–78 (B. Ra‘ad).

Nathanson, Michael. Between Myth and Mandate: Geopolitics, Pseudohistory and the Hebrew Bible in HLS 13, no. 2 (Nov. 14): 223–27 (L. Thompson).

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Weaver, Alain E. Mapping Exile and Return: Palestinian Dispossession and a Political Theology for a Shared Future in JPS 44, no. 2 (Win. 15): 74–76 (M. Chmiel).

Arab and Middle Eastern Politics

Norton, Augustus R. Hezbollah in JPS 44, no. 2 (Win. 15): 70–71 (A. AbuKhalil).

Achcar, Gilbert. The People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprising in Bustan 5, no. 2 (14): 147–56 (Y. Hazran).

Balci, Ali. Turkish Foreign Policy: Principles, Actors, Practices [in Turkish] in Insight Turkey 16, no. 3 (Sum. 14): 248 (S. Bardakçi).

Bennoune, Karima. Your Fatwa Does Not Apply Here: Untold Stories from the Fight against Muslim Fundamentalism in MEP 21, no. 4 (Win. 14): 160–63 (B. Weinberg).

Brown, Nathan J. When Victory is Not an Option: Islamist Movements in Arab Politics in ROMES 47, no. 2 (Win. 13): 237–38 (T. Keskin).

Fuller, Graham E. Turkey and the Arab Spring Leadership in the Middle East in Insight Turkey 16, no. 3 (Sum. 14): 225 (A. Szarejko).

el-Husseini, Rola. Pax Syriana: Elite Politics in Postwar Lebanon in IJMES 46, no. 4 (Nov. 14): 835–36 (M. Gasper).

Jebnoun, Noureddine. Modern Middle East Authoritarianism: Roots, Ramifications, and Crisis in MEP 21, no. 4 (Win. 14): 163–65 (N. Lean).

Kassem, Fatima S. Party Politics, Religion, and Women’s Leadership: Lebanon in Comparative Perspective in CAA, 7, no. 4 (14): 599–603 (J. Kabbanji).

Kuran, Timur. The Long Divergence in CAA, 7, no. 4 (14): 595–99 (Z. Hafez).

Lefevre, Raphael. Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria in BRIJMES 41, no. 4 (Oct. 14): 527–29 (E. Kurtulus).

LeVine, Mark, and Mathias Mossberg, eds. One Land, Two States: Israel and Palestine as Parallel States in IJFA 8, no. 3 (Sep. 14): 107–16 (A. Tal).

Levitt, Matthew. Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God in MES 50, no. 6 (14): 1043–45 (I. Zelkovitz).

Pierret, Thomas. Religion and State in Syria: The Sunni Ulama from Coup to Revolution in MES 51, no. 1 (15): 163–64 (L. Khatib).

Rubin, Lawrence. Islam in the Balance: Ideational Threats in Arab Politics in MEJ 68, no. 4 (Aut. 14): 660–61 (J. Haynes).

Salamey, Imad. The Government and Politics of Lebanon in BRIJMES 41, no. 4 (Oct. 14): 520–22 (A. Assi).

Scheller, Bente. The Wisdom of Syria’s Waiting Game Foreign Policy under the Assads in Insight Turkey 16, no. 3 (Sum. 14): 223 (J. Bastaki).

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Wahid, Mariam. The Body and Politics [in Arabic] in SD, no. 199 (Jan. 15): 184 (Y. Mansur).

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International Relations

Bonine, Michael E. Is There a Middle East? The Evolution of a Geopolitical Concept in ShA, no. 160 (Win. 14): 243–47 (G. Tawfiq).

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Cormac, Rory. Confronting the Colonies: British Intelligence and Counterinsurgency in MES 50, no. 6 (14): 1027–32 (C. Jones).

Dienst, Bill and Greta Berlin. Freedom Sailors: The Maiden Voyage of the Free Gaza Movement and How We Succeeded in Spite of Ourselves in JPS 44, no. 2 (Win. 15): 72–73 (S. Vinthagen).

Emery, Christian. US Foreign Policy and the Iranian Revolution: The Cold War Dynamics of Engagement and Strategic Alliance in BRIJMES 41, no. 4 (Oct. 14): 522–26 (M. Farhang).

Greene, Toby. Blair, Labour and Palestine: Conflicting Views on Middle East Peace after 9/11 in IJFA 8, no. 3 (Sep. 14): 127–30 (R. Sabel).

Jonasson, Ann-Kristin. The EU’s Democracy Promotion and the Mediterranean Neighbors: Orientation, Ownership and Dialogue in Jordan and Turkey in Insight Turkey 16, no. 3 (Sum. 14): 227 (S. Ihlamur-Öner).

Migdal, Joel. Shifting Sands: The United States in the Middle East in IJFA 8, no. 3 (Sep. 14): 117–20 (J. Rynhold).

Miodownik, Dan, and Oren Barak. Nonstate Actors in Intrastate Conflicts in Bustan 5, no. 2 (14): 167–70 (D. Porch).

Mutawa’, Mohammad. The West and the Middle East: From the Iraq War to the Arab Spring Revolutions [in Arabic] in SD, no. 199 (Jan. 15): 185 (I. Manshawi).

Neumann, Iver B. Diplomatic Sites: A Critical Enquiry in IJFA 8, no. 3 (Sep. 14): 145–50 (M. Cohen).

Phares, Walid. The Lost Spring: U.S. Policy in the Middle East and Catastrophes to Avoid in SD, no. 199 (Jan. 15): 180 (B. Rashed).

Pope, Laurence. The Demilitarization of American Diplomacy: Two Cheers for Striped Pants in IJFA 8, no. 3 (Sep. 14): 145–50 (M. Cohen).

Tejirian, Eleanor H., and Reeva S. Simon. Conflict, Conquest, and Conversion: Two Thousand Years of Christian Missions in the Middle East in ROMES 47, no. 2 (Win. 13): 264–65 (B. Masters).

Wright, Lawrence. Thirteen Days in September: Carter, Begin, and Sadat at Camp David in MEP 21, no. 4 (Win. 14): 151–55 (M. Rubner).


Keshavjee, Mohamed M. Islam, Sharia & Alternative Dispute Resolution: Mechanisms for Legal Redress in the Muslim Community in ROMES 47, no. 2 (Win. 13): 257–58 (L. Bambach).


Ahram, Ariel I. Proxy Warriors: The Rise and Fall of State-Sponsored Militias in ROMES 47, no. 2 (Win. 13): 230–31 (J. Russell).

Cronin, Stephanie. Armies and State-Building in the Modern Middle East: Politics, Nationalism and Military Reform in MES 50, no. 6 (14): 1038–41 (M. Hughes).

Haikal, Fatuh A. International Intervention in the Fight against Terrorism and Its Implications on National Sovereignty [in Arabic] in SD, no. 199 (Jan. 15): 189 (A. Barbari).

Kitchen, James E. The British Imperial Army in the Middle East: Morale and Military Identity in the Sinai and Palestine Campaigns in JPS 44, no. 2 (Win. 15): 65–66 (K. Ulrichsen).

Rodman, David. Sword and Shield of Zion: The Israeli Air Force in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948–2012 in Bustan 5, no. 2 (14): 163–66 (R. Tira); IJFA 8, no. 3 (Sep. 14): 135–39 (D. Shalom).

Ulrichsen, Kristian C. The First World War in the Middle East in MEJ 68, no. 4 (Aut. 14): 657–59 (A. Terrill).

Economy, Society, and Education

Abraham, Matthew. Out of Bounds: Academic Freedom and the Question of Palestine in JPS 44, no. 2 (Win. 15): 63–64 (S. Salaita).

Deeb, Lara, and Mona Harb. Leisurely Islam: Negotiating Geography and Morality in Shi‘ite South Beirut in IJMES 46, no. 4 (Nov. 14): 820–22 (A. de Koning).

Elshakry, Marwa. Reading Darwin in Arabic, 1860–1950 in MEJ 68, no. 4 (Aut. 14): 661–63 (G. Saliba).

Jayyousi, Odeh R. Islam and Sustainable Development: New Worldviews in MA 37, no. 430 (Dec. 14): 159–63 (B. Saba).

Mikhail, Alan, ed. Water on Sand: Environmental Histories of the Middle East and North Africa in Bustan 5, no. 2 (14): 157–62 (S. Schoenfeld).

Literature, Arts, and Culture

el-Ariss, Tarek. Trials of Arab Modernity: Literary Affects and the New Political in ROMES 47, no. 2 (Win. 13): 241–42 (I. Boullata).

Cohen, Ari A. Falafelism: The Politics of Food in the Middle East (film review) in ROMES 47, no. 2 (Win. 13): 228–29 (J. Ebeling).

Gugler, Josef, ed. Film in the Middle East and North Africa: Creative Dissidence in BRIJMES 41, no. 4 (Oct. 14): 526–27 (T. Dadar).

Hout, Syrine. Post-War Anglophone Lebanese Fiction: Home Matters in the Diaspora in ROMES 47, no. 2 (Win. 13): 255–56 (M. Hartman).



(Arab Studies Quarterly)


(British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies)


(Bustan: The Middle East Book Review)


(Contemporary Arab Affairs)


(Confluences Méditerranée)


(Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East)


(Digest of Middle East Studies)


(Holy Land Studies)



(Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs)

(International Journal of Middle East Studies)


(Israel Affairs)


(Israel Law Review)



(Israel Studies Review)

(Journal of Palestine Studies)


(Jerusalem Quarterly)


(Al-Mustaqbal al-‘Arabi)


(Majallat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya)


(Middle East Journal)


(Middle East Policy)


(Middle Eastern Studies)


(Middle East Law and Governance)


(Maghreb Machrek)


(Military and Strategic Affairs)

(Politique Étrangère)


(Review of Middle East Studies)


(Studies in Conflict and Terrorism)


(al-Siyasa al-Duwaliyya)


(Shu‘un ‘Arabiyya)

Posted in Palestine Affairs, LiteratureComments Off on Bibliography of Periodical Literature Compiled

The Palestinian Resistance: Interview with Ramadan Shallah ‘Part II’

Image result for Ramadan Shallah PHOTO
Ramadan Shallah

In the text that follows, which is the second of a two-part interview, Dr. Ramadan Shallah, the secretary-general of Islamic Jihad in Palestine discusses national unity, the prospects of the Palestinian national movement, the role of the resistance, and Islamic Jihad’s view of nationhood.

Shallah, born in the Gaza City neighborhood of Shuja’iya in 1958, obtained his doctorate in economics from the University of Durham in the United Kingdom and was subsequently adjunct professor at the University of South Florida in the United States. In 1995, he assumed the leadership of Islamic Jihad after the movement’s charismatic founder, Fathi Shikaki, was assassinated in an Israeli operation in Malta. The Shikaki assassination is often portrayed by Israel as an instance in which an organization is dealt a mortal blow by the physical elimination of its leader. While Islamic Jihad was indeed slow to recover, today it is an integral component of the Palestinian national movement, politically as well as militarily, and particularly so in the Gaza Strip.

Shallah himself remains based in Damascus, reflecting the closer relations Islamic Jihad has traditionally nurtured with Iran and Syria, when compared to Hamas. On the strength of its relationship with what is often referred to as “the axis of resistance,” Islamic Jihad boasts a military arsenal and capability that is second only to that of Hamas. Within Palestine, the organization has managed to remain equidistant from both Hamas and Fatah, declining to join the Palestinian Authority while remaining a major proponent of national reconciliation. Despite periodic and sometimes violent tensions with each, it has generally managed to maintain constructive relations with both, and it coordinated closely with Hamas during Operation Protective Edge, Israel’s summer 2014 attack on Gaza.

Part I of the interview with Dr. Shallah appeared in JPS 174 (Winter 2015). The entire interview was translated by Dima Ayoub and originally appeared in JPS’s sister publication, Majallat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya #100, Autumn 2014.


What are your thoughts on the war on Gaza? And what are your views on overhauling the Palestinian national project?


I’d like to start by saying that Israel’s war on Gaza this time, a war that lasted fifty-one days, wasn’t just a random occurrence in the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict but a turning point in that history—and its impact has been commensurate with the scale of the attack in every respect. As to the future of the Palestinian national project, to be quite frank, I’m afraid, that in its current iteration that project is unable to fully integrate or absorb the achievements and accomplishments of the latest conflict—besides being incapable of addressing the postwar challenges or the destruction and devastation wrought by the war. My reservations stem from the depth of the crisis at hand, the total impasse that has led many to ask themselves if there even remains a Palestinian national project and, if so, what exactly it is. What are its goals? What are its methods, capabilities, or allies? And what are its prospects in light of the huge changes sweeping the region and the world?

Over two years ago already, I had stated that the national project spearheaded by the Palestinian Liberation Organization [PLO] and formulated as the two-state solution was finished. The reasons for such a conclusion are obvious and well-known. Does that mean that Hamas or Islamic Jihad has come up with an alternative? It’s not that simple. A national project is not like an electoral platform for establishing power in the shadow of the Israeli occupation, nor is it about the bullets or rockets fired by the resistance, despite the latter’s importance. In the case at hand, it’s a far more complicated project, it is an existential issue that goes to the core of the question of Palestine as a people and land, and it can be viewed only in the context of the entire history of the conflict [with Israel], whether present, past, or future.

As to the impact of the Gaza war on overhauling the national project, I will say that it will be determined by the following: first, what I would call the intra-Palestinian situation, that is, the internal dynamics and relationships between Palestinians, which have been and remain characterized by a deep split; second, the conflict with Israel—I will not say Palestinian-Israeli relations, because I can frame the Israeli occupation only from the vantage point of the conflict; third, the Islamic-Arab dimension, by which I mean the wider Arab and Islamic hinterland of Palestine, its holding vessel so to speak, and specifically, the support the Palestinian national project can rally; and last, the international community’s stance and, specifically, its position vis-à-vis the Palestinian people, their rights, their resistance, and their future.

Looking at those four factors through the prism of the Gaza war gives us an insight into the war’s impact on the Palestinian national project. Personally, my view is that overall, the impact can be considered positive, provided that we seize the historical moment and make it work in our favor.


What are your views on the question of national unity?


We can’t talk about national unity without addressing the issue of Palestinian nationalism, and that is something on which we all remain united—and that is to what I will be referring when I talk about the Islamists’ role.

We are still in the midst of a national struggle and the national movement has yet to achieve the goals that it set out to accomplish ever since the early days of the conflict. In the process of struggle for national liberation, unity is not an option: it is a duty, an existential necessity, and a prerequisite for every Palestinian—which is why we saw Palestinians raise the slogans, “the people demand an end to Palestinian division” and “the people demand the end of the occupation” simultaneously and spontaneously. Thus, ending the division and the occupation are inseparable goals because unity and liberty are two sides of the same coin. Still, the important question remains regarding the nature of such national unity. Is it a mere tactic to reap short-term gains or is it a strategy for the overall struggle? Unfortunately, ever since the Palestinian political establishment began going down the road of compromise, the issue of national unity has gone from being a strategic, long-term, and organizing principle of the struggle to a tactical, short-term, and minor consideration.

In the past, discussions of national unity began with a political agenda, and the concept of unity was both a measure of our work and the banner [under which it proceeded]. Today, just agreeing on the smallest political initiative has become difficult, and reaching consensus on a unified political platform is impossible. Given that, I consider it a major achievement that all the political factions were represented in the delegation attending the Cairo negotiations [to end the summer 2014 assault on Gaza]. Does this mean that we should abandon any hope of achieving national unity? Of course not! We must strive unrelentingly toward laying its foundations. In that regard, I believe that unity should not be discussed in terms of blood ties or destiny, nor in terms of history and land, since all these elements, which are generally regarded as constitutive of a nation, have already been compromised. I will enumerate the four founding principles that I consider essential to national unity.

First and foremost, our overall objective: In other words, what are the Palestinian people and their national movement seeking to accomplish? From the beginning of the conflict and until the interim platform of 1974,* the main goal of the movement was to liberate Palestine from the river to the sea [from the Jordan to the Mediterranean]. The 1974 platform trimmed that goal down to establishing a national authority in those areas that had been liberated. Later, after the Algiers Declaration of 1988 [when then-PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat declared Palestine a state], the objective shifted to establishing a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. Then there was Oslo, and the PLO’s recognition of Israel in exchange for “self-governance” in the West Bank and Gaza, ostensibly as a first step toward full-fledged statehood in the framework of a two-state solution. But in actual fact, Oslo went way beyond the 1974 interim platform. It established that a [Palestinian] state would recognize Israel, normalize relations with it, and back down on the [Palestinian] right of return and of self-determination, all of which had been explicitly ruled out by the interim platform, which had moreover stipulated that any governing Palestinian authority or state would be established on territory that was “liberated” by armed struggle and not obtained via negotiation.

To be succinct, no liberation movement in history has recognized the legitimacy of its enemy before achieving its own goals, barring utter defeat or surrender. The PLO recognized its enemy in exchange for being recognized as an organization! Even with a Palestinian position favorable to gradualism and the incremental achievement of political goals, the question of recognition and reconciliation should have been left up to the Palestinian people as a whole, and only once they had gained statehood. As it was, the Palestinian side was divested both of its goal [liberation] and the means to achieve it [armed struggle], and, furthermore, was required to guarantee the security of its enemy while being engaged in a struggle for national liberation! That was a grave mistake and it is the first item that needs revisiting in the framework of the Palestinian national project. Believe me, I’m not trying to place obstacles in the way of national unity, nor do I want to widen the gap between the different factions of the Palestinian liberation movement. What I am trying to do is set aside the illusion that we can attain the unattainable. The two-state solution is dead. The dream of establishing an independent Palestinian state via negotiations is impossible, first, because the balance of power precludes it and, second, because the directions for achieving such an outcome were drawn up in reverse order: recognition and reconciliation and the “renouncing of violence” before statehood—in other words capitulation—and forsaking the Palestinian gun or using it in the service of Israel! As far as we [Islamic Jihad] are concerned, recognizing Israel is unacceptable regardless, but here I’m shedding light on the historical mistake made by the chief decision-maker when he agreed to relinquish the overall objective before taking a single step toward a solution.

And now I come to the second element in this enumeration:How is the overall objective to be achieved, through negotiation or resistance? I think that both the negotiations process and the Gaza war answer that question. The former has reached a dead end, demonstrating the futility of the negotiated option, and the latter has shown us that there are prospects for resistance, which hinge on the Palestinian people’s continuing support for the resistance and their readiness to accept the very high cost involved.

Third, is the issue of institutions. In brief, we have two institutional players, the PLO and the Palestinian Authority or PA. The former has, in my opinion, become a burden, both to the Palestinian cause and to the people. The PLO has been at the forefront of the backsliding that has turned the conflict from one with Israel/the occupier into an intra-Palestinian struggle for power. The organization that was supposed to provide the solution has instead become the problem. Rather than being the inclusive and participatory structure that represents all Palestinians it was meant to be, the PLO has become a source of internal conflict between factions. Unfortunately, all efforts at reconfiguring the PLO have been largely in vain, and it’s not clear what the organization wants. Should it co-opt the Islamists into an organization that has recognized Israel? Or correct the mistake [of Oslo] and redirect the struggle so that it can once again embody the goal for which the organization was established? Your readers might be surprised to hear that such a question is not raised in PLO leadership meetings and that even when it is raised, it is never seriously addressed.

The fourth and last issue that goes to the core of national unity is the Israeli peril. By this I mean, the continuing settlement of the West Bank, the Judaization of Jerusalem, and the persistence of the blockade and devastating wars on Gaza. The brutality of the Zionists, their targeting of our land, our people, our sacred sites, as well as our history and geography should have us focusing on the true conflict, the one with Israel, and downplaying our own differences. The Israeli danger is undoubtedly a unifying element, but there will be no closing of ranks without a bold and transparent examination of the four factors I have just outlined. We cannot correct the errors that were made along the way or readjust our aim merely by deploying the rhetoric of slogans and yearning for unity without building consensus.


How do you envision the role of the Palestinian diaspora and the Palestinians of ’48 in the struggle for national unity?


One of the great perils of our situation as Palestinians is the absence of a unified society on a shared land. Palestinians today are dispersed in small communities across the world where they live under very different circumstances, in different environments, and with different concerns. True, Palestine unites them, but to what extent and for what purpose?

Palestinians are generally divided into three categories: the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza, those of ’48, and those in the diaspora. But that’s a very general classification, within which are a myriad of complex, arduous, and frustrating details. I believe that we are still paying the price of the Nakba and that its impact is ongoing, and I attribute that in large part to the political course taken by the Palestinian national movement, going all the way back to the interim [1974] platform, which basically disregarded the Palestinians of ’48 and the Palestinians living in the diaspora. Further concessions under Oslo limited the conflict and its possible solutions to the 1967 lines, which were defined in the accord as “disputed lands,” absolving Israel from the consequences of the Nakba, in other words, forsaking the Palestinians’ right of return. It is well known that the majority of Palestinians live in the diaspora, but what is their role? What are their rights? According to information that leaked out during the [Oslo] negotiations (and was verified by sources on both sides), Palestinian negotiators agreed to a maximum of one hundred thousand Palestinians returning to Palestine, out of the six million living in the diaspora. Under the Olmert government [2006–9], the State of Israel accepted the return of five thousand Palestinians, and the conditions of their return stipulated that they be chosen by Israel, that they return only to Gaza or the West Bank, and that their return take place over a span of five years! During the most recent round of negotiations [that broke down in July 2014 and were led by U.S. Secy. of State John Kerry], the issue of the right of return was dropped altogether while the Arab Initiative [of 2002] called for a “just solution to the problem of refugees” in accordance with United Nations [General Assembly] Resolution 194—none of this was new, as all of these initiatives recapitulated what was set forth in United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 [the so-called land-for-peace resolution of 1967] that makes no mention of Palestine in so many words, affirming only the necessity of “achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem.”

Palestinians in the diaspora who remain refugees have been victimized twice over: they lost their homeland as well as their homes during the Nakba, and are once again victims of the circumstances in which they live across the world. Take the example of the Palestinians in Syria and their experiences in the Yarmuk refugee camp. Look at how Palestinian refugees live in the camps in Lebanon. Palestinians everywhere are paying a heavy price for the violent upheavals all over the Arab world, sometimes to an even greater extent than the local populations. Today, Palestinian youth are faced with the choice to join extremist organizations, so-called Salafists, or immigrating to Europe, and drowning at sea on the way. What does the PLO do for these young people? Where is the authority of recourse that represents Palestinians everywhere?

As for the Palestinians of ’48, we know that in spite of their suffering and their bitter experience of egregious racial discrimination in Israel, their continued presence on the land of Palestine is one of the most important strategic assets of our cause. They are testimony to the untruth of the Zionist establishment’s claims and founding myths, and are flesh-and-blood obstacles in the way of Israel’s attempts to bring about a “Jewish state.” They are, as a result, the victims of a slow and mostly silent ethnic cleansing, especially in the larger cities of Haifa, Acre, Lydda, and in the Negev/Naqab, where they suffer house demolitions, land confiscations, internal displacement, and all manner of harassment. We saw how the Palestinians of ’48 demonstrated solidarity with the people of Gaza during the war. Despite the absence of a unified people living in a shared land, the solidarity of the Palestinians of ’48 with the people of Gaza demonstrates that Palestinians as a people have been able to maintain an overall sense of national unity. It also shows that despite their geographic dispersal, the people’s spirit cannot be broken, and neither can their will or their sense of belonging. No matter where they are or what their beliefs may be, Palestinians are one people with one cause.


You claim that the two-state solution is dead. You compared its current formulation with that of the interim platform, about which you also expressed reservations. What then, in the view of Islamic Jihad, is the solution?


Islamic Jihad doesn’t generally concern itself with proposing solutions or alternatives such as the two-state versus the one-state solution, for a number of reasons, chief among them the PLO’s experience. The PLO [under Oslo] offered what was termed a “historic compromise,” accepting the establishment of a state over 22 percent of the land [of historic Palestine], a proposal that was of course rejected by Israel.

We have no illusions, and are well aware that our problem is immensely complex because Israel’s settler-colonial enterprise is very different from other projects of colonial conquest. Israel is an invading settler-colonial state. The Israeli army does not consist of 180,000 regular soldiers and 400,000 reserves—it’s not like Algeria or Vietnam. The Israeli army is composed of every single Jewish inhabitant of the State of Israel, all of whom believe that the land of Palestine in its entirety—from the river to the sea—is the “Land of Israel” to which they have a providential right.

How are we supposed to deal with the Israelis, and what formula or solution could convince them to live side by side with the Palestinian “other” under a two-state solution or to coexist in one state?! Israel’s rejection of a compromise on the basis of even the most minimalist solution is due to the power imbalance: Israel considers itself the winner in the Arab-Israeli conflict and therefore feels entitled to impose an Israeli solution to the conflict under conditions which, essentially, do not go beyond self-rule, with some sort of linkage between the West Bank and Jordan.

This is why we believe that discussing frameworks and solutions—from Fatah’s original 1968 idea of a single democratic state, to the 1974 interim platform, and including the two-state framework—will have absolutely no effect whatsoever on the Zionist stance. The only thing that will produce change is maintaining the military pressure on Israel such that a shift occurs, both in the balance of power and in perception, thus allowing new parameters to emerge. That is the mission and work of the resistance, as we saw in Gaza, even if the PLO chooses to follow the negotiated settlement route. I think the late Yasir Arafat understood this quite well and was leaning that way during the second intifada—which is why they killed him.

Thus, based on the failure of the negotiated settlement option, we believe that despite the fact that there is no level playing field—as the international community continues to support a negotiated settlement that is basically an acquiescence to Israel’s demands, on the one hand, and persists in decrying and hemming in the resistance, on the other—it is our belief that thanks to its unshakeable resolve, the Palestinian people will prevail.

Consequently, I can state that our vision is for the struggle and resistance to continue until the entirety of the West Bank and Gaza Strip are freed from occupation unconditionally and without qualification. This should not be understood to mean that we are waiving our rights to Palestine within the 1967 borders, but only that we are aiming for a goal around which there is general agreement among Palestinians as well as broad support among the wider Arab and international communities—regardless of the fact that it could be pointed out that resistance to foreign occupation is sanctioned under international law. And by unconditionally and without qualification, we mean liberating the land with no obligation to recognize Israel or to forfeit any claims on the rest of Palestine.


What is the role of the Islamist currents in the overall national movement? And what is the nature of their relationship to the movement’s more secular groups?


To understand the role of the Islamists, we should set aside diplomatic niceties and be candid about the Palestinian national movement’s emergence and the historical circumstances attendant to its development. That is why I said earlier that the question of “Palestinian nationalism” must precede any discussion of Palestinian unity today.

The first iteration of “Palestinian nationalism” arose in the early part of the twentieth century, in the context of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, the Balfour Declaration in 1917, the defeat of the Ottomans in World War I, and the British occupation and Zionist colonization of Palestine. In response, there were the first stirrings of resistance: political parties were formed and nationalist leaders emerged during the 1920s and 1930s, including a movement led by Shaykh Izzeddin al- Qassam [who was educated at al-Azhar University]. The nationalist movement, placed under the leadership of Haj Amin al-Husayni (and I will not comment here on how that choice was made), was shaped by two defining ideas: confronting and resisting the Zionist project, on the one hand, and the wider Arab-Islamic dimension of the struggle, on the other. At the time, there was no problem of identity, nor a split or contradiction between the three elements of nationalism, Arabism, and Islam. As such, Haj Amin embodied a Palestinian nationalism that encompassed all three key elements and was thus inclusive of all.

The second iteration of Palestinian nationalism came about after the Nakba of 1948 and flourished during the 1950s and 1960s when it was subsumed under the broader pan-Arab movement, a left-leaning nationalist trend in the Arab world with a pronounced bias toward secularism. Thus, the Palestinian liberation movement became part of a broader pan-Arab struggle for liberation. Because of the [ideological] clash between nationalists and the Islamic current in the broader arena, that split between pan-Arabism and Islam in the Palestinian context meant that the Islamic dimension was overshadowed to the extent that it no longer formed part of the Palestinian national movement’s landscape. The movement thus lost its earlier cohesiveness, and now retained only one of its defining features, namely resistance to and struggle against the Zionist project, in the guise of a modern Palestinian revolution.

Following the 1967 Arab defeat [in the June War] and Fatah’s takeover of the PLO, whose establishment [in 1965] had expressed the Palestinian “totality” or whole, so to speak, the cause became infused with a strongly nationalistic spirit, undergoing “Palestinianization,” so to speak. As the call for national self-determination grew louder, the pan-Arab dimension now began receding from the picture, and the PLO charter changed from one that was “national” in the broad pan-Arab sense to one that was “nationalist” in the narrower Palestinian sense. This was now the third phase of the Palestinian national movement, which still maintained its commitment to confronting and resisting the Zionist project. The end of this phase witnessed the emergence of the Islamist currents, spearheaded by Islamic Jihad, and that paved the way for the Islamist return to the national fold; Hamas only emerged later, with the start of the first intifada in 1987.

Not to crow about our achievements, but as a matter of historical record, I’d like to note that the emergence of Islamic Jihad, followed by that of Hamas, brought about a significant shift in the conduct of the struggle, as it rectified the earlier imbalance in the Palestinian national movement. This not only restored the movement’s three-pronged cohesiveness (nationalism, Arabism, and Islam) but it also reinforced the notion of struggle against the Zionist project by way of resistance.

In order for the Islamist current not to be misunderstood as seeking to replace or take over the national movement, early on during the first intifada, Islamic Jihad adopted the concept of a nationalist collectivity that would subsume the three elements outlined above. But nobody was patient enough to give Palestinian nationalism the necessary time to recalibrate. Starting with Madrid [in 1991] and ending with Oslo in 1993, the emergent Islamist current was portrayed as a monster from which to run, so that the groundwork could be laid for an agreement with Israel. Don’t forget that the Oslo accords were arrived at by way of backdoor negotiations, conducted by Mahmoud Abbas, with the knowledge and under the direction of the late Yasir Arafat, with a view to establishing the PA, which was done by 1994. And this is when the fourth phase of Palestinian nationalism begins—and what a phase! Ever since, the national movement has undergone a process of gradual dismemberment if not outright disintegration. Where “Palestinianization” saw the shift from a national [read pan-Arab] charter to a strictly [Palestinian] nationalist one, then what some have termed “Israelization” in the shadow of Oslo has effectively obliterated the charter, specifically its provisions regarding the resistance struggle, and replaced it with the creation of the PA.

During this last phase, we have witnessed the systematic erasure of the two aforementioned distinguishing features of the national movement: its cohesiveness (and the inclusion of the Islamic current in the overall picture) and resistance against Israel. And now, it is the Islamists, and not Israel, who are portrayed as the danger because of their commitment to that resistance! Ever since the split between them, Hamas has become the enemy in Fatah’s view, and vice versa.

The proponents of Oslo never understood that closing the door to armed struggle against the enemy occupier would lay the national movement open to fighting within its own bosom over issues of identity, belonging, and power to the point that it would implode. That is why Islamic Jihad’s decision not to join the PA’s ranks not only demonstrates its refusal to serve the occupation, but it also reflects its sober understanding of the charade underway, namely creating “alternative enemies” within the Palestinian arena. This charade has now overtaken the politics of the entire region, such that today Iran is regarded as enemy, and not Israel.

If I were to sum up everything I’ve laid out here, I would say that Palestinian nationalism will neither survive nor thrive if it is severed from its broader Arab and Islamic contexts and if it forsakes resistance to the Zionist project while Palestine remains occupied.

As to the question of the relationship between the Islamist and secular elements of the movement, I think both sides bear a tremendous responsibility: the Islamist groups must not substitute the struggle against Israel with a struggle over Palestinian identity, and should be using dialogue as a means to promote understanding and coexistence; and the secular groups, for their part, must recognize that the Islamists’ existence is both a necessity and a national imperative if Palestinian nationalism is to recover the cohesiveness and equilibrium it enjoyed at its inception. Given what is happening in the region, these elements of balance and cohesiveness are needed today more than ever. Insofar as they are forces of moderation and mediation, Hamas and Islamic Jihad are essential to Fatah and the more left-leaning factions in order to guard against extremism in the Palestinian political arena. Those who today decry Hamas or Islamic Jihad will tomorrow find themselves faced by an alternative far more horrifying.


Can you shed more light on Islamic Jihad’s idea of a nationalist collectivity?

As I mentioned earlier,

Posted in Palestine AffairsComments Off on The Palestinian Resistance: Interview with Ramadan Shallah ‘Part II’

West Point Professor Calls For Military Strikes On Journalists Critical Of War On Terror

Professor William C. Bradford went as far as to publish a long academic paper in the National Security Law Journal that aggressively promotes suppressing dissent about military force, civilian casualties, and expanding military operations in the Middle East.

An assistant professor from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point recently declared that professionals critical of the “War on Terror” constitute a “treasonous” opposition that should be subject to military force.

He believes the U.S. should have the right to attack people who are critical of U.S. military operations — specifically, professionals, legal scholars, journalists, and other people effectively spreading ideas that oppose war.

Professor William C. Bradford went as far as to publish a long academic paper in the National Security Law Journal that aggressively promotes suppressing dissent about military force, civilian casualties, and expanding military operations in the Middle East.

Using the excuse that victims would be “lawful targets,” Bradford argues that “law school facilities, scholars’ home offices and media outlets where they give interviews” should be targeted with military force to suppress dissent. He asserted that the war on terror should be expanded“even if it means great destruction, innumerable enemy casualties, and civilian collateral damage.”

He further suggested that the U.S. should wage “total war” on “Islamism,” using “conventional and nuclear force and [psychological operations]” to “leave them prepared to coexist with the West or be utterly eradicated.”

He said that “Threatening Islamic holy sites might create deterrence, discredit Islamism, and falsify the assumption that decadence renders Western restraint inevitable.”

Despite his self-description as an “associate professor of law, national security and strategy,” a representative of the National Defense University has tried to distance the school from Bradford by saying he wasn’t part of the staff, but rather a contracted professor.

Sporting a long history of exaggeration and pro-military extremism, “He resigned from Indiana University’s law school in 2005 after his military record showed he had exaggerated his service,” according to The Guardian.

Though the man seems to be held in high esteem by the military, he spoke with such disregard for human rights that the National Security Law Journal had to apologize.

The NSLJ released a statement on the front page of its website, saying it

“…made a mistake in publishing [the] highly controversial article…”

“The substance of Mr. Bradford’s article cannot fairly be considered apart from the egregious breach of professional decorum that it exhibits,” it admitted.  “We cannot ‘unpublish’ it, of course, but we can and do acknowledge that the article was not presentable for publication when we published it, and that we therefore repudiate it with sincere apologies to our readers.”

Ironically, Bradford has a Master of Laws (LL.M.) degree from Harvard University with a focus in Human Rights Law.

This is a man who is apparently incorporating his violent philosophy into his teaching at West Point. He started on August 1st 2015 — after he published his article.

This is only the tip of the iceberg in forming a complete understanding of the ideological fabric held by many of the war hawks in U.S. Military.

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Obama’s Drone War Escalates In Syria, Despite Fueling Violence In Other Countries

The operations are separate from the 2,450 strikes, which have been launched in the U.S.-led military offensive in Syria.


In this Jan. 31, 2010 file photo, an unmanned drone flies over Kandahar Air Field, southern Afghanistan, on a moon-lit night. (AP Photo/Kirsty Wigglesworth)

President Barack Obama’s administration has apparently expanded covert drone operations in Syria in order to strike leaders of the Islamic State. But the expansion is destined to fail as much as previous operations in other countries, which have only fueled the rise of violent extremism.

A number of anonymous U.S. officials spoke to The Washington Post, for a September 1 report, about drone operations and how the CIA and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) are working together. The CIA and JSOC have been responsible for recent strikes on senior Islamic State operatives.

According to the Post, the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center (CTC) is identifying and locating “high-value targets.” JSOC is carrying out the strikes. The claimed legal authority for the strikes is the post-9/11 Authorized Use of Military Force for targeting al-Qaida.

The operations are separate from the 2,450 strikes, which have been launched in the U.S.-led military offensive in Syria. They apparently reflect a view among “counterterrorism officials” that the Islamic State continues to become more and more dangerous, and “conventional strikes” are not properly degrading the “group’s strength.”

The CIA and JSOC’s ability to mount “relatively small” and “nimble operations” in a “culture of near-total secrecy,” has been appealing to the Obama administration, according to author Daniel Klaidman’s book, “Kill or Capture.”

Klaidman argued JSOC is not required by law to brief Congress when it engages in clandestine operations. The lure of JSOC is that it has helped free Obama from the constraints of law and politics.

Freedom from accountability does not mean that relying on this secret army has worked. In 2014, the State Department reported on “serious threats” posed by the emergence of al-Qaida affiliates in Iraq, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, and parts of northwest Africa. These are countries where the U.S. has been relying on covert intelligence or military operations to fight terrorism.

In May 2012, The Washington Post reported that in Yemen, “An escalating campaign of U.S. drone strikes is stirring increasing sympathy for al Qaida-linked militants and driving tribesmen to join a network linked to terrorist plots against the United States.”

More than 100 drone strikes have been launched in Yemen since 2009, but Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has grown from 200 people in 2009 to “several thousand.”

As Amel Ahmed, a Yemeni freelance writer, suggested, “Al Qaida would not be in Yemen but for a discredited central government that has failed to provide its people with opportunities and better living conditions.”

Plus, the U.S.-backed war fought by Saudi Arabia in Yemen has strengthened AQAP. The U.S. has continued drone strikes against alleged al-Qaida fighters, even amidst a raging war between Saudis and Houthis where the Saudi government is not explicitly targeting al-Qaida. But these strikes do not seem to be noticeably diminishing the power of al-Qaida forces in Yemen.

Jeremy Scahill’s “Dirty Wars,” makes it immensely clear how this strategy has backfired.

The CIA backed Somali warlords were defeated by the Islamic Courts Union in the mid-2000s. “Blowback sparked by US policies in Somalia and abroad,” further inspired al-Qaida activity.

“The civilian tolls the wars were taking in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the abuses at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, gave credence to the perception that the United States was waging a war against Islam,” Scahill wrote. “While the United States backed its own warlords in Mogadishu, Washington’s post-9/11 actions led to the formation of a coalition of former warlords and religious movements that would challenge the rule of the U.S. proxies in Somalia.”

When Ethiopia got involved in the fighting, that further escalated the conflict. Malcolm Nance, a “career navy counterterrorist specialist who trained elite U.S. Special Operations Forces,” told Scahill, “The Shabab existed in a very small warlord-like infrastructure, prior to that, but once Ethiopia went in there—it’s pretty obvious that they were acting as a [U.S.] surrogate—al-Qaida said, ‘Great! New full-on Jihadi battlefront. We’ve got ’em here. We’ve got the Christian Ethiopians, we’ve got American advisers. Now we just create a new battlefront and we will reinvigorate East Africa’s al-Qaida organization.’ And that is exactly what happened.”

On September 1, Shabab militants reportedly “overran an African Union military base in southern Somalia.” The attack included a suicide bombing and a firefight. Shabab claimed it had killed 50 Ugandan peacekeepers. This happened about a month after the U.S. increased drone strikes to not only strike “high-value targets” but also defend troops on the ground.

Compared to Somalia and Yemen, Pakistan has managed to achieve a bit of success against militant groups in the past months with its own military offensive. Daud Khattak described how short-term victories have been won against the Taliban, and, “For the first time in the past several years, Pakistani security forces attained the undisputed support of the civilian leadership, including the political parties” as well as the “general public.”

Terrorist violence decreased for the first time since 2007. According to the Islamabad- based Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies, “militant attacks have dropped by 50 percent since the launch of Operation Zarb-e-Azb.”

Although a U.S. drone strike killed six alleged militants on September 2, the rate of drone strikes in Pakistan has dropped considerably since January. That may partly explain the support for the Pakistan military’s offensive.

A Pew Research Center poll published in 2014 found 66 percent of Pakistanis opposed drone strikes. It seems apparent that success against militant groups will come from the country’s own forces and not US forces, which are likely to fuel and attract responses from militant groups.

There is zero evidence to suggest that drones or other covert operations will be more effective against terrorist groups than the current US-led military offensive. However, no officials in Washington—including elected representatives in Congress—will challenge the use of drones.

The U.S. is already struggling with a CIA program involving the training of “moderate” Syrian rebels. “Al-Qaida-style extremists” have played a key role in the fight against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. They are militant Islamists, the same types the president has proudly placed on kill lists for assassination.

Aside from the ineffectiveness, these dirty wars stretch the boundaries of international law and result in the deaths of hundreds of civilians, even as the Obama administration insists drone technology is somehow more precise than other modes of warfare.

But do not expect to hear this reality confronted by anonymous U.S. officials, who agree to talk to The Post for an “occasional” series called “Confronting the ‘Caliphate.’”

Anonymous U.S. officials are only interested in their talking points on the rise of the Islamic State and U.S. efforts to fight the militant group. They depend on the propaganda value of a newspaper which will publish statements from them and produce features like this which avoid questioning the efficacy of transforming the world into a battlefield.

Posted in USA, SyriaComments Off on Obama’s Drone War Escalates In Syria, Despite Fueling Violence In Other Countries

Six Palestinian Journalists Kidnapped By Nazi Forces In August


Posted by: Sammi Ibrahem, Sr

Palestinians, this past month, have witnessed an escalation in the organized attack against Jerusalemite journalists during their coverage of the continued incursions of Al-Aqsa Mosque and the daily events in the city, in general.


The Union of Palestinian Radio and Television documented about 20 Nazi violations regarding the rights of Palestinian journalists and media staff working in Palestine this August.

The Union stated, in the monthly report issued on Thursday, that Nazi forces detained six Palestinian journalists and two photojournalists, including Hazem Obaid, who works for Al-Quds TV.

According to Al Ray, Obaid was detained while he was en route to travel via Al-Karama crossing. Authorities later extended his detention.

The number of journalists, writers and media activists detained in the Nazi Camp was up to 19 prisoners, by this time, to include Nidal Abu Aker, the director of Bethlehem’s Al-Wehda Radio and presenter of “In Their Cells” programs. Abu Aker has staged a continued hunger strike since August 20th, in protest against the administrative detention policy.

Palestinians, this past month, have witnessed an escalation in the organized attack against Jerusalemite journalists during their coverage of the continued incursions of Al-Aqsa Mosque and the daily events in the city, in general.

During Nazi latest Holocaust on the Gaza Strip, 17 journalists were reported killed by Nazi forces. According to the Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms (MADA), over 80 percent of Palestinian journalists were engaged in self-censorship by late October of 2014. In a dangerous precedent, Nazi police recently fined Palestine TV photojournalists and crew members of Russia Today TV, under the pretext of “obstruction” caused during their coverage to prevent the entry of worshipers to the Al-Aqsa Mosque from Al-Silsila gate.

After the incident, a request was reportedly submitted to the Nazi police for the arrest of the Al-Tamimi family, who were accused of “assaulting” the soldier.

Posted in Palestine Affairs, ZIO-NAZI, Human RightsComments Off on Six Palestinian Journalists Kidnapped By Nazi Forces In August

Yemen’s Hidden War: How The Saudi Zio-Wahhabi Led Coalition Is Killing Civilians

Along with the Saudi coalition’s bombing campaign, American warships have also helped to enforce a naval blockade that the Saudis say is necessary to prevent weapon shipments to the Houthis, whom they claim are supported by Iran. According to the U.N., this collective punishment has left the country “on the brink of famine.”

A man stands on the rubble of a wedding hall destroyed by a Saudi-led airstrike in Sanaa, Yemen, Friday, July 10, 2015.

A man stands on the rubble of a wedding hall destroyed by a Saudi-led airstrike in Sanaa, Yemen, Friday, July 10, 2015. More than 3,000 people have been killed since March, when a Saudi-led and U.S.-backed coalition began launching airstrikes against the rebels who seized control of the capital and other cities starting September. (AP Photo/Hani Mohammed)

Originally published at The Intercept.

IN THE ISLAMIC CONCEPT of qadar, your divine destiny is inescapable. If you try to cheat death it will find you. For two women on a dusty road in mid-June on the southwest corner of the Arabian Peninsula, their repeated attempts to dodge fate ended in tragic failure.

Leaving the war zone of Yemen’s southern port city of Aden on June 10, the women headed north in a Toyota Cressida driven by a male relative. The pair were escaping the violence that had already turned entire streets in Aden to rubble, left hundreds dead and thousands of civilians under siege, struggling to find food, water and medical care.

Driving ahead of them was a family of four in a Hilux pick-up truck, slowing at the numerous checkpoints along the road and weaving around potholes in the asphalt. Between 4:30 and 5 p.m., seemingly from nowhere, the first missile struck. The Hilux flipped into a cartwheeling fireball, killing the two children and their parents inside.

Before the women in the Toyota had a chance to compose themselves an ominous whistle preceded a second missile, which smashed into the ground beside them and sent their car careering off the road into the dusty scrubland. Twice in the space of just a few minutes the women had stared death in the face.

Dressed in black abiyas — the uniform dress code of women in Yemen — they clambered out of their sand-bound car. Seeing the two stranded women, Mohammed Ahmed Salem pulled over in his bus. Salem was taking his 25-year-old daughter to the province of Lahj and had filled his bus with passengers to help pay for the fuel. The passengers made room for the two women, who left their male relative to wait for a family member to help recover the crashed Toyota. But as they thanked God for their narrow escape, the third and final missile came out of the sky. The bus and some 10 passengers were obliterated.

The names of the dead did not even make news in the local press in Aden. This form of death is now commonplace amid a war so hidden that foreign journalists are forced to smuggle themselves by boat into the country to report on an ongoing conflict that the U.N. says has killed more than 4,500 people and left another 23,500 wounded.

On one side of the conflict is the U.S.-backed coalition of nations led by Saudi Arabia supporting Yemen’s president-in-exile, Abd Rabu Mansour Hadi. Their adversaries are the predominantly Shiite Houthi fighters who hail from the northern province of Saada that abuts the Saudi border, along with soldiers from renegade military units loyal to the country’s former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh.

A March 30 airstrike on a public bus in the Khormakser district of Aden, Yemen, left four dead, including one child. Photo: Iona Craig

A March 30 airstrike on a public bus in the Khormakser district of Aden, Yemen, left four dead, including one child. Photo: Iona Craig

In March, the Saudis — aided by U.S. and British weapons and intelligence — began a bombing campaign in an attempt to push back the Houthis, who they see as a proxy for Iran. Since then, from the northern province of Saada to the capital Sanaa, from the central cities of Taiz and Ibb to the narrow streets at the heart of Aden, scores of airstrikes have hit densely populated areas, factories, schools, civilian infrastructure and even a camp for displaced people.

From visiting some 20 sites of airstrikes and interviews with more than a dozen witnesses, survivors and relatives of those killed in eight of these strikes in southern Yemen, this reporter discovered evidence of a pattern of Saudi-coalition airstrikes that show indiscriminate bombing of civilians and rescuers, adding further weight to claims made by human rights organizations that some Saudi-led strikes may amount to war crimes and raising vital questions over the U.S. and Britain’s role in Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen.

(The number of civilian casualties has not been officially collated or recorded by NGOs or aid agencies. Only a handful of humanitarian and independent human rights organizations have had a presence on the ground in Aden, while nationwide just a small fraction of the strikes have even been independently documented. The death tolls for the eight strikes, which include five on public buses, were given by witnesses, or those who collected the dead after the strikes, and are necessarily imperfect; the total ranges from 142 up to 175.)

“The Obama administration needs urgently to explain what the U.S.’s exact role in Saudi Arabia’s indiscriminate bombing campaign is,” said Cori Crider, strategic director at the international legal group Reprieve. “It very much looks like there is a case to answer here — not just for the Saudis, but for any Western agencies who are standing behind them. International law shuns the intentional targeting of civilians in war — and in the United States it is a serious federal crime.

These civilian deaths occurred in strikes that account for just a handful of the thousands of bombing raids carried out by the Saudi-led coalition since its aerial campaign began. Of particular concern are the U.S.-style “double tap” strikes — where follow-up strikes hit those coming to rescue victims of an initial missile attack — which became a notorious trademark of covert CIA drone strikes in Pakistan. On July 6, for instance, at least 35 rescuers and bystanders were killed trying to help scores of traders hit in a strike five minutes earlier on a farmers market in Fayoush, in Yemen’s Lahj province.

Abdul Hamid Mohammed Saleh, 30, was standing on the opposite side of the road when the first missile hit the gathering of more than 100 men who had been arriving since before 6 a.m. to trade goats and sheep at the daily market. The initial blast, he told me, killed around a dozen men and injured scores more. Body parts flew through the air, and an arm landed next to Saleh. He said he began to flee, but hearing the screams of the injured he turned back and crossed the road to try and help. The second strike landed less than 30 yards from him, sending shrapnel flying into his back.

Mohammed Awath Thabet, a 52-year-old teacher who helped collect the bodies of the dead after the twin strike, said at least 50 people, all civilians ranging from teenagers to men in their 60s, were killed in total. “After 50 it was hard to tell,” Thabet said. “The rest were all body parts. People cut to pieces. What parts belonged to who? We couldn’t tell. Some were animal parts. Some were human,” he added, pointing to a brown stain on a nearby cinderblock wall left by a man’s head that had been stuck to it by the force of the blast. He and other witnesses said that there were no conceivable military targets or Houthi fighters in the area.

On June 12, six days after an airstrike split a large public transport bus in two on the edge of Aden’s Dar Saad district, Lami Yousef Ali, 23, found the decomposing body of his 28-year-old brother, Abdu, still entangled in the wreckage. Lami and Abdu had been chatting via WhatsApp moments before the bus was bombed, and their father, Yusef Ali, also died in the strike, which killed at least 16 civilians. According to witnesses, this bombing also hit two cars carrying Houthi fighters. (This is the only case of the eight strikes investigated in which Houthi fighters appear to have been the target rather than civilians.) Although no remnants of the cars are visible at the strike site, the twisted metal of the bisected bus still lies in the sand, rusting in the scorching heat of Aden’s summer sun. In the background the familiar sound of distant bombings resonates from the shifting front lines as the battle moves on.

On April 25 a fighter jet bombed a public bus towing another bus carrying Somali refugees from the isolated Kharaz refugee camp, 93 miles northwest of Aden. Forced to take a winding back route to Aden because of fighting on the main road, the shambling convoy was hit around 11 a.m by at least two strikes in the remote desert scrublands of Lahj.

Mustafa al-Abd Awad said he lost his brother, Mohammed, a father of seven. When Awad went to the site to recover his brother’s body, he counted more than 30 others in the ashes of the two burnt-out buses. Other relatives who went to collect their dead said the total killed was as high as 52. “They take everything from us,” shouted Awad, gesturing toward a cloudless sky. “Why? Tell me why.”

Mohammed Hussein Othman, posing for a selfie (L), was later killed by an airstrike that hit the public bus he was traveling in on April 25 in Lahj, Yemen (R). Photo: (selfie) Mohammed Hussein Othman (Othman deceased) Abdulkhader Hussain Othman

Mohammed Hussein Othman, posing for a selfie (L), was later killed by an airstrike that hit the public bus he was traveling in on April 25 in Lahj, Yemen (R).
Photo: (selfie) Mohammed Hussein Othman (Othman deceased) Abdulkhader Hussain Othman

Mohammed Hussein Othman, 23, was also killed that day, leaving behind his 4-year-old son, Rashid, who had already lost his mother at birth. “My Dad went to heaven to be with my Mum,” said the little boy, sitting in the lap of his grandmother, Itisam, while the older woman smiled at selfies taken by her son shortly before his death.

These erroneous Saudi-led strikes have not just hit remote desert roads. In the Crater district of Aden, nestled in the heart of a dormant volcano, at least 18 civilians were killed on April 28, including a family of seven. The crumbling buildings and carcasses of cars left behind suggest that multiple strikes hit the narrow residential street. The facade of one house torn open by bombs exposes furniture and family possessions like a child’s doll house; just a few yards away a school, mosque and maternity clinic all lie in ruins.

Along with the Saudi coalition’s bombing campaign, American warships have also helped to enforce a naval blockade that the Saudis say is necessary to prevent weapon shipments to the Houthis, whom they claim are supported by Iran. According to the U.N., this collective punishment has left the country “on the brink of famine,” with desperate shortages of food, medical supplies and fuel — vital not only for transportation but for pumping increasingly scarce water from the depths of the country’s depleted water tables. Four out of five Yemenis are now in need of humanitarian assistance.

To add to the worsening humanitarian crisis, on August 18 Saudi-led fighter jets bombed the port in the northern city of Hodeidah, a main supply route for aid agencies, while on the outskirts of Aden white sugar spills into shredded sacks of flour. Hundreds of pounds of vital food supplies lie ruined in bombed-out warehouses.

While protesters have taken to the streets of the capital, Sanaa, in the thousands to demonstrate against the bombings, in Aden green Saudi flags flutter in the sea breeze at checkpoints, and street vendors sell posters of Saudi Arabia’s King Salman in acknowledgement of the Kingdom’s support in the battle to remove the Houthi Saleh forces from their city. Unlike northern Yemen, where sympathy for the Houthis is strongest, many southerners are reluctant to blame their Saudi neighbors for the civilian casualties.

Some observers, such as Human Rights Watch, say evidence shows many of the Saudi-led strikes appear to be “serious laws-of-war violations,” while others stress that the many civilian deaths are a result of error. In Aden, where scores of civilians have also been killed in a ground war that raged for over four months, Southern Resistance fighters place blame for the deaths on the poor coordination between the anti-Houthi militias and their coalition partners in Riyadh. “It was not organized,” said tax director and Southern Resistance supporter Mohammed Othman of the Saudis’ first attempt at managing a modern war. “Those calling in the strikes were old commanders who don’t know the recent layout of the city.” (A day after our meeting, Othman was shot dead by a Houthi sniper.)

Brig. Gen. Ahmed Assiri, spokesperson for the Saudi-led coalition forces, denied air strikes had targeted civilians and rescuers, or civilian infrastructure. When asked to comment, he said that “It is not a good story to talk about,” and also that he welcomed any United Nations investigation into the strikes.

But some on the ground in the south still find it difficult to absolve the Saudi-led coalition. Shukri Ali Saeed said he was driving his flatbed truck from Lahj into Aden on June 18, the first day of the holy month of Ramadan, when it was hit by an airstrike. Two men sitting alongside him were killed. With both his legs broken and suffering from third degree burns, Saeed dragged himself out of the upturned truck. He lay on the side of the road for more than two hours before someone came to help him. Two months later Saeed is still in the hospital. At night the sound of the incoming missile haunts him when he tries to sleep. “I can’t blame the Houthis,” said Saeed from his hospital bed. “It’s clear who is responsible.”

Last week, 23 human rights organizations called on the United Nations Human Rights Council to create an international commission of inquiry to investigate alleged violations of international laws by all sides in the ongoing conflict. This includes the U.S. and Britain. Some 45 U.S. advisers are currently assisting the Saudi coalition from joint operations centers in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, while the American government has also supplied intelligence, in-flight refueling of fighter jets, and weapons, including, according to rights organizations, banned U.S. cluster munitions.

America’s continued support of Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen comes as Saudi-U.S. relations have been strained by President Obama’s pursuit of a nuclear deal with the Kingdom’s regional nemesis, Iran. Adam Baron, a visiting fellow with the European Council on Foreign Relations, suggests that the U.S. has been more eager to conciliate Saudi Arabia than usual, “because they want them and the other Gulf States to at least not actively oppose the Iran deal.”

A U.S. Department of Defense spokesperson responded: “We take all accounts of civilian deaths due to the ongoing hostilities in Yemen seriously. We continue to provide logistical and intelligence support to the Saudi-led coalition in response to ongoing aggressive Houthi military actions. We have asked the Saudi government to investigate all credible reports of civilian casualties and to undertake urgent steps in response if these reports are verified.”

Meanwhile, the U.S.-backed bombing campaign continues into its sixth month and Yemen’s largely hidden war endures; its civilians struggle to survive, with little influence over their fate. “We don’t know when or where death will come, where the next bullet or bomb will drop,” said Itisam, staring at a picture of her dead son’s gray, dismembered body wedged under the undercarriage of a bus. “Only God knows.”


Posted in Saudi Arabia, YemenComments Off on Yemen’s Hidden War: How The Saudi Zio-Wahhabi Led Coalition Is Killing Civilians

Obama Secures Veto-Proof Majority On Iran Deal

Still, experts warn that a ‘resolution of disapproval’ could ‘undermine and eventually unravel the deal’.

Barbara Mikulski (D-Maryland) said Wednesday that she will support President Obama's nuclear deal with Iran. (Photo: NASA HQ/flickr/cc)

Barbara Mikulski (D-Maryland) said Wednesday that she will support President Obama’s nuclear deal with Iran. (Photo: NASA HQ/flickr/cc)

In what supporters are hailing as a victory for diplomacy and peace, the nuclear deal between Iran and six world powers now appears guaranteed to survive a Republican-led congressional challenge.

Sen. Barbara Mikulski (D-Md.) said on Wednesday that she will support President Barack Obama’s nuclear deal with Iran, giving the White House the 34 votes needed to sustain a presidential veto of a congressional resolution of disapproval if Republicans pass such a measure later this month.

National Iranian American Council (NIAC) Action executive director Jamal Abdi called Mikulski’s announcement “a major milestone that ensures the Iran agreement can move forward despite the millions of dollars and misinformation pumped out by opponents in an effort to kill the deal.”

However, Abdi added that “work for the agreement’s supporters is not done,” noting that nearly the entire Republican presidential field has pledged to nullify the agreement if they take the White House, and that the opposition is still working on a “resolution of disapproval” that could “undermine and eventually unravel the deal.”

Supporters of the nuclear agreement will now work to secure at least 41 votes in the Senate to block such a resolution and keep Obama from having to use his veto power in the first place.

As the Washington Post reported, Mikulski’s “vote now potentially clears the way for other undecided senators to support the deal. There are 10 Democrats who remain undeclared—if seven more of those senators vote for the deal, Obama might not need to pick up his veto pen at all. If 41 senators support the agreement, deal backers could successfully filibuster the resolution of disapproval and the pact will stand.”

According to a new University of Maryland poll, the majority of Americans support the Iran deal, with 55 percent of respondents saying Congress should get behind the agreement, despite some concerns.

But Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who had personally lobbied U.S. lawmakers to block the nuclear pact, will continue fighting the agreement, an Israeli official said. And Marshall Wittmann, spokesman for the pro-Israel lobby AIPAC, said his group also would continue rallying opposition to the nuclear agreement.

Meanwhile, the Associated Press reports:

In a letter delivered to Congress Wednesday, Secretary of State John Kerry called Israel’s security “sacrosanct,” recounting the billions of dollars the U.S. has provided the Jewish state for missile defense and other security assistance. U.S. and Israeli officials, he said, are working on a deal to “cement for the next decade our unprecedented levels of military assistance.”

The letter was sent as Kerry defended the Iran deal in Philadelphia. His speech was carried live in Iran, an unusual occurrence.

“Rejecting this agreement would not be sending a signal of resolve to Iran, it would be broadcasting a message so puzzling that most people across the globe would find it impossible to comprehend,” Kerry told lawmakers and civil leaders at the National Constitution Center.

Civil society groups and citizens of Iran, the U.S., and the world have joined with academics, faith leaders, and lawmakers to mount a wide-ranging campaign in support of the deal—and by extension, in support of peace in the Middle East and beyond.

Indeed, one of the great victories of the Iran nuclear debate is the potential for “a paradigm shift with regard to Iran that is in lock step with the preferences of a majority of war weary Americans,” wrote Trita Parsi and Reza Marashi of the National Iranian American Council on Tuesday. “[Obama] knows that the American public overwhelmingly prefers diplomacy and opposes war when it comes to both Iran’s nuclear program andAmerica’s projection of power around the world.”

The Senate and House of Representatives are expected to take up the issue as soon as they return to Washington, D.C. on September 8 after their August recess.

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Crashed drone sparks US Open security concerns


A drone crashed at the US Open Thursday, causing a match to be interrupted after it flew over the Flushing Meadows complex.

Police officers investigate the sight after a drone crashed in the corner of Louis Armstrong Stadium during a match. — AP
Police officers investigate the sight after a drone crashed in the corner of Louis Armstrong Stadium during a match. — AP

The drone crashed in the corner of the Louis Armstrong Stadium in the latter stages of a women’s singles clash between Italy’s Flavia Pennetta and Monica Niculescu of Romania.

“I feared the drone was a bomb,” Pennetta told Tennis World Italia in an interview.

“With all the news out there, I thought it was over. My team was so scared.”

US Open organisers said the incident was under investigation.

“At approximately 8:27pm on Thursday, a drone flying from the east flew into the southwest corner of Louis Armstrong Stadium during the Flavia Pennetta vs. Monica Niculescu match,” said a tournament spokesman.

“No spectators were in the immediate area of the crash and there were no injuries.”

“The New York Police Department (NYPD) responded and is conducting an ongoing investigation.

There was a similar incident at Wimbledon in July as some of the world’s top players warmed up for the Grand Slam in south-west London.

Police were alerted to a man flying a drone over the All England Club from a nearby golf course in contravention of British law, which states that it is an offence to fly a drone within 50 metres of a structure.

Drones have become a security concern at major sporting events since October, when a Euro 2016 qualifier between Serbia and Albania ended with the match abandoned after a drone carrying a political banner was flown into the stadium.

Players clashed when the drone and flag were pulled to the ground and the Albania players refused to play on after being attacked by Serbian fans.

Also last year, a suspected drone pilot was arrested after a device was flown over Eastlands during Manchester City’s Premier League match against Tottenham.

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For Syrian refugees, journey to Europe begins on social media


Syrian migrants take a picture after their safe arrival on an overcrowded dinghy to the coast of the southeastern Greek island of Kos from Turkey, on August 15, 2015. —AFP
Syrian migrants take a picture after their safe arrival on an overcrowded dinghy to the coast of the southeastern Greek island of Kos from Turkey, on August 15, 2015. —AFP

Would-be migrants hoping to flee war in the Middle East are using Facebook as their compass for finding the human smugglers they hope will get them to a better life in Europe.

The US-based website and other social media that were once used to help mobilise the “Spring” uprisings now host information services for those escaping the Syrian civil war and other conflicts in the region.

There refugees can find much of what they need to know, right down to the prices, fees, bribes they will have to pay on a journey fraught with dangers ranging from drowning at sea to suffocating in a lorry.

On top of this, messaging apps such as WhatsApp and Viber help them en route to contact smugglers, friends and families alike while Internet mapping ensures they don’t get lost.

In Facebook groups set up in Arabic, users post phone numbers of contacts they say can take refugees from the Turkish coast to nearby Greek islands or even further into Europe, a continent struggling to cope with the migration crisis.

For those seeking a boat ride to Greece, details on where best to cross the Serbian-Hungarian border, or the price for being smuggled all the way from Turkey to Germany, users of these groups appear to offer many of the answers.

An ad posted this week offered a late availability seat in rubber dinghy departing from the Turkish seaside city of Izmir, one of the main points of departure for Syrian refugees trying to reach Greece. The price: $1,200.

Trip is tomorrow, 100 per cent, for sure,”it said. ‘ll give you a free life jacket.”Another post offered places on a more comfortable yacht at $2,800.

Facebook guides refugees before they even leave Syria, said Muhammed Salih Ali, head of the Izmir-based Association for Solidarity With Syrian Refugees.

Many are told on Facebook pages to make their way to the Izmir district of Basmane, the informal headquarters in Turkey for traffickers and those hoping to make the passage are able to make contact on Facebook with intermediaries.

Once they are in Basmane, they can also spend three or five days at hotels and investigate their options.

They speak with others about which smuggler is more affordable or has a reputation for safety,”he said in an interview.

Facebook users also exchange the latest news coverage from Europe on the crisis, including one story about German football fans unfurling banners welcoming refugees.

Another article covered Hungary’s efforts to reinforce its border with Serbia to slow the flow of humanity. A trip all the way from Istanbul to Germany costs 6,000 euros, according to one advert on Facebook.

One user uploaded a video purporting to show a group of men wearing lifejackets celebrating as they arrived in a boat on the Greek island of Lesbos. A caption with the video offered two phone numbers for future customers.

Some refugees make the entire journey from Syria using one agent. Hafez, a 31-year-old refugee from Damascus, said he had found his via social networks.

“We use our smart phones primarily, to have a GPS signal so we don’t get lost,”said a Syrian refugee who gave his name as Ahmad at a Budapest railway station, where he was camping last week with hundreds more refugees.

“We use social media, including WhatsApp, Viber or Facebook to communicate with people we know. If they are already in western Europe, they send information back to us to help us navigate the route,” he said. “That includes contact information for smugglers sometimes, as well as things to watch out for.”

Turkey is hosting about 1.9 million Syrian refugees fleeing a war that shows no sign of abating, many more people are heading all the time to the EU via neighboring Greece.

A trip all the way from Istanbul to Germany costs 6,000 euros, according to one advert on Facebook.

The UN refugee agency has registered more than 4 million Syrian refugees across the Middle East, with another 7 million driven from their homes inside the country by the war in which an estimated 250,000 people have been killed.

Posted in SyriaComments Off on For Syrian refugees, journey to Europe begins on social media

Drowned Syrian boys, mother buried in Kobani

Drowned Syrian boys, mother buried in Kobani
Drowned Syrian boys, mother buried in Kobani
Two Syrian toddlers who drowned with their mother as they were trying to reach Greece were laid to rest in the Syrian town of Kobani on Friday, a Reuters witness said.

A photograph of the body of one of the toddlers, 3-year-old Alan Kurdi, washed up on the shore, appeared in newspapers around the world this week, prompting sympathy and outrage at the perceived inaction of developed nations in helping refugees.

Alan died along with his brother, Galib, 5, and their mother, Reham.

Abdullah Kurdi wept as the bodies of his sons and wife were buried alongside each other in the “Martyrs’ Ceremony” in the predominantly Kurdish town of Kobani, also known as Ayn al-Arab, near at the border with Turkey.

Speaking at the border crossing, Kurdi said he hoped the death of his family would encourage Arab states to help Syrian refugees.

“I want from Arab governments – not European countries – to see (what happened to) my children, and because of them to help people,” he said in footage posted online by a local radio station,cbs news reports.


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